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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTI ON
IT is apparent that the spirit of democracy which
brooded over the enfranchisemen t of men without
regard to rank, religion, or property has inspired
the movement for equality of legal and political
status without regard to sex. The history of the
legal and political status of women in Iowa from
1838 to 1918 is typical of the development of the
movement in the United States.
BENJ. F. SHAMBAUGH
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT AND EDITOR
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA

lowA

CITY

lowA

AUTHOR'S PREFACE
IN the preparation of this monograph the writer has
attempted to present a general survey of the status of
women in Iowa by pointing out the distinctions between
men and women which have been established by law or
sanctioned by judicial rulings. The status of women
with reference to activities which are not regulated either
directly or indirectly by the government is outside the
scope of this monograph and is not discussed in these
pages. Thus the position of women in religious and
other similar organizations has not been considered since
this does not concern their status as citizens.
'
Furthermore, all laws of a general nature applying
equally to men and women have received only incidental
mention, although such laws are often of vital importance
to women. In this class belong the laws concerning
public utilities, protection of life and property, public
health, and municipal administration. Unless otherwise
specified or plainly inapplicable to both sexes, Iowa
statute laws governing civil rights and obligations may
be assumed to apply equally to men and women. Laws
concerning political matters, on the contrary, refer to
male citizen_s only unless women are specifically included.
vii
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In some cases it has seemed advisable to include a
brief discussion of certain aspects of the status of
women which show little or no legal discrimination
against women. Thus the admission of women to the
public schools, to institutions of higher education, and
to the professions has been discussed, although the Iowa
laws show but little difference between men and women
in such matters. There are two reasons for including
these subjects: first, because such privileges are largely
furnished at the expense of the State; and secondly, because the equality which has prevailed in Iowa is by no
means general throughout the United States and ought
not to be taken for granted. Teaching has been included
for the same reasons, and also because the teacher in
State supported schools is in one sense a public official.
In this study of the various aspects of the status of
women in Iowa it has been necessary to consult such
sources as the session laws of Iowa, the codes of Iowa
law, and the Iowa Supreme Court reports. These pages,
however, are in no sense intended as a contribution to
law and jurisprudence: the effort of the writer has been
rather to ascertain the principles which have governed
the status of women in Iowa and to describe the situation
in non-technical language. And in this connection it may
be well to explain that since this monograph is limited
for the most part to the discussion of the legal and political status of women in Iowa, references to court reports,
House and Senate journals, and other public documents
refer to Iowa unless otherwise stated.
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-A history of the status of women in Iowa divides
itself naturally into two parts: the political position of
women, and their status in civil affairs. Logically, the
former should be discussed first, since it is theoretically
the source and guarantee of all other rights ; but historically the advance of women in civil affairs takes
precedence. Consequently, it has seemed advisable to
study first the position of women under the Common
Law and the gradual evolution of her personal, educational, and property rights. Along with these successive
advances has come an almost negligible increase in the
actual participation of women in public administration.
At the same time women have exerted a very powerful
indirect influence in public affairs which has, to some
extent, made further progress possible.
It has not been the intention of the writer to portray
the men and women of Iowa as hostile classes. The line
of cleavage between the advocates and opponents of
measures concerning the status of women has usually
separated progressives from conservatives - groups in
which both men and women are to be found. Furthermore, there is no evidence that injustice to women has
been desired by the electorate, although the voters have
usually looked upon proposed changes with distrust.
In many respects Iowa is fairly typical of the northern States in its treatment of women. Though less progressive than the western Commonwealths, it has been
more progressive than many of the eastern States; and
it is far in advance of the South, which still adheres to
most of the Common Law rules concerning the position
of women - more especially married women.
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Throughout the preparation of the monograph, the
writer has been greatly indebted to Dr. Benj. F.
Shambaugh, under whose direction the work was carried on, for advice and encouragement and for the final
editing of the manuscript. Helpful suggestions and
advice were also received from Dr. Frank E. Horack,
Dr. Dan E. Clark, and Professor E. A. Wilcox. Mr.
V. Diamonon assisted in the verification of the manuscript.
RUTH
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF
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PART I
CIVIL RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IOWA

1

I
INTRODUCTION: THE COMMON LAW
THE Common Law of England became to a large extent
the fundamental law of the English-speaking American
colonists; and with certain modifications and adaptations
to American conditions, it has been incorporated into the
jurisprudence of practically all the States which have
been organized since the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Little by little much of the Common Law
discriminating between men and women has been superseded by statute law, until now, especially in Commonwealths like Iowa, only in rare cases is the Common Law
resorted to in judicial decisions.
Since the Common Law has been in force in Iowa, and
is still followed in cases not covered by statute law, it will
be worth while to examine briefly such of its principles as
dealt with the legal status ·o f women. Indeed, such a
study will constitute an historical background for the
discussion of the status of women in Iowa. Here only
the provisions of the Common Law which distinguished
between men and women in the matter of legal rights and
privileges will be discussed, although women were directly or indirectly affected by the administration of the
general law.
The most striking feature of the Common Law in
respect to women was the distinction between those who
were married and those who were single. An unmarried
woman was, in most respects, legally entitled to nearly
all the civil rights and privileges accmded to men: at
3
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the same time, because of her subordinate position in the
family and because she lacked the physical force to assert
her rights she did not actually enjoy many of the advantages the law gave her. Among these were the right to
own property, the right to make valid contracts, the
right to act as administrator, and the right to assume
other financial obligations on practically the same terms
as men. Political rights, except for the Queen, were undreamed of by women in an age when force was the
undisputed foundation of political power.
The position of a married woman, or f eme cov ert as
she was legally termed, was very different in law from
that of a single woman. A girl might make a valid marriage contract at the age of twelve, although, by an early
statute, a clergyman who performed the ceremony might
be fined if the bride was under sixteen and did not have
the consent of her father or guardian. In case the girl
was wealthy, the husband could be deprived of her property if the consent of the father or guardian was lacking. 1
By entering into a marriage contract a woman lost
her legal personality for the period of the marriage, or
during her coverture as the wife's condition was called.
Her husband became her baron or lord and she ceased to
have a separate existence before the law except under
certain conditions. For this reason a husband could
make no contract with the wife nor could he give her
property, since the Common Law recognized but one
person -the husband. Thus, since a person can not
make a contra'3t with himself, receive a gift from himself, or give anything to himself, all transactions of the
kind mentioned between the husband and wife were invalid.2
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Furthermore, the Common Law deprived the wife of
the control of her real property and she lost even the title
to all personal property in her possession, even though it
had been acquired before the marriage, which was declared to be "an absolute gift to the husband of the
goods, chattels and personal estate of which the wife was
actually or beneficially possessed at the time of the marriage, and of all such as shall come to her during coverture. '' 3
An exception to this rule was made in the law concerning the rights of the Queen, since she was under no
such disability as to property rights or the right to make
contracts. The King's wife could sue and be sued alone,
might receive a grant from her husband, and was in general treated as a / eme sole. This was explained as an
attempt to relieve the King of the care of his wife's
property since he had the care of the state. Another
exception was also found in London where custom permitted a married woman to carry on trade and made her
responsible for her debts. 4
For the most part, however, the husband was given
control of his wife's property and she was enleast
at
tirely disqualified from making any arrangements concerning it. In prescribing the terms of the husband's
rights to the wife's property, the Common Law established three general classes with slight variations for
each. These may be designated as real estate, choses in
action, and personal property in the immediate possession of the owner.
The wife's real estate did not become the husband's
while the wife lived, although there were so few restrictions on his control over it that it was his in fact until

6
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his death if there were children or until the wife's death
if there were none and he could sell or lease his interest
in the property without the wife's consent. The right of
the husband to the wife's property after her death, if he
survived her, was generally called a title by curtesy and
began as soon as a child was born alive. Before this, in
feudal times, the husband and wife were both to do
homage for the wife's lands; but after the birth of a
child the husband, as the guardian of the heir, could do
homage for it alone. Some peculiar exceptions to this
rule are to be found in the early Common Law treatises.
For example, a husband had no title by curtesy in the
real estate of his wife if she were an idiot, for then she
was under the guardianship of the King. Furthermore,
the child must be capable of inheriting the mother's
estate, for, if only a male heir was entitled to it, the birth
of a daughter conveyed no right to the husband. 5
A second class of property was that in the immediate
possession of the wife at the time of the marriage such as clothing, jewelry, and house furnishings. These
became the husband's absolutely and could be sold, taken
for the husband's debts, or destroyed by him without the
wife's consent. The wife's clothing and jewelry, designated as her "paraphernalia", could not, however, be
willed away from her, and she secured possession of them
at the death of the husband provided he had not sold or
give!\ them away while he was alive or his creditors did
not take them for his debts if he became insolvent. 6
Another kind of property was usually designated as
choses in action. This consisted of notes, bank stock, or
other chattels not in the immediate possession of the
owner. The husband was entitled to the absolute owner-
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ship of these by Common Law, if he reduced them to
possession during the marriage. If he required the aid
of the courts of equity in securing possession of such
property, it was necessary for him to make a reasonable
provision for the wife; otherwise she had no right to it or
to the profits from it. Even this exception was barred if
the wife was found guilty of adultery. The wife's personal property was subject to the husband's debts and
was forfeited by his crimes.7
A married woman could not dispose of her personal
property either by sale or will without the consent of the
husband, although the latter right might be secured by
an antenuptial agreement. She could not act as an administrator without her husband's concurrence; nor
could she make a contract, although she could bind her
husband for necessaries - a power which was lost if the
wife left the husband without cause. It is evident that
this rule was not interpreted in favor of the wife, for it
was once decided that the wife was not justified in leaving her husband's home even when he introduced an
immoral woman into it. 8
A wife could purchase an estate, however, without the
consent of her husband, provided he did not definitely
forbid it; but after the husband's death either the widow
or - if she were dead - her heirs might avoid the contract unless it had been reaffirmed after she had become
a widow. "But the conveyance or other contract of a
f eme-covert ", declares Blackstone, " ( except by some
matter of record) is absolutely void, and not merely voidable". In this respect a wife was at a greater disadvantage than a minor, who merely had an opportunity to
avoid his contracts upon coming of age. At the death of

8
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the wife, the husband had the exclusive right to act as
administrator of her estate.9
In addition to the control over the wife's property,
the husband was entitled to her company and services.
He could collect her wages just as he could those of a
minor child, and persuading or even assisting a wife to
leave her husband was punishable by fine and imprisonment. The woman's consent made no difference in the
guilt of her abductor or protector, since she had no legal
power to consent. Indeed, in ancient times it was unlawful for a man to take another man's wife to his home
even though she needed care and protection. He might,
however, take her to the market, to the justice court, or
to the spiritual court to sue for a divorce. 10
Moreover, the husband was entitled to collect the damages for injuries to the wife whether malicious or accidental. In all cases involving acts preceding the marriage
the wife was joined with the husband, and it was also
necessary that she be joined with him if the suit was for
damages to her person or character when the occasion
arose after the marriage. The husband might include
the wife in suits arising after marriage if they were concerned with property or contract rights but suits for
damages because of medical expenses or loss of services
could be brought in the name of the husband only. In
any case the damages belonged to him and the wife had
no claim upon them unless he died before the suit was
decided or the judgment paid. If the wife was included
in the suit and the husband died before the decision was
rendered, she might continue the proceedings, but if not,
the suit was dropped. In case the husband died after th e
decision of the case but before the payment of the sum
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awarded, it ·went to the widow if she was a party to the
suit, but to the husband's administrator if he sued alone.
If the injury produced instant death, however, the husband could not recover damages for his right to her society ended at her death; nor could the husband recover
for the wife's injuries if she died before the case was
decided. This claim was not reciprocal and the wife
could not recover damages for any injuries to her husband; for if he lived, he was expected to prosecute the
suit and if he died her interest ended at his death.11
On the other hand the husband assumed certain responsibilities at the time of the marriage. He was required to support his wife and children in a manner
consistent with his position in life; and he assumed the
wife's debts incurred before marriage. No such responsibility rested upon the wife since she legally ceased to
exist at the time of the marriage and her property passed
into her husband's possession. As a result she was held
responsible for nothing except obedience to her husband
and for certain crimes. The husband could not escape
his obligation to provide for his wife even by issuing a
public statement that he would refuse to pay bills contracted by her; but this advantage the wife lost if she left
her husband without cause, and in practice this rule compelled her to submit to almost any form of cruelty, for
the courts seldom admitted that her plea was sufficient
justification. 12
The husband was likewise responsible for the torts
committed by the wife either before or after marriage so
long as both were alive; but a person injured by the wife
could not recover from the husband after the wife's
death. If the husband died before judgment was ren-

10
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de red, the wife again became responsible for her acts
and could be sued as if she had not been married. 1 3
Even criminal misconduct on the part of the wife was
usually excused on the theory that subjection to her husband made her merely his agent and consequently if he
were present when the crime was committed and influenced her to commit it, the woman was not punished although the husband was held liable if he participated in
the act. The law presumed that the wife was coerced and
did not act voluntarily unless it was proven otherwise.
Some crimes, however, were not included in this immunity. For example, a married woman who killed or
attempted to kill the King was guilty of treason, even
though her husband ordered her to commit the deed, for
her allegiance to the King was superior to the duty she
owed her husband. The husband was indeed the "baron"
and the wife his subordinate, but his right ceased when
he became false to his sovereign. Moreover, it was petit
treason for a wife to kill her husband even when they
were living apart under a limited divorce. For crimes
of this degree women, if convicted, were sentenced to be
burned alive. Murder and manslaughter committed by a
woman even in the presence of the husband were felonies
and the guilty person could be punished in spite of the
theory that the ~ife was not responsible for acts committed in the company of her husband. 14
Coincident with this tlieory of the wife's lack of culpability, was the laissez faire principle of the Common
Law concerning domestic affairs which, in practice, gave
to the husband the right to control and punish his wife
much as he could his children. He could keep her at
home against her will, refuse to permit even her r elatives
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to visit her, and it was sometimes asserted that he could
legally chastise her providing he did not use a stick
larger around than his thumb. 15
Neither husband nor wife could, under Common Law
rules, be a witness for or against the other; nor could
. they sue each other except for divorce. A man, however,
could bring suit against a woman for breach of promise
just as she could against him if he failed to fulfil his
contract. 16
Although a woman could not make a legal marriage
contract until she reached the age of twelve, a statute of
Elizabeth fixed the age of consent at ten. In this connection it will be of interest to recall that the consent of a
married woman, no matter what her age, was of no consequence so far as the punishment of her seducer was
concerned, while that of a ten year old girl barred prosecution. Rape was a felony without benefit of clergy.
The forcible abduction and marriage or violation of an
heiress, whether maid, widow, or wife, was also a felony
- but only in case the woman had money and in this case
the wife was permitted to testify against her husband.17
A further right - and one of the dearest to a woman
- was denied to a wife by the Common Law. She had
no right to the custody of her own children, for the father was the sole guardian during his life and could
appoint a guardian by will to the exclusion of the mother's claim. The parental authority, except in unusual
cases, rested entirely in the father even when a divorce
had been granted to the wife - it being said that "a
mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect''. 18
At the death of the husband, the wife, if she survived

12
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him, received one-third of his real estate for life. This
might include property purchased with money received
from the wife. She was also entitled to remain forty
days in her husband's house. This dower right, as it was
called, might be alienated in three ways: if she accepted a
bequest by will or a payment in lieu of dower; in case of
divorce; or by an antenuptial agreement. She could not,
however, contract concerning dower after marriage. 19
Divorces during this early period in England could
be granted only by act of Parliament or by the Ecclesiastical Courts. The divorce by Parliament was said to
be a vinculo matrimonii and was an absolute divorce.
Divorces by the courts were of two kinds. The first was
really an annulment of the marriage since it could be
granted only for causes which were impediments to a
legal marriage, such as consanguinity, and in such cases
the children were considered illegitimate. The second,
called a divorce a mensa et thoro, was a partial divorce
and could be granted chiefly for adultery. The wife, if
she obtained the divorce, might be allowed alimony, if
she herself had not committed adultery. 20 Since the husband always had the right to the children and absolute
control over the property of both, the wife had not an
equal chance in divorce proceedings, although the law
permitted her to sue on theoretically equal terms.
Such, in brief, were the principles of the Common
Law which most affected women as distinguished from
men. Unjust as many of them appear it is probable that
the idea of protesting against them seldom occurred to
the women of that day. Many of them lived happy and
contented lives, raised large families, and accepted their
subordination as both natural and just. Marriage and
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the monastic life offered the only careers open to women
and as a result girls married early, passing directly from
the father's jurisdiction to that of the husband.
In spite of the common belief that women were incapable of acting independentl y it appears that single
women might act for themselves and married women
occasionally took charge of their husbands' affairs with
courage and ability during their absence. This they
were justified in doing by the Common Law principle
that a wife in such event was the agent of the husband.
A number of causes probably contributed to the theory of the unity of husband and wife in the person of the
husband. Wife purchase had been in vogue in early
times and this combined with the attitude of the early
church toward women tended to subordinate the wife.
Furthermore , women had been at a disadvantage in a
society where force, too often, took precedence over the
court in deciding disputes.
It must also be conceded that the men of this period
were not conscious that the laws were unjust to women,
for it was believed that the disabilities of married women
were a protection and benefit rather than a hardship.
Indeed, Blackstone's comment on the status of women
was concluded with the following words: '' so great a
favourite is the female sex of the laws of England. " 21
This Common Law which denied a married woman
practically all rights in property and even the legal right
to her children became the foundation for colonial jurisprudence, and with its American adaptations was later
introduced into Iowa. The story of its promulgation in
this State and its gradual elimination by the substitution
of statute law will be discussed in the following chapters.

II
EARLY STATUS OF WOMEN IN IOWA
THE territory now included in the State of Iowa came
into the possession of the United States as a part of the
Louisiana Purchase. Before its transfer to this country,
Louisiana had been under the jurisdiction of both France
and Spain, and the Civil Law was in force in the white
settlements. Since white men, however, were rare and
white women almost unknown in the northern part of the
province, the political and legal status of- women under
the Civil Law does not materially concern the history of
their rights in the Iowa country.
On the 26th of March, 1804, Congress provided for the
government of the new purchase by dividing it into two
parts: the Territory of Orleans, south of the thirty-third
degree of north latitude, and the District of Louisiana,
north of that line. The Governor and Judges of the Territory of Indiana were given jurisdiction over the district
of Louisiana; but since the Iowa country remained uninhabited by white people for another quarter of a century, no considerable amount of legislation was needed or
provided. The act creating the two political subdivisions
of Louisiana provided that the "inhabitants of each district, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, shall be
formed into a militia". 22 It was not the intention of
Congress, however, to include women in the militia: indeed, as a rule early laws disregarded women in matters
concerning the administration of government, and the
14
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words "person", "inhabitants", and "people" are used
without qualifying adjectives when only men are intended.
A year after this first act Congress organized the Territory of Louisiana in place of the District of Louisiana,
and on June 4, 1812, the Territory of Louisiana was reorganized as the Territory of Missouri. ·The act creating this new Territory provided for one representative
in the Territorial legislature for every five hundred
"free white male inhabitants", and "all free white male
citizens of the United States" who possessed certain
other qualifications could vote, although the members of
the House of Representatives were to be elected by the
"people of the said territory". 23 The use of the qualifying adjectives '' free white male'' suggests, however, not
that white women were expected to claim the right to
vote, but that slaves or free blacks were to be denied the
franchise. The same qualifications were prescribed for
office-holding and for jury service -probably for the
same reason.
This act also provided that the people of the Territory of Missouri should be entitled to judicial proceedings
according to "the common law and the laws and usages
in force in the said territory"- a provision that was restated more specifically in an act passed by the General
Assembly of the Territory of Missouri on January 19,
1816, which read, in part, as follows:
The common law of England, which is of a general nature,
and all statutes made by the British parliament in aid of or to
supply the defects of the said common law, made prior to the
fourth year of James the first, and of a general nature . . . .
whi<:lh said common law and statutes are not contrary to the laws

16
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of this territory, and not repugnant to, nor inconsistent with the
constitution and laws of the United States shall be the rule of
decisions in this territory, until altered or repealed by the legislature.24

Laws concerning domestic relations and property
rights in Iowa were thus based on the Common Law, since
the Iowa country was then a part of the Territory of
Missouri, but the judges in this State have a more decisive authority for their decisions than this act, as a
study of later Iowa history will show.
When Missouri was admitted as a State in 1821 the
Iowa country was not included in any political subdivision: it remained in a state of political orphanage until
1834 when it was made a part of the newly organized Territory of Michigan. The Ordinance of 1787 had been
extended over this Territory and thus Iowa fell heir to
the provisions of that famous organic act. The Ordinance of 1787 guaranteed to the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory all judicial proceedings '' according to the
course of the common law", and consequently the settlers who had crossed the Mississippi River were likewise
placed under the Common Law. 25
Although the extension of the Common Law over the
Iowa country was considered an advantage by the settlers, who were chiefly of Anglo-Saxon origin, its effect
on the position of women - especially married women was by no means entirely beneficial. Mr. Emlin McClain
makes the following comment on the relative status of
women under the Civil Law and the Common Law:
As an illustration of the higher civilization embodied in the
Civil Law as compared with the Common Law, there would be
general unanimity, I think, in referring to the condition of mar-
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ried women under the two systems. I say emphatically, married
women, for though it is often assumed that by reason of her sex,
woman as such is by the Common Law degraded and wronged,
yet the fact is that the Common Law has always recognized the
perfect equality in property rights, in power to make contracts,
in the vindication of her liberties, and the protection of her property between the unmarried woman and the man. The unmarried woman, under the institutions of England, which are still
largely prevalent in the United States, is not entitled to the elective franchise, nor to hold public office, ·b ut those are mere political privileges having no relations to her civil rights. It was only
as an incident of marriage that by the Common Law, the woman
lost her power to own or control property, to make contracts, or
to bring suits in the courts. But it must not be forgotten that
with these disadvantages, she had a total exemption from liability under her contracts, and was in many ways granted immunity
from the burdens of legal relations. As contrasted, however,
with this inequality in the condition of the married woman under
the Common Law it is usual to refer to the doctrines of the Civil
Law as illustrating a higher appreciation of her intelligence and
legal capabilities. By that system in its present form, she may
own property independently of her husband, she may make contracts, and indeed, she is in most respects in the same legal position as a woman unmarried. But this situation is not due to any
inherent principles of the Civil Law, indicating a higher reverence and respect for the married woman. By the earlier Civil
Law, she became absolutely the property of her husband, and
everything she had became his in his complete individual right.
She passed under her husband's hand by marriage, as completely
as a chattel passed under his hand, when he made a purchase of
it and paid the price. Indeed, the original theory of the Civil
Law with reference to the entire domestic relations was that the
head of the family had over all its members, including his wife,
his sons, whether of age or not, and their families, the most
2
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absolute and despotic power, a power extending to the control of
the entire family property, and the personal supervision of every
member. 26

The Ordinance of 1787 also made provision for the
descent of property of intestates, '' saving in all cases, to
the widow of the intestate, her third part of the real
estate for life, and one-third part of the personal estate".
Estates might "be devised, or bequeathed by wills in
writing, signed and sealed by him or her, in whom the
estate may be, (being of full age).'' 27 The right of
curtesy, however, is not mentioned.
In this connection it would not be practicable to
undertake a detailed study of the laws of Michigan which
affected the status of women either directly or indirectly.
There was no feminist movement in those pioneer days
and there was very little discussion of either the legal or
political status of women. A few statutes, however, may
be cited as of interest. Girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen and boys between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one could contract legal marriages if the consent of the ''parent'' or guardian was secured; but the
marriage of a girl under fourteen or a boy under eighteen
was prohibited-which was a great improvement over
the ages of twelve and fourteen fixed by the Common
Law. 28 Divorces were to be granted by the supreme or
circuit courts for impotency, adultery, extreme cruelty,
or wilful desertion for three years. In case of adultery
by the wife, the husband was to have her personal estate
forever and her real estate during his life if there were
children and during her life if there were no children.
The court might allow her subsistence out of her property if it desired to do so. In case the husband were
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guilty of adultery, the wife was allowed her own property and such alimony as the court might allow, but not
exceeding one-half of the husband's income during the
life of the wife. If there were children, the court might
alter these rules. 29
It appears that one of the earliest subjects of legislation among these pioneer law-makers was the question of
providing for the support of illegitimate children chiefly because they frequently became a burden on the
community. Accordingly, in 1827 an act was passed by
the Michigan legislature to enable the mother of such
child to compel the father to contribute to its support.
The woman might not testify in a case of this kind, however, if disqualified in other cases. About -a year later
this law was extended to Indian mothers in certain counties. If the mother of an illegitimate child should by
neglect or severity cause the death of such child, she was
to be punished by a fine not exceeding three hundred
dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor not more than
two years, or by both fine and imprisonment. The age of
consent was ten years; and the punishment for rape committed by one over fourteen years was a fine not exceeding $1000, imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both fine and imprisonment. 30
In respect to property, unmarried women were apparently upon the same basis as men - at least no mention is made of any distinction. A married woman's
property, however, passed largely under the control of
her husband, although she retained the title. Furthermore the law provided that '' when a man and his wife
shall be seized of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, in
her right and fee, and issue shall be born alive of her
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body that may inherit, or might have inherited the same,
and such wife shall die, the husband shall have and hold
such estate during his natural life, as tenant by the courtesy.' ' 31 If a widow, acting as one of the executors of
her husband's estate, should remarry, her nus band was
given no share in the responsibility, but her marriage
automatically extinguished her right to act and the other
executors might act without her as if she had died. If a
single woman began a suit and married before its completion, her husband upon proof of the marriage might
prosecute or defend the suit as if it were his own. 32
A wife, however, had a certain claim on the real property of the husband, although this claim was inchoate
during his life. If he sold the property she still retained
her dower right in it unless she joined with him in the
transfer and declared, when examined alone by the officer
before whom the transaction was made, that her act was
not due to her husband's will or compulsion. If she did
not give her consent to the sale in accordance with this
provision, upon her husband's death, her claim to dower
in the property became a legal right and could be enforced against it, no matter who owned it at the time.
The widow received one-third of the real estate for life
and one-third of the personal property of the husband
"forever", if there were children and one-half if there
were none. 33
In case it was impracticable to divide the shares of
the children, one of them might take the whole amount
and pay the others their share, but in this respect preference was to be given to sons, especially the eldest son.
If a child died before it reached the age of twenty-one,
the other children inherited its share, and if over twenty-
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one and unmarried at the time of death the mother and
other children inherited its share at the death of the
father. If a man left little or no surplus above his debts
his wife was given the right to her . apparel and such
other allowance as the court might provide.3 4
On April 20, 1836, Congress made the Iowa country a
part of the newly organized Territory of Wisconsin.
The organic act repeated the provision that only free
white male citizens could vote : indeed, no change in the
political status of women can be discerned in this act. 35
Although there was not much legislation concerning
the position of women during the two years that Iowa
was a part of Wisconsin, some of the acts of the legislature are interesting. Thus, it appears that divorces were
granted by the legislature and that the early lawmakers
were not unfair to women petitioners, or else wives had
more cause for desiring divorces than husbands, for the
majority of the acts granting divorces were for the benefit of women petitioners. For example, on January 15,
1838, Martha Newton was granted a divorce from John
C. Newton, the status of "femme sole" and entire control
of their child; and on the same day, Lucinda Jones was
divorced from Abraham Jones, both of Burlington, Iowa.
All property in the possession of the wife was to belong
to her and she was given the custody of the children.36
Indeed, in many respects women fared better in the matter of divorces at the hands of the legislators than they
did in the courts, for the legislature paid little attention
to the Common Law, while the judges relied very largely
upon it in determining cases involving domestic affairs.
Married women belonged to their husband's families
rather than their own so far as legal responsibilities were
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concerned, and in the law fixing the responsibility of relatives for poor persons the provision is added that
"married females, whilst their husbands live shall not
be liable to a suit. " 37
Like all the northwestern or north central States, the
Territory of Wisconsin made no discrimination against
girls and women in the matter of education. A law
passed on December 8, 1836, provided that the Wisconsin
University was to be founded at Belmont, Iowa County,
for the purpose of '' educating youth'' and the Dubuque
Seminary, Philandrian College at Denmark, and the
seminaries at Mineral Point, Depere, Fort Madison, West
Point, Cassville, Mount Pleasant, Farmington, Augusta,
and in Des Moines County, were planned for both sexes.
The Davenport Manual Labor College, however, was to
promote the "general interests of education, and to qualify young men to engage in the several employments
and professions of society". 38
The permanent effect of these laws of Michigan and
Wisconsin in the newly created Territory of Iowa is,
however, a matter of dispute. An Iowa law passed July
30, 1840, repealed the laws of Michigan and Wisconsin
and declared that the statutes of Great Britain should
not be in force in the Territory of Iowa. This was later·
interpreted to mean only the laws passed after 1707.39
···:

,·
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III
PERSONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN
person living in an organized society is largely
dependent for his happiness and welfare upon the laws
governing his right to property, regulating his association with other persons, and fixing his relation to the
government under which he lives. Or, in other words,
a person may have personal, property, and political
rights with corresponding obligations. The first two
groups are frequently ref erred to as civil rights as distinguished from political rights and, indeed, in many
cases are so closely associated as to be indistinguishable.
Theoretically political rights are fundamental as a
means of securing the civil rights of individuals, but in
practice a participation in government has generally followed the acquisition of the rights of property and those
of personal liberty. Thus the women of Iowa have passed
from the restrictions of the Common Law to a position of
virtual equality in civil affairs, and now, with a hope of
almost certain success, they claim the right to participate
in the management of the government under which they
live.
The laws most directly affecting the welfare and happiness of women are those which concern their personal
freedom and protection and those governing their relations with other persons. Since single women, even under
the Common Law, were accorded practically all the civil
rights which were recognized as belonging to men, the
ANY
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discussion of the acquisition of these rights by the women
of Iowa relates largely to married women. The different
aspects in which these personal rights present themselves
will be considered separately for the sake of clearness,
although, as a matter of fact, such rights as guardianship of children and divorce are closely connected.
Among the rights classed as personal as distinguished from property and political rights, are those of personal protection, legal settlement, testimony, recovery
for personal injuries, and the guardianship of children.
RIGHT OF RESIDENCE OR SETTLEMENT

One of the earliest rights secured by law was that of
a legal settlement or recognized residence in a certain
community. This was made necessary by the system of
poor relief administered through local governments and
was regulated by law to prevent disputes between different localities as to which should supply relief to a depend
ent who moved from one locality to another.
The early lawmakers and judges of Iowa recognized
the need of such legislation both for purposes of poor relief and, in the case of men, for voting. Any person who
lived for a certain period of time in any one place acquired a settlement in that place, and if he became destitute was entitled to poor relief. If a person became
destitute in a community in which he did not have a
settlement, he was promptly returned to his place of
settlement. The frequent provisions in the early Iowa
laws concerning this matter are not important: it will
only be necessary to indicate the provisions which applied
unequally to men and women.
A single woman acquired a settlement on the same
4
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terms as a man; but, in conformity to the Common Law
idea, a married woman's settlement followed that of her
husband. If he had none, the wife retained that which
she had at the time of her marriage. A wife abandoned
by her husband could acquire a settlement of her own if
she had received authority from the court to transact
business independently. Legitimate minor children had
the settlement of the father; illegitimate children that
of the mother. 40
This rule has remained in force with only minor
changes. The Code of 1897 permits a married woman
whose husband has abandoned her to acquire a settlement as if unmarried without the formality of a court
decision, but in other respects the requirement as to a
wife's settlement remains practically as at Common
Law.41
In 1908 the Supreme Court decided that the legal
:settlement of a married woman follows the husband's only
when the family relation exists at the time he acquires
the new settlement, and a wife abandoned by her husband,
retains the settlement she had. Again in 1915 the same
•court ruled that if a wife had been committed to a hospital for the insane and the husband moved to another
place, she retained her settlement in the county from
which she had been sent so long as public restraint con-tinued.42
Closely allied with this ancient right of settlement,
which had to do largely with poor relief, is the right to
acquire a legal residence. This right has become more
important than the right of settlement since it is a requirement in voting and in certain judical actions. Here
.also, an unmarried woman or a widow is on the same
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footing as a man-except in the matter of voting-but a
married woman has the same legal residence as her husband unless she has left him for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce. Even in this event, the Supreme Court decided in 1899, the residence of the husband would be considered that of the wife for the purpose of serving her
with notice of an action when it appeared that she left
him without cause. 43
IN THE MATTER OF NAME

In Iowa, as in other Anglo-Saxon commonwealths,
legislation concerning the legal names of individuals is
largely based upon old customs. The married woman
in this State has always, as a matter of course, taken the
surname of her husband, nor can she change it after marriage as a man or an unmarried woman may, by application to a district court. 44 Indeed, it appears that the provision in Iowa concerning a woman's name is similar to
that of the United States concerning her citizenship: if
unmarried, there is no distinction between her and a man;
if married she takes her name as well as her citizenship
from her husband and he may change either without her
consent. There is, however, practically no opposition to
this rule concerning a married woman's name, 45 although
in States where women vote, the citizenship rule is occasionally a hardship to American women who have married aliens.
IN THE MATTER OF TES'l'IMONY

Although the right to testify before a court is not as
a rule personally desired, it is an important and coveted
civil right since it is indispensable in the protection of
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other rights. Iowa laws have not discriminated against
women in this respect, although the provision that neither
husband nor wife could be a witness against the other
'' except in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed
by the one against the other" is probably more to the
advantage of the husband than to that of the wife. The
Code of 1851, however, provided that husband and wife
might be witnesses for each other-something not permitted by the Common Law. 4'6
This has been the general rule of Iowa courts since
1851. Indeed, the Supreme Court once reversed a decision of an inferior court because the judge, in: giving
instructions to the jury, had declared that the testimony
of the defendant's wife in ms behalf '' should be received
with great caution". 47
The Revision of 1860 contained the rather ambiguous
provision that the husband or wife "shall in no case be
a witness for or against the other, except in a criminal
proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding one against the other,
but they may in all criminal prosecutions be witnesses
for each other.'' All prohibitions as to testimony, however, were not to be applicable if the party in whose
favor they operated waived the rights conferred. 48
Apparently the code commissioners intended to prohibit a husband or wife from testifying or being compelled to testify against each other, but the section was
so vague that it required judical interpretation and the
courts disagreed as to what the law really meant. In the
case of Karney v. Paisley it was held that a wife could
not testify even for her husband; while later decisions
declared that a husband or wife might testify for the
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other if the prohibition was waived by the one involvedin the case. 4-9
This inconsistency was not, however, corrected in the
Code of 1873 for the section appears in almost the same
words; but in 1874 the General Assembly so amended
the Code as to make it clear that a husband or wife might
testify for each other in any case, but could not appear as
a witness against the other except in a suit brought by one
against the other. 50
The Code of 1897 made this exception more definite.
A husband or wife might testify against the other only
in a trial for a crime committed by one against the other,
in a civil suit brought by one against the other or by one
against a third party for alienating the affections of the
other. This provision was amended in 1898 to include
'' any civil action brought by a judgment creditor against
either the husband or the wife, to set aside a conveyance
of property from one to the other on the ground of want
of consideration or fraud". 51
No important changes in the law have been made since
that time, but the question arises frequently in judicial
decisions. 52 From one of these it appears that the rule
barring a husband or wife from testifying against the
other applies to crimes committed before marriage as
well as afterwards. 53 Another case presented an unusual situation. A man was accused of forging his wife's
name to an obligation for the payment of money and an
attempt was made to compel the wife to testify on the
ground that it was a crime involving her. The court,
however, decided that the crime was against the person
who had been induced to accept the fraudulent paper and
not against the wife. Consequently she could not be pun-
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ished for contempt of court because she refused to
testify. 54
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

The right to recover for personal injuries by an appeal to civil law has two phases : recovery for an injury
to the person bringing the action, and damages sued for
on account of injuries to another whereby the plaintiff
claims to have been deprived of services or subjected to
expense or trouble. The right of recovery for damages
in certain cases was provided by the Common Law and
unmarried women were entitled to the same privileges as
men. Married women, on the contrary, were deprived of
practically all opportunities to recover for injuries of
any kind; the husband was entitled to all money recovered for injuries to himself, his wife, or their minor
children, but in the case of the children he acted merely
as the guardian and the money did not legally belong to
him. If he were dead the wife regained her right to sue,
but she could not recover damages for his death resulting
from the negligence of another. Furthermore, the husband was entitled to his wife's society and services and
might be given damages if a third person had a part in
depriving him of them.
These Common Law principles were in force in Iowa
until about 1860, when modifications began to appear, and
the decisions of the courts in early years were based
upon them. For example, in 1849 the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled that a father could not recover damages o'n
account of the marriage of a daughter between twelve
and fourteen years of age, because the Common Law recognized the marriage as valid, and the right of the hus-
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band to the wife's services was superior to the father's
claim on his minor child. "The wife", said the court,
'' cannot be held to 'serve two masters' therefore the
right of the husband must prevail. " 55
In 1856 a wife deserted by her husband was permitted
to bring an action for slander without her husband's
joining her, since it was held that equity demanded that
the wife who had been compelled to support herself
should have the privilege of protecting her property and
reputation without the formality of a decree from the
District Court as the law required. If the two were living together, however, the husband was required to bring
the action. One decision contains the following comment :
We suppose that at common law, the rule is well settled, that
for an injury to the person of the wife during coverture, by battery, or to her character, by slander, or for any such injury, the
wife must join with the husband in the suit. When, however,
the injury is such that the husband received a separate loss or
damage, as if in consequence of the battery, he has been deprived
of her society, or been put to expense, he may bring a separate
action in his own name.56

The Revision of 1860, like the Code of 1851, contained
few modifications of the Common Law rules governing
recovery of damages where married women were concerned. An '' unmarried female'' might prosecute for
her own seduction and recover damages, but another witness was required. The father of a minor daughter, or,
if he were dead or disqualified, the mother might also
prose.c ute for the seduction. Ten years later, the husband's share in actions brought against or by the wife
was slightly modified, by the provision that the wife
might sue or be sued alone except where both were, in
their own right, parties to the suit. 57
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The interpretations of these provisions in judicial decisions are interesting because they illustrate the tendency to emancipate women and to construe laws more to
their advantage. In 1864 the Iowa Supreme Court decided that the husband must be joined with the wife in an
action for slander of the wife; but in 1871 the same
tribunal ruled that a married woman had the same right
to bring an action for an injury to her person or reputation that she had to bring an action to def end her property, and that the husband had no right to participate
except to sue for damages resulting from his own deprivation or expense resulting from the injury to the
wife. Moreover, the husband need not join the wife in an
action for libel. 58
The Code of 1873 reflects these changes in reference to
the civil rights of married women. The husband was
freed from his former responsibility for torts committed
by the wife; and he was likewise denied the right to recover for those committed against the wife except in so
far as he was himself injured by loss of the wife's services or by expenses incurred on account of her injury,
for he was still responsible for medical attendance and
support for his wife, whether she was able to work or
not. 59
The Iowa Supreme Court in applying these provisions worked out a fairly consistent rule. It was agreed
that the wife might recover damages for pain resulting
from an injury; but the husband alone could recover for
loss of time and medical attendance unless the wife was
engaged in a business of her own or was working for
wages, but even in this event the husband must sue for
the expenses of medical attendance. 60
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Some individual decisions are worth citing briefly as
illustrations of the various phases of this question. According to a decision in 1875 neither husband nor wife
could maintain an action against the other for a tort
committed during coverture. In another case it was decided that a man might recover damages from a physician for mal-treatment of his wife which subjected him
to additional expense; but if she died as a result of this
treatment, action could be brought only by her administrator. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that it
was an error for a lower court to instruct the jury that
the damages would be the same for a married as for an
unmarried woman - the damages were not the same,
since everything an unmarried woman made was her
own, while a wife devoted at least part of her time to her
husband and his estate. 61
Another decision, handed down by Judge Shiras at
Council Bluffs in 1894, denied a woman damages for suffering resulting from being struck by a switch engine on
the ground of contributory negligence, but her husband
received $3000 for loss of her services. 62 In another case
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of a lower
court giving a married woman damages for disability
resulting from an accident caused by a defective street,
declaring that the husband only was entitled to sue for
such damages while the wife was keeping house for him.
Some quotations from this decision express the principles which governed the judges. "We know of no legislation", an earlier decision read, "which changes the
relations of husband and wife so as to give the headship
of the family in any case to the wife. He [the husband]
is still bound for her support, and entitled to her earn-
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ings, when she is not engaged in business on her own
account." "Whatever time she [the wife] lost or would
lose would have been devoted to his employment, and the
loss was her husband's for which she had no right to
recover. If we admit her right to recover, defendant
would be twice liable, for assuredly, under the rules of
law, the husband may recover for such losses as were
sustained by her.'' '' She can not recover for loss of time
occasioned by an injury, if her occupation is that of a
mere housewife in the family of her husband. " 63
In 1899 the Iowa Supreme Court decided that a married woman who owned a sewing machine and earned
from five to ten dollars a . month sewing might collect
damages for loss of earning capacity if injured by the
fault of another. In another case the same court declared that a married woman's equal liability for medical
services rendered her did not give her a right to recover
for such expenses in an action for assault and battery. 64
Down to 1911, indeed, court decisions in Iowa consistently ruled that a wife might collect damages for pain
and suffering, but her husband only could collect for loss
of time, unless she were engaged in a separate business,
and in any case for the expenses resulting from such injuries. At that time the General Assembly made a radical change in the law by adopting the provision that a
woman, if injured by the negligence or wrongful act of a
person or corporation, might '' recover for loss of time,
medical attendance and other expenses incurred as a
result thereof in addition to any elements of damages recoverable by common law; and if such injury result in
causing death, her administrator may sue and recover
for her estate the value of her services as a wife or
3
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mother or both .
. but in no event shall the
amount recovered exceed the sum of six thousand dollars". 65 Four years later the maximum punitive dam.ages to be recovered by the administrator of a woman's
restate, in case of her death, was raised to $15,000 - a
sum that could be awarded even for '' services as a wife
or mother". 66
Thus, by 1915 a woman in Iowa, even though she were
married and engaged in housekeeping, came to be recognized as an individual with a right to secure compensation in her own right for pain and for loss of time. The
old rule that everything the wife earned belonged to her
husband has been displaced at least partially by new
statute law.

It is interesting to note that the laws of Iowa from
very early times singled out one injury for which an unmarried women might collect damages, namely, seduction. The civil action to recover damages for this injury
was entirely separate from the criminal prosecution
which required that the woman be of previously chaste
character - while in the civil action there was no such
requirement. The Code of 1851 provided that an unmarried woman might prosecute such an action in her
own right; or the father, mother, or guardian of a minor
daughter or ward might bring such a suit, but any damages awarded the guardian were to be used for the benefit of the girl. Similar provisions have been repeated in
the later codes, the only change being the omission of the
guardian's right after 1873. 67
The amount of damages awarded has varied with the
circumstances of the particular case and the :financial
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standing of the seducer. In one case, for example, a
woman was awarded $5000 and in another $16,000 for
breach of promise including seduction. 68
RIGHT TO RECOVERY FOR INDIRECT INJURIES

It is evident that under the Common Law the legal
status of a wife and minor children was one of dependence upon the husband and father. The husband was
entitled to the services or wages of the wife and children
and could collect damages if wrongfully deprived of them
by another. He was, on the other hand, held responsible
for their maintenance and medical attendance; and if the
eost of this was increased by the fault of another he
might also sue for such an amount as would reimburse
him for his outlay.
If, however, the man were injured the wife and children had no recourse in their own hands. If the husband
~urvived, it was his privilege to sue for damages, and
any which he might secure belonged to him. The wife
and children could not secure any compensation for loss
of support aside from that awarded to the husband. In
ease of an injury to a child the right of action for injuries was part of the right of guardianship and could be
exercised by the mother only in rare cases.
In Iowa the right of a woman to sue for injuries to
others has been closely associated with the administration of estates, the guardianship of children, and the
property rights of husband and wife. Thus the question
of recovery for indirect injuries by women requires little
discussion apart from the history of their rights in these
other fields. A woman has been given the right to bring
an action for the death of the person of whose estate she
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is administrator, for the death or injury of any minor
child for whom she is the legal guardian, and, in certain
special cases, for loss of support due to some injury to
her husband. 69
It is this third phase of the question which alone requires elaboration in this connection, since the first two
are covered by the more general accounts. For the sake
of clearness it may be said that a wife can not, under
ordinary circumstances, sue for damages on account of
injuries to her husband- no matter how much she may
suffer on account of them. An exception to this rule, and
one which has acquired some importance in Iowa, concerns the recovery of damages by the wife from one who
sells intoxicating liquor to the husband. This is entirely
a matter of statute law and court decisions, since there is
no foundation for such suits in the Common Law.
The Code of 1873 provided that a wife might sue for
injury to her support produced by the illegal sale of
liquor to her husband; and this provision with modifications and additions has been repeated in succeeding
codes. The damages awarded might include exemplary
damages as well as actual damages, it being declared in
cases of this kind that '' a married woman shall have the
same right to bring suits, prosecute, and control the same
and the amount recovered as if a single woman". 70
Court decisions on this subject have been numerous
and important, though n:ot always consistent. The courts
have decided, for example, that this section applies only
to the sale of liquor when such act is illegal; but that the
sale of beer, when this was not prohibited, could not be
made the basis for awarding damages for loss of support
to the wife. On the other hand, even the giving of liquor
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to an intoxicated person might subject the giver to liability, according to one judicial interpretation.71
Other decisions have established the rule that a wife
may collect damages for loss of support either because
of the death or loss of earning capacity of the husband
due to the illegal sale of liquor to him and for injuries to
her person or property resulting from the same cause.
Moreover, exemplary damages may also be fixed by the
jury, if a basis for actual damages is found. The fact
that the husband was habitually intoxicated before the
defendant sold him liquor does not, the court decided,
prevent the wife's recovery of damages, if the fact of the
sale and its illegality are proven. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has ruled that a wife may not recover for
threatening language, loss of social position, or similar
hardships, not immediately affecting her person or property.72
One of the cases involving the liability of the one selling intoxicating liquor included a claim for the value of
a horse belonging to the wife which had been sold by the
husband while intoxicated. The court decided that the
wife could recover the value of the animal from the seller
of the intoxicating liquor.73
Several years later a decision awarded a wife exemplary damages because her children were compelled to
leave home, as well as actual damages for loss of support; but this, the court explained, would be true only in
case the defendant were aware of the situation.74
Court decisions have generally agreed that in an
action brought by a wife for the recovery of damages due
to the illegal sale of liquor to the husband it is sufficient
to prove that the liquor sold by the defendant contribI
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uted to the intoxication of the husband even if it were
not the sole cause of it, but if the wife contributed by
giving the husband liquor she could not recover. Even
in this event, however, the wife's motives are to be considered; and giving the husband liquor in order to keep
him away from places where it was sold was, on one occasion, declared to be no bar to recovery. 711
It appears that the laws making the seller of intoxicating liquor liable for damages to the wife of the man
to whom it is illegally sold are largely intended to supplement the punishments fixed for the illegal sale of liquor.
As the sentiment against the sale of intoxicating beverages has become stronger and interest in the welfare of
dependent wives and children has increased, the decisions in cases of this kind have become increasingly
favorable to the wife.
A case involving still another phase of recovery for
indirect injuries came before the Iowa Supreme Court
in 1894. This ·case was a suit brought by a wife on account of the alienation of her husband's affections. Such
cases on the part of husbands were, of course, not unusual and were governed by the Common Law. It was
generally believed, however, that such action could not
be brought by the wife for she possessed no separate personality and could suffer no individual injury. The Iowa
decision, however, was rendered in the wife's favor, since,
the court declared, the "tendency of legislation in this
country is toward making husband and wife equal in law,
giving to each the rights possessed by the other, and the
legislation of this state is designed to accomplish that
end, in most respects.' 176

IV
WOMEN IN EDUCATION
the most important factor in the development
of any person or group of persons is education. This is a
subject that has many different aspects; but in this connection the opportunity to follow out any line of instruction or training desired is the most important of these
privileges and is the most essential to the enjoyment of
personal and political freedom. In this sense education
means more than a chance to attend schools and colleges :
it includes the right to take up any desired profession, to
speak, and to write without incurring either a civil penalty or social ostracism. Of all educational agencies in
America the most fundamental has been the public
school.
PERHAPS

I N THE MATTER OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

Co-education has been so much in evidence in Iowa
that the general prejudice against it in former times is
difficult for us to understand. To the Iowa pioneers it
was the natural and only possible plan for the primitive
schools. Their boys and girls worked and played together on the prairies; and so when the public schools
were first organized the L egislative Assembly declared
that they should be '' open and free for every class of
white citizens between the ages of four and twenty-one
years". Horace Mann visited Davenport in 1858 and
recommended co-education in secondary schools, and
39
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there is little evidence that any other plan for the common schools was ever considered.77
The system, however, was not so universally approved
for the secondary schools; and female seminaries were
established here and there over the State to provide education suitably diluted for the daughters of the pioneers.
But there were other secondary schools which began as
co-educational institutions, giving young women the
same opportunities as those offered young men. These
early schools were semi-public in character since they
were incorporated by law, although supported by tuition
or private subscriptions. When the public high school
was established co-education was the natural rule: the
right of girls to attend such schools has never been questioned.78 The advisability of separate departments or
separate classes for high school boys and girls has been
frequently discussed in educational circles, but without
any idea of discriminating between the sexes.
When the State University was organized there was a
decided difference of opinion as to the advisability of the
admission of women. The act incorporating the institution made no mention of co-education, and it is possible
. that the legislators did not even anticipate that women
would attempt to enter. All the precedents of European
and eastern universities opposed the idea. Nor was
there any such association between the University and
the secondary schools as there was between these and the
common schools.
That some young women did not accept such precedents is evidenced by the first report of students which
lists forty-one young women out of an attendance of one
hundred and twenty-four. This was not entirely pleas-
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ing to the Board of Trustees, who in 1858 voted to exclude women from general university work after that
year since it was '' neither consistent with the design of a
university nor expedient to admit women to regular instruction.'' Co-education, however, was too strongly
entrenched in the State supported schools of Iowa to be
successfully prohibited at the State University; and so
this ruling of the Board was first modified to permit
women to attend lectures, then to attend the normal department, and before the close of the same year the
original action of the Board was entirely rescinded. 79
Thus ended the only serious attempt to exclude women from the State University in which they have been
enrolled in large numbers. In 1864 the General Assembly definitely stated that the object of the University
should "be to provide the best and most efficient means
of imparting to the youth of the State of both sexes upon
equal terms a liberal education and a thorough knowledge of the different branches of literature, the arts and
sciences'' .80
There appears to have been some thought of excluding women from the State Agricultural College also, for
a petition that they be admitted was presented to the
legislature in 1868; but here too equality of opportunity
prevailed. Indeed, the first enrollment at the college
shows thirty-seven young women in attendance. 81
That the women of Iowa have not failed to prove
their equality in intelligence is suggested by the report
that five of the nine persons granted life certificates by
the Board of Examiners from 1862 to 1873 were women.
In 1910 the percent of illiteracy in Iowa was 1.7 for both
males and f ernales over ten years of age - the lowest in
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the United States, for the entire population and for men.
Two States, however, Idaho and Oregon, showed a lower
rate of illiteracy for women. 82
IN THE MATTER OF TEACHING

Closely associated with the privilege of school attendance has been the opportunity of teaching. In Iowa
the employment of women as teachers in the public
schools was never restricted by law, but rather by custom
and by economic conditions. In 1848 only twenty-three
women were listed among the one hundred and twentyfour teachers in the Territory, or about one to five; but
the number of women engaged in teaching increased
especially during the Civil War when the men were
called to the camps and battlefields, and in 1862 for the
first time the women outnumbered the men employed in
educational work.83 This condition has prevailed ever
since for the reason that economic conditions have generally given men more profitable occupations and public
opinion has considered teaching the employment best
sujted to respectable young women. In 1910 the number
of men teachers in Iowa was 2671, while the number of
women teachers was 22,068 - almost ten to one. 84
The pay of women teachers, however, has remained
inferior to that of the men in the same lines of work.
According to a report made for 1854 the average wage
paid men teachers was less than twenty dollars a month,
while that of women teachers was less than ten dollars.
It is evident that this proportion varied at different periods and in different places. For example, Iowa City
was reported as paying the men teachers in its schools
in 1864 an average of $50 a month, while the women re-
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ceived only $30, although the men teachers' wages in the
decade between 1863 and 1873 for the State as a whole
increased from twenty-two to thirty-six dollars per
month and women's wages rose from sixteen to twentyeight.85
This difference in pay was sometimes regulated by
the county authorities. Thus in Muscatine County the
compensation was fixed according to certificate and sex
-women receiving from twenty-five to thirty-five dollars per month, and men from thirty to forty. A resolution offered in the House of Representatives in 1868
declared that "it is the sense of this House that the custom practiced in some parts of this State of paying to
male teachers ·in our public schools higher prices than
are allowed fem ale teachers for the same amount of labor, is a relic of barbarism, and should be discountenanced by all good citizens.' ' 86
As a matter of fact the salaries paid women in educational work have remained lower than those of the men
partly because of the limited field of employment for
women outside the school room and partly because women have not, as a rule, desired or prepared for positions
requiring executive as well as intellectual ability - positions which usually carry the higher salaries.
Some women, however, have served in such positions
and the number is increasing. Mrs. Lou M. Wilson
served as superintendent of the West Des Moines schools
from 1884 to 1888; and in 1888 Miss E. M. Todd was
elected superintendent of the Cedar Falls schools at a
salary of $1250. 87 Nor have women been unrepresented
in the honorary positions to which no remuneration is
attached. Miss Phoebe W. Sudlow was chosen President
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of the State Teachers' Association in 1876 and twelve
years later that position was held by Miss Lottie E.
Granger. Three other women have served in this capacity doW11 to 1917: Miss Abbie S. Abbott of Cedar Rapids
in 1908, Miss Alice Dilley of Osceola in 1912, and Mrs.
Eva Fleming of Ottumwa in 1917.8 8
In college work, women probably occupy a more favorable place in Iowa than they do in eastern and southern localities. It is said that the first woman in America
to be elected to a full professorship in a college was Miss
Harriette J. Cook of Cornell College. 89

V

WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS
women were very early included among the
teachers of Iowa and girls were equally entitled to the
education provided by the Commonwealth, it was not
until after the close of the Civil War that women appear
in the more specialized professions. While newspaper
work, law, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, the ministry,
and similar occupations offer work suitable for trained
women the number in such professions is relatively
small. Two considerations deter women from preparing
themselves for highly specialized professions : the length
and difficulty of the training required, and the difficulty
of coordinating such work with homemaking and the care
of children. In other words, women show a tendency to
avoid highly specialized training which has little to do
with the work of the normal woman after marriage.
The history of the struggle of women for admission
to professional schools lies, for the most part, outside
the annals of Iowa history; but the adjustments which
have occurred in this Commonwealth may profitably be
studied as illustrations of the tendency of women to secure freedom of choice and then to select congenial occupations. For the most part, such restrictions as have
existed in Iowa as to the admission of women into the
professions have been due to popular opinion rather than
to legal restraints. Indeed, it would seldom have occurred to early lawmakers to forbid what was practically
unheard of.
ALTHOUGH
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In discussing this subject it is clear that only such
professions as are regulated by law or aided by the
State need to be considered. For example, it is not regarded as a part of the State's duties to provide special
training for persons engaged in religious work, nor does
the law in any way establish qualifications for such occupations. On the other hand, the practice of medicine and
law are under State supervision and may be studied as
illustrations of professions having a legal status.
THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

Women have always been especially interested in the
care of the sick, and pioneer women had some knowledge
of common herbs and their use. Many served as midwives where regular physicians were too distant or too
expensive for the settlers. Indeed, some of these home
doctors were frequently as competent as many of the socalled physicians who often had little or no professional
training. The suggestion that women should study medicine, however, was at first generally opposed.
There were, of course, many reasons for this opposition. Women were considered as intellectually inferior
to men, and the life of a physician on the frontier was
unusually full of hardships. Medical training was, as a
rule, secured largely through a system of apprenticeship
by which the physician secured a driver and office assistant, and the apprentice was given an opportunity to read
and observe. This training was sometimes supplemented
by a course of lectures at some medical school for a few
weeks, but many physicians carried on a regular practice
without this schooling. Such preparation was, not without reason, considered unfit for young women.
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The law, however, made no distinction between men
and women; nor did it for many years make any attempt
to restrict practice by the incompetent. The Code of
1851 provided that the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Keokuk, which was named as the medical department of the future State University, should have
power '' to grant diplomas
. to such persons
as they deem qualified''; and all persons with such
degrees might practice in the State, but there was no disqualification of those who were not graduates. 90
It is probable that the word "persons" used at this
time is no proof that women were included, for it was
frequently used in early laws when men only were meant.
The State, however, never assumed control of the Keokuk medical school and paid no attention to its administration. It is doubtful whether women were admitted to
the Iowa institution. The few who entered the profession went east for their training. When the medical department of the State University was organized in 1870
it was clearly the purpose of the institution to admit
women, since it was requested that the candidate for
graduation should notify the Dean of "his or her" intention.91
Moreover, it is evident that there was a demand for
such professional education on the part of women, since
the first list of students in the medical department contains the names of eight women, five of whom were married. It is recorded that the admission of women to
anatomy classes along with male students aroused much
discussion and this, together with an experiment known
as '' a gastric juice dog'' and a case of body stealing,
gave the school a good deal of advertising which was not
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altogether favorable. Two women were graduated from
the medical school of the University in 1872 - Anna A.
Shepard and Isabel G. Whitfield. 92 By this time a woman's right in the profession was recognized by a part of
the people of Iowa although prejudice remained. In
1873, the first woman physician was appointed to a position in a State institution when Miss M. Abbie Cleaves
was made an assistant physician at the Mount Pleasant
hospital. 93
According to a list of physicians and surgeons in Iowa
in 1878-1879 there were at least nineteen women practicing in the State, nearly all of whom were graduates of
some medical course. Of this number about half were
homeopaths and half regulars - only one of the graduates having completed the course earlier than 1870.94
The first act of the General Assembly providing fully
for the regulation of the practice of medicine was passed
in 1886. This law made no distinction between men and
women candidates: indeed, it specifically included women
by the use of the double pronoun "his or her". Equality
of men and women in the closely allied profession of
pharmacy had been definitely recognized six years before in the law providing for the registration of pharmacists.95
The number of women physicians in Iowa has increased steadily, although, as might be expected in a
highly specialized and exacting profession, the number
is still small. The United States census reported eight
women physicians in Iowa in 1870, seventy-three in 1880,
one hundred and twenty-eight in 1890, two hundred and
sixty in 1900, and three hundred and twenty-five in 1910.
This number, though small, is exceeded by that in only
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seven other States. 96 The statistics include many women practitioners in the newer and semi-professional
schools such as osteopaths and chiropractors. Many
others, however, are graduates of high grade medical
schools and have large and profitable practices.
NURSING

Closely associated with the medical profession is
nursing which is preeminently a woman's profession.
The first legal restriction on this occupation was made in
1907 when provision was made for the certification of
graduate nurses. No distinction was made between men
and women - the act applying to all alike. The number
of men in this work is, however, negligible. The number
of women listed as trained nurses has increased from
160 in 1900, when nurses were classed with women in
domestic or personal service, to 1710 in 1910, when
trained nursing was listed as a prof ession. 97
THE PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY

In the profession of dentistry it does not appear that
any legal sex qualification or restriction has ever been
made in this State. Miss Lucy B. Hobbs (Mrs. Taylor)
began the practice of dentistry here in 1863, and later
through the influence of her male associates was admitted to a dental college in Ohio from which she had formerly been excluded. Although the number of women
dentists in Iowa has always been comparatively small,
this is due to preference, since women are admitted both
to schools of dentistry and to practice on the same terms
as men. 98
Women have usually been satisfied with equality in
4
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the professions, but the law of 1917 concerning "dental
hygienists'' apparently gives them a monopoly of this
particular work, since it provides that '' any woman over
eighteen years of age and of good moral character'' and
a graduate of a training school may be given a license as
a dental hygienist upon passing the required examination.99
THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Among the highly specialized professions one of the
oldest and most influential is the study of the law and its
application. It has been one of the latest to be opened
to women and apparently one of the least attractive to
them. It is doubtful whether the women of pioneer Iowa
ever desired the right to appear before a court as attorneys, but the subject was being agitated in the East. Apparently the makers of the Code of 1851 did not favor
admitting women to the bar, for they definitely provided
that only a "white male citizen" with certain other qualifications might practice law in the State courts. It was
not until 1870 that this disability was removed by striking
out the words '' white male' '-negroes and women being
admitted on equal terms with white men. 100
Accounts of the early practice of law by Iowa women
are somewhat conflicting. Mrs. Arabella Mansfield of
Mount Pleasant is said to have been admitted to the bar
in 1869 - a year before the General Assembly passed the
law removing the disability of women with respect to this
profession. Under the law of 1870 several women were
successful in passing the examinations. Among them
were Mrs. Judith Ellen Foster, Mrs. Annie 0. Savery,
and Mrs. Emma H. Haddock. Judge Austin Adams was
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the first chief justice to admit women to practice in the
Supreme Court of Iowa. 101
The first woman regularly enrolled in the law school
of the State University of Iowa was Mary B. Hickey of
Newton, Iowa, who graduated in 1873. Since then, between twenty-five and thirty women have completed the
law course at the University-seven of whom belonged
in the classes of 1899 and 1900. A few of these women
have remained in the State as active lawyers, but usually
in association with their husbands. Others have located
outside the State, and only a few are carrying on an active law business independently. 102 The practice of law
has not, however, been popular among the women of
Iowa.
The census reports show that the number of women
lawyers in Iowa increased from none in 1870, to five in
1880, twenty-one in 1890, and fifty-three in 1900; but only
ten are reported in 1910.103 This decrease is probably
due partly to a more strict interpretation of the term
and also to a realization on the part of women that law
is not at present as suitable for women as other employments, since it requires a long period of training and is
not closely associated with the field of activity usually
claimed by women. A greater interest in legal work for
dependent classes, however, may overcome this condition
to some degree.
GENERAL SUMMARY

This brief survey suggests that law is the only profession from which women were ever barred by law in
Iowa, and this may have been due to the close relation
between the courts and political affairs. In such profes-
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sions as medicine, nursing, dentistry, and pharmacy the
personal preference of women and public opinion have
regulated the number of women thus engaged, while
other professions have established the status of women
by private agreement.
The following table showing the number of women in
certain occupations at different periods in the history
of Iowa may be of interest in this connection:
YEAR

1870
1880
1890
1900
1910

CLERGYMEN
DENTISTS LAWYERS

3
10
34
117
31

0
1
13

52
43

0
5
21
53
10

PHYS!CIANS

8
73
128
260
325

TEACHERS

4,472
10,157
16,502
19,589
22.088

OFFICIALS 104

0
184
243
391
307

VI
WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
THE exercise of the police power is one of the fundamental activities of government: the protection of life
and property is indispensable for the order and prosperity of any community. The status of women under
the criminal law of Iowa requires but brief consideration,
since only in minor details has there been any distinction
between men and women either as to protection from
injury or treatment when accused or convicted of a
crime. The great mass of criminal law applies equally
to both sexes and so does not come within the scope of
this study which deals chiefly with distinctions between
men and women. The great majority of people almost
everywhere are interested in criminal affairs principally
from the standpoint of protection. Impartial jury trials
for those accused of crimes were, it is true, highly prized
by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, but measures for the safeguarding and reformation of criminals or those accused
of crime have attracted attention only recently and
rather from motives of public welfare than from personal interest.
THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN

The Common Law apparently made little distinction
between men and women so far as personal protection
was concerned, except in cases involving a husband and
wife and in the class of crimes which are based upon
differences in sex. It is true that married women were
53
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entitled to very little protection against mistreatment by
their husbands, unless such treatment resulted in death,
since the law did not interfere in what were considered
minor domestic difficulties. The murder of a wife was
frankly considered a less important crime than the killing of the husband by the wife, which was looked upon as
a kind of treason. A wife was also expected to depend
upon her husband for protection against many of the
crimes which might be committed against her person or
property by a third party.
The attitude of the Common Law towards the sex
crimes, such as rape, seduction, and prostitution, has
been discussed in an earlier section. It is, the ref ore,
only necessary in this connection to note that the laws
were generally more favorable to men than to women at least as applied in the courts. Furthermore, these
acts appear to have been considered largely as injuries
against the husband or father who was entitled to the
woman's services rather than against the woman herself,
since the spiritual courts rather than the civil courts were
responsible for the punishment of immorality.
The Common Law was at first the basis for the punishment of crimes in Iowa, but step by step it was superseded by statute laws more favorable to women. In
studying the development of these laws only such crimes
as rape, seduction, and desertion require consideration
since women have been entitled to equal protection in the
case of general crimes.
Rape was among the earliest crimes for which punishment was provided by the legislature of Iowa. The penalty for this crime depended upon the age and character
of the woman, and hence even under the Common Law
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there had developed a minimum age below which the girl
was considered incapable of agreeing to her own dishonor. The Iowa law of 1838 accepted the Common Law
standard and fixed ten years as the age of consent. If
the girl was over that age, proof of her consent or nonresistance prevented prosecutio n. The punishmen t in
case of conviction was from twenty years to life imprisonment if the victim was less than ten years of age, and
if she was ten years of age or more the man, if found
guilty, might be imprisoned for not more than ten years
and fined up to $500. 105
This minimum age of consent remained in force in
Iowa until 1886, when it was raised to thirteen; and in
1896 fifteen was established by law as the age at which a
girl became responsible for her honor, although she was
required to be eighteen before property was entrusted to
her care. Since 1896 no change in this particular has
been made although a definite movement to fix it at
eighteen is evident from the petitions presented to the
various General Assemblies - as many as thirty-thre e
petitions having been presented to the House of Representatives alone in 1915. Occasional bills to raise the
age of consent have also been introduced , but none have
been favorably acted upon, the chief argument against
the change being the possible injustice to young men. 106
Another difficulty in securing the conviction of defendants accused of rape has been the requireme nt that
the testimony of some witness other tban the injured
person must be presented to secure conviction. This restriction, although intended to prevent injustice to a man
accused falsely, has made difficult the conviction of the
guilty.107
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Closely associated with this universally condemned
crime is that specified as e:o.ticing a virtuous woman to a
house of ill-fame. The Code of 1851 provided a penalty
of from three to ten years imprisonmen t in the penitentiary for this crime, and one year in jail or a $500 fine
for keeping such a resort. A second conviction increased
the penalty for the latter offense to three years in the
penitentiary. Coercing a woman into marriage was
made punishable by a $1000 fine and a penitentiary sentence up to ten years. The use of stupefying drugs for
immoral purposes was to be considered as rape. A special provision was made in case the woman enticed away
for immoral purposes was under fifteen. Upon conviction, the one responsible for such an act might be sentenced to three years in the penitentiary or a $1000 fine
and one year's imprisonmen t in the county jail. For
enticing away a girl under twelve years of age, the penalty might be ten years in the penitentiary, a $1000 fine,
or both fine and imprisonmen t. 108
The statute penalizing the enticing of a virtuous woman or girl into resorts of prostitution has also been retained in later enactments, and in 1884 the law was so
amended as to include women who had formerly been in
such resorts but had partially reformed. 109
Seduction, which involves the use of promises or deceit instead of force or drugs, was punishable by a period
of five years in the penitentiary or a $1000 fine and one
year in jail, but the subsequent marriage of the parties
was a bar to prosecution. As in the case of rape, the
testimony of a witness other than the complainant was
necessary to convict. 110
One question not definitely answered by the Code of
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a
common victim of unscrupulous men. This left the question for the courts to decide, depending largely upon the
reason or sympathy of the jury. In one case the court
ruled that lack of consent was to be presumed, although
in the case of normal women the reverse was usually
true.m
In a trial for seduction a number of elements must be
considered: the fact of the crime must be proven and the
woman must have been of previously chaste character.
Iowa courts have generally assumed a woman to be
chaste until she has been proven otherwise, thus throwing the burden of proof in this respect upon the defendant. Seduction accomplished by means of a promise
which indicated that the woman was not deceived could
not be punished as a crime according to a ruling of the
Iowa Supreme Court in 1898. 112
The Code of 1897 provided a penalty for desertion by
the husband, without good cause, in case the marriage
had been the means of escaping prosecution for seduction, although desertion was not at this time made · a
crime in other cases.113 Ten years later, however, the
General Assembly responded to the popular demand that
men who abandoned their wives and children should be
punished in other cases as well as the one fixed in 1897.
A wife, of course, might obtain a divorce for desertion,
but that did not help support the family. The law passed
in 1907 provides a penalty of one year's imprisonment
in the penitentiary or six months in jail for any man who
deserts his destitute wife or children under-sixteen years
of age and for any woman who deserts her children
under that age if they are left destitute. In cases of this
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kind the husband or wife are competent witnesses for the
State, although they can not be compelled to testify. rn
WOMEN OFFENDERS

As noted above, the Common Law did not, as a rule,
hold a woman responsible for a crime or tort committed
in the presence of her husband and under his direction,
the assumption being that it was the wife's duty to obey
without question the command of her husband. This
rule, in a modified form, has largely prevailed in Iowa.
Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court has applied this principle of the wife's exemption to a case of manslaughter,
although this crime was one of the exceptions under the
Common Law, and other American courts have generally
held the wife responsible in such cases.
The Code of 1851 contained the provision that a married woman might be found guilty of arson even though
the property destroyed belonged wholly or in part to her
husband and this provision has been retained in subsequent codes. The presumption of the wife's innocence,
in so far as it applied to a husband and wife jointly indicted for keeping a disorderly house, was also denied by
the Supreme Court in 1911. 115
In other respects criminal law makes little distinction
between men and women defendants. It sometimes
seems that a woman charged with a crime has an advantage when tried before a jury of men; but if this is true
it is entirely a matter of sentiment and not of law.
In the matter of caring for prisoners - especially
those not yet tried and those found guilty of slight offences -the people of Iowa have been, on the whole,
slow to realize their responsibility. The early lawmakers
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paid little heed either to the possibility of reforming
men or women convicted of crime or to the evil effects of
collecting old and young offenders, the guilty and the
innocent in the jails to await trial. The only provision
concerning the treatment of women prisoners found in
the Old Blue Book was the law that men and women must
not be confined in the same apartments.11 6
This remained almost the sole restriction on the management of jails in this particular until 1894, when cities
having a population of 25,000 or over were required to
provide separate apartment s at certain police stations
for women and children who were under arrest or detained for any reason. A police matron was also to be
employed and was to receive a stipend not less than the
minimum paid patrolmen. Four years later, the minimum population was raised to 35,000 and only one matron in each city was required instead of several. Smaller cities might adopt the plan if they desired, but it was
not obligatory. 117
The care and treatment of prisoners, especially women, after conviction first began to attract public attention
about 1870. Indeed, women convicts have always been
comparatively few in numbers in Iowa and in the early
days were almost unknown. Moreover, the public conscience had not been awakened to the pos·sibility of prevention and reform.
In 1882 a committee of the House of Representa tives,
appointed to consider a petition presented by the W oman 's Christian Temperanc e Union, reported in part as
follows:
Your committee confidently believe that at an early day the
legislature of the State of Iowa will take proper steps and enact
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a law establishing an institution or prison of the kind referred to
. . . . wherein fallen women convicted of crime may be confined, looking to the reclaiming of the virtue of the fallen and
lost women, and in connection with said institution a reformatory school may be established for the reformation of the young
and tender lost females. 118

The legrslation suggested was not provided, however,
and petitions continued to pour into both houses from
individuals and societies interested in this reform.11 9 In
1890 the General Assembly appropriated $30,000 for a
building for women convicts at Anamosa, and the Code
of 1897 authorized the warden of the penitentiary at that
place to appoint a matron to take charge of the women
imprisoned there. Three years later the Iowa Industrial
Reforme~ory for Females was established in connection
with the Anamosa penitentiary: it was organized as a
separate institution under the Board of Control. Another law, adopted in 1907, provided that any female
heretofore or hereafter '' convicted of a felony and sentenced to the penitentiary" should be sent to Anamosa.
Furthermore, girls under eighteen might be sent there
instead of to Mitchellville at the discretion of the court,
and girls over fourteen might be transferred from Mitchellville to the reformatory if unruly and incorrigible.
Besides making these provisions for women convicted of
crime the General Assembly also, in 1904, enacted a law
that females who were dipsomaniacs, inebriates, or addicted to the excessive use of drugs might be sent to
a State hospital for the insane. 120
Finally, in response to a determined if not a general
demand the legislature, in 1913, made an appropriation
for the purchase of a new site for the Industrial Re-
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fonnatory for Females to take the place of the Anamosa
annex. Two years later a general outline for the administration of the new institution was drawn up and
adopted. This scheme provided for a woman superintendent with a ·salary of $2000 a year and board and
dwelling for herself and her minor children. The superintendent was empowered to appoint subordinates. All
the women convicts at Anamosa and all women over sixteen years of age who might afterwards be convicted
were to be imprisoned at the new reformatory when it
was ready for occupancy. In addition to the older offenders, all girls between twelve and sixteen years of age
who might be convicted of an offense punishable by life
imprisonment might be sent to the new institution or to
the industrial school as the court might decide. The law
also required that any woman prisoner when being transferred from one place to another must be accompanied by
a woman attendant designated by the warrant. 121
When the General Assembly met in 1917 agitation was
begun to repeal the act of the earlier legislature and sell
the land which had already been purchased at Rockwell
City for the new reformatory for women. The movement
failed, however, and the only statute concerning this institution which was adopted was one changing the name
from the "Iowa Industrial Reformatory for Females"
to "The Women's Reformatory". 122
Closely associated with the treatment of adult women
offenders after conviction and even more important perhaps was the attitude of the State government towards
delinquent girls. When the Iowa Reform School was
established in 1868 it was intended for both boys and
girls; but the limited support made it impossible to pro-
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vide suitable quarters for the girls during the time when
the school was located in Lee County. Four girls, however, were cared for in the family of the superintendent,
and thus the law was to some extent carried out. 123
In 1872 the boys were moved to Eldora and the farm
in Lee County was made available for delinquent girls by
an appropriation of $5000. The superintendent was
under the direction of the superintendent of the school at
Eldora and reports were made as if the two schools were
united. Eleven girls were present in 1873, and by 1875
this number had increased to thirty. After much discussion as to the advisability of consolidating the two
schools at Eldora, the plan was rejected, and when the
lease on the Lee County farm ran out in 1878 the girls
were removed to temporary quarters at Mount Pleasant.
The maximum age limit was reduced to sixteen in 1876
and the minimum age was fixed at seven, but in spite of
this fact there were fifty-three girls in this department in
1877. Two years later steps were taken to secure a site
near Mitchellville and forty acres were purchased, together with the building of a seminary, as a site for the
present Industrial School for Girls. 124
The Code of 1897 fixed the per capita allowance for
the boys in the industrial school at ten dollars a month
and that for the girls at eleven dollars. The Twentyeighth General Assembly increased the allowance for
girls to twelve dollars per month and fixed the minimum
age at nine instead of seven years. In 1913, the two
branches of the school were declared to be separate institutions under the management of the Board of Control.
The provisions concerning the schools, however, remain
almost identical. Boys and girls may be committed to
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these schools between the ages of ten and eighteen, but
no sentence can extend beyond the age of twenty-one.
Certain classes of girls, however, are sent to the reformatory instead of to the Industrial School, and other girls,
at the discretion of the court, may be sent to reputable
institutions maintained in the State for such girls. In
this case an allowance is to be paid to the institution by
the county from which the girl is sent. A per capita
allowance of thirteen dollars for each boy and sixteen
dollars a month for each girl is provided by the State
for the maintenance of the schools. 12 '5
The application of general terms to specific cases is
always an important point in legislation and judicial
action. The word ''person'' which, for example, is used
generally in the Constitution and laws has been interpreted as ref erring only to a man in so far as political
affairs are concerned, but as ref erring to either men or
women in criminal matters. Indeed, as late as 1915 it
was urged that the words '' any person'' in the statute
providing for the punishment of '' prostitution or lewdness" applied only to women; but in this case the Supreme Court ruled that it might also apply to men. A
woman would be guilty of prostitution, a man of lewdness.126
According to the definition of a ''tramp'' made by the
General Assembly in 1890 a woman can not be legally
considered as such, since a tramp was declared to be any
"male person sixteen years of age or over who is physically able to perform manual labor'' and yet refuses to
do so and is not able to provide for himself honestly in
other ways. 127

VII
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
THERE has been a large amount of legislation enacted in
Iowa concerning the rights of married persons, but comparatively little relating to the marriage contract or its
dissolution. Marriage in Iowa is considered a civil contract between a man and woman who have the proper
qualifications to enter into such a contract: it is also a
status in which the community is interested as a party.
Consequently, the State exercises control over the f ormation of the contract and restricts or regulates its abrogation or dissolution.
IN THE MATTER OF MARRIAGE

When Iowa became a Territory in 1838 its law concerning marriage was derived from the Common Law and
from the legislation of the Old Northwest. Thus a valid
marriage contract might be made by a woman at twelve
years of age and by a man at fourteen. 128 A year later
the Legislative Assembly raised the minimum age to
eighteen for men and fourteen for women, although a
boy between fourteen and eighteen and a girl between
twelve and fourteen years of age might make a valid
marriage contract if the father's consent was obtained
- or, in the case of his death or disability, the mother's
approval was sufficient. In all other respects the law
made no distinction between the qualifications required
of men and women. 129
64
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When the Code of 1851 was adopted the minimum age
was fixed at sixteen for males and fourteen for females.
Persons under these minimum ages could not make a
valid marriage contract, while the consent of the '' parent
or guardian" was necessary if either party was a minor.130 The age qualifications have not been changed
since 1851; but since 1897 the law provides that if either
party is a minor the consent of the "parents" is necessary, or that of the survivor if one is dead or disqualified.
The Iowa laws have fixed twenty-one as the age of majority for men and eighteen for girls, but all minors attain their majority at marriage. 131
IN THE MATTER OF DIVORCE

Divorce in many of the ancient countries was granted
only to the husband and was probably associated with
the theory that a wife was ·a form of property. The
owner might dispose of his chattel; but, of course, a
chattel was not competent to dispose of its owner. Under
the Common Law the wife was, theoretically at least, entitled to secure a divorce for certain causes, but in practice she was at a disadvantage in beginning a suit for
divorce, since the husband was given control of all the
property, the children, and even the wife's person.
Causes for Divorces in Iowa.- Under the laws of
Iowa the causes for which divorces may be granted have
been, as nearly as possible, the same for men and women182- although the interpretation of the laws has varied according to the sentiment of the judges and, until
1846, of the legislators. It will, therefore, be of interest
to point out only the distinctions between husbands and
wives in divorce legislation and court decisions.
5
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As a general rule public sentiment in the early days
opposed the resort of the wife to a divorce court. Married women were expected to yield their preferences and
even their rights rather than oppose the wishes of their
husbands. A newspaper paragraph on the subject in
1843 contains the following advice to wives: '' Study your
husband's temper and character; and be it your pride
and pleasure to conform to his wishes. Check at once the
first advances to contradiction, even of the most trivial
nature." "How indecorous and offensive it is", continued the same authority, '' to see a woman exercising
authority over her husband and saying, 'I will have it
so.' 'It shall be done as I like' ". 133
Wives apparently did not always follow this advice,
or if they did it was not sufficient to prevent dissensions,
for divorces were not unusual even in early Iowa history.
Among the causes usually established by law were: impotency, bigamy, adultery, desertion, conviction of a
felony after marriage, drunkenness if acquired after
marriage, inhuman treatment, and incompatibility. As
has already been stated these causes, while in force, applied equally to men and women, so that there is no need
to discuss each one separately. 134
Although a husband has always been legally required
to support his wife, failure to support her is not of itself
a cause for divorce in Iowa although it may be included
in desertion or inhuman treatment.
· One of the few provisions relative to divorce in which
the wife's offense only is mentioned as a cause is to be
found in the Code of 1873 and also in later codes. This
:section gives the husband the right to secure a divorce
from the wife if, at the time of their marriage, she was
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pregnant by another, unless he had an illegitimate child
living at the time unknown to the wife. The existence of
such child did not, however, entitle the wife to a divorce
- it merely acted as a bar to the granting of a divorce to
the husband on account of the wife's misconduct. 135
Cruel or inhuman treatment has ordinarily been one
of the causes for divorce by either husband or wife in
Iowa; but, as a matter of fact, this charge has been more
frequently preferred by women than by men. For this
reason the definition of '' cruel or inhuman treatment''
requires a brief discussion in a paper dealing with the
differences between the legal and political status of men
and women in Iowa.
It is evident that the opinions -of the courts might
vary greatly as to what would constitute '' cruel or inhuman treatment''. In 1871 the Iowa Supreme Court
decided that a wife was not entitled to a divorce on this
ground unless it threatened physical danger. "Mere
turbulence of temper, petulance of manner, infirmity of
body or mind", declared the judges, "are not numbered
among these grave and weighty causes.
And it
is not every slight touching of the wife by the husband,
even in anger, which will justify a divorce.'' This decision appears to be a lineal descendant of the old
opinion that a husband might chastise his wife if he did
not use a stick larger around than his thumb. 13 '6
Later decisions, however, have given a broader meaning to the words. In 1889 it was decided by the same
court that '' cruel or inhuman treatment'' need not be
physical, and a wife who left her husband for cause could
not be held to have deserted him. 137 Moreover, repeated
assertions by the husband that the wife was unchaste,
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made in the presence of the family or others, was in one
case held to be sufficient cause for divorce, since such a
charge would naturally produce a mental state detrimental to health. On the other hand, a similar charge
made by the wife against the husband was not generally
considered sufficient to injure his health. The wife could
not secure redress in this case, however, if she by her
wrongful acts provoked the cruel treatment. 188

Alimony.- The chief problems associated with divorce cases, aside from the question of the divorce itself,
are the adjustment of :financial claims and the disposal of
the minor children. The :financial settlement was in the
beginning an outgrowth of the Common Law principle
that the wife's property came under the husband's control at marriage, while he was required to supply her
with necessities in keeping with his station in life, so long
as she remained at home. The influence of this rule is
observable in the first law regulating divorces passed by
the Territorial legislature.
One of the causes for which a divorce might be granted at that time was adultery, and if the wife was the
guilty party the husband received all her personal property as his own and was to be given the use of her real
estate during his life, if there were children, or during
her life if there were none. If the husband, on the contrary, was the offender, and there were no children the
wife was permitted to keep her own property and to receive such alimony as the court might assign her during
her life, but this could not exceed one-half of the husband's income. This provision was to be modified at the
discretion of the court if there were children. 13 9
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A law of 1840, however, repealed this provision, declaring merely that the guilty party, in case of divorce,
forfeited all the rights acquired by marriage. Property
acquired by the husband at the time of the marriage was
to be settled upon the wife and children, if the wife secured the divorce. Alimony could be granted only to the
wife, and on the condition that she was the innocent
party. This was usually a money payment made by the
month or year and was assigned to the wife in recognition of her right to support by her husband. If the
man's income increased, the alimony might also be increased by an appeal to the court which had granted the
divorce. 140
The Code of 1851 made no attempt to provide the details of property settlement in case of divorce, but it was
provided that "when a divorce is decreed the court may
make such order in relation to the children and property
of the parties and the maintenance of the wife as shall be
right and proper. '' 141
Four years later a case arose which required the
interpretation of the word "alimony". A wife who had
been granted a divorce had been given eighty acres of
the three hundred and forty-five acres held in the husband's name, but partly paid for with money belonging
to the wife. The husband did not contest the divorce
decree: he merely denied the authority of the court to
grant land to the wife, on the ground that "alimony"
meant a money payment and not a division of real estate.
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the district court,
basing its decision upon the words of the Code and also
upon equity. "While technically, perhaps," reads the
decision, "it [the land] is recognized as the husband's,
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yet rightly and properly, it is also the wife's
It is not his nor hers, but theirs.'' 142
This recognition of the wife's claim to a share in the
common property instead of to maintenance only suggests that ''alimony'' meant the share of property granted to one of the parties to a divorce as a recompense for
the dower right which, of course, ended whenever the
marriage was dissolved. Accordingly it appears that alimony might legally have been granted to a husband out
of the separate estate of the wife in case he secured the
divorce.
Since the wife was entitled to support, however, and
the husband was not, alimony was most frequently
granted to the wife and was considered almost as much
her prerogative as it had been before 1851. Indeed, so
complete was the husband's control over the wife's property at this time that few wives maintained a separate
title to their property and thus the husband received it
without the formality of a court decree.
Indeed, the wife was sometimes granted alimony even
when she was the guilty party, for in 1871 the Supreme
Court reversed a decision of a lower court which gave a
wife alimony although she had been guilty of adultery.
The higher court, however, decided that she was not entitled to alimony under the circumstances if the husband
had received no property from her or she had not contributed to the common fund. 143 This decision, which
indirectly recognized the right of even a faithless wife
to a share in her own property, was much more lenient
than the law of 1838 which had deprived the wife of all
right to her own property as well as to support from the
husband.
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As has already been stated, alimony in the original
meaning of the term is usually granted only to the wife,
since she is entitled to support from the husband if she
is the innocent party, while she owes no such obligation
to him. The term "alimony", however, has frequently
been used to denote compensation paid by one of the
divorced persons - usually to the injured party as a
substitute for the property right acquired by marriage
and lost by the divorce. In this sense alimony is sometimes awarded to the husband.
The Code of 1873 provided that in case of divorce
'' the court may order either party to pay the clerk a sum
of money for the separate support and maintenance of
the adverse party and the children, and to enable such
party to prosecute or defend the action." 144 Indeed, in
1882, a husband was awarded $300 alimony by the district court, although he was at fault and had already
taken some $400 worth of the wife's property. The Supreme Court permitted the sum of twenty-five dollars
allowed as an attorney's fee to stand, but denied the rest
as unjust. 145 Likewise, the court set aside a decree of
alimony granted to the husband in an ex parte suit, on the
ground that the real estate involved had been purchased
with his money, when it was proven that this claim was
false. 146
On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme Court has decided that a husband's surety could not escape an obligation for temporary alimony on the ground that the
wife had appropriated goods from the husband's house,
since the wife is presumed to have a right to use the
household goods; nor can a debt for alimony be evaded
by a fraudulent conveyance of property. 147
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Court decisions in divorce cases have on the whole
become gradually more favorable to women. In 1896 a
wife was awarded $750 a year out of the husband's salary of $1500, but she had two small children to support
out of her allowance. Again in 1911 an award to the wife
of $2500 out of $5000 worth of property was likewise
con:firmed. 148
In case the wife accepted service of a notice of a divorce action and failed to appear, the courts decided that
she could not afterwards secure alimony; but a voluntary separation in which she agreed to release her claim
upon her husband's property has been held to be no bar
to alimony, since such agreements are invalid. 149
In addition to alimony the husband or wife may put
in a claim for attorney's fees. This is usually allowed to
the wife when the husband is the offending party, but
may also be awarded the husband. The reason for allowing the wife attorney's fees is very evident when it is
considered that the property acquired by the joint labor
of both husband and wife is frequently under the sole
control of the former. The justice of allowing such expenses to the husband out of the wife's property is legs
evident.
The court rulings have usually allowed attorney's
fees to the wife in cas~ the husband appeals after a divorce has been granted her when she has established her
right to it. The husband may also be charged with attorney's fees if he accuses the wife of acts which, if true,
would reflect upon her reputation- unless he can prove
that the charges are true. But if the wife begins an unnecessary suit or dismisses a well-founded one, it has
been decided that her lawyer can not collect his fee from
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the husband, even though the action was dismissed without the attorney's consent. 1'5o Decisions on this point are
not uniform, however, since the decision rests upon the
opinion of the court in each case.
It has also been decided that alimony may be granted
to a wife without a divorce in case she leaves her husband for conduct justifying a divorce, and the husband
may be compelled to pay the costs of the action. 161 Such
a decision is, however, based upon equity and public policy and not upon statutory law.

Disposition of Children.- Many divorce cases also
involve the disposition of children; and here there is
great difficulty in formulating any general rule. Early
judges were strongly impressed by the father's paramount right to the children as found in the Common Law,
and the mother was frequently denied the guardianship
of her children even when she was the innocent party.
The divorces granted by the legislature between 1838
and 1846 were, on the contrary, much more favorable to
the mothers, and the husband was sometimes denied the
right of control either of the children or of the wife's
property. Wives were frequently given permission to
resume their maiden names, and in at least one case the
child was also to bear the mother's maiden name. 152
The disposition of minor children is one of the most
important of the judge's duties in divorce cases where
there are such children, but data as to the number granted to the husbands and to the wives are not available
except in scattered court records'. In case the wife
brings the suit and secures the divorce she has usually
been awarded the custody of the minor children, espe-
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cially since the time of the Civil War. Possibly it is because of this that the divorce cases begun by wives show
a larger proportion reporting children than do those
brought by husbands. Out of the 26,384 divorces secured
by women in Iowa between 1887 and 1906, it appears that
14,325 involved children; while only 2640 of the 8490
divorces granted to husbands reported children. The
number of children involved in the former group was
27,339, and in the latter 4643. Since the children are
generally given to the mother if she secures the divorce
and sometimes even when she is the defendant in the
suit, it is probable that the wives secured the custody of
a large per cent of the children disposed of by the courts.
From 1887 to 1906 the statistics of divorce for Iowa
were as follows : 153
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Number of Divorces.-A comparison of the divorce
statistics of the various countries and States proves that
the number of divorces is not of itself an indication of
the status of women or the happiness of married people.
Japan, for example, had a ratio of about one divorce to
three marriages during the period between 1887 and
1896, while France had only about one to forty; and yet
the position of women was probably better in France
than in Japan. 154 On the other hand, it can not be assumed that women are more unjustly treated in Nevada
where divorce is frequent than in South Carolina where
it is almost unknown.
Many factors combine to determine the divorce rate
of a country or State. Religion, social conditions, custom, and economic conditions are among the more important influences determining the attitude of people
toward divorce and the status of divorced persons. The
development of an independent personality by the women of a country may also increase the divorce rate until
social readjustment is secured.
None of the influences mentioned have predominated
in Iowa, although the divorce rate has been affected by
all of them. The pioneers were intensely individualistic,
cared little about the religious side of marriage, and naturally considered that a civil contract made under the
authority of the State could likewise be dissolved by a
decree of the courts or by an act of the legislature. There
was no mysterious sanctity about a marriage ceremony
performed by a frontier justice of the peace. Divorce
was restrained only by morality, reason, and the respect for the marriage institution which prevailed among
the Iowa pioneers.
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Sufficient proof that the alleged grievances were true
was not always required. Indeed, in the legislative divorces no attempt was made to hear both sides of the
case. It was apparently the belief of the legislators that
no one would ask for a divorce without good reason or at
least that the contract might as well be dissolved if one
or both of the parties to it were dissatisfied. The Iowa
legislature did not even consider each case separately,
but included several divorces in a single bill. An example is found in a law passed over the Governor's veto in
1842, by which no less than eighteen couples were
divorced. 155
The courts also had jurisdiction over divorce cases,
but many persons apparently preferred the less expensive and easier method of direct legislation. Since 1846,
however, all divorce cases have been tried by the district
courts, the General Assembly being denied the power to
grant divorces.
The proportion of divorces granted to husbands and
wives is of great interest in the study of the leg,al position of women and should be considered in connection
with the total number. This proportion will be affected
by two things: the provocation given, and the ability of
the one injured to secure redress by an appeal to the law.
In other words, the relative number of divorces granted
to husbands and wives will vary with the equality or inequality of men and women before the law and also with
the treatment accorded one by the other. If a wife whose
husband is unfaithful to her knows that she will lose the
companionship of her children if she secures a divorce,
she will often prefer to remain at home. Again, the law
may protect the wife, but if she is afraid to act or is
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ignorant of the laws in her favor, she must endure ill
treatment, since interference by third parties is worse
than useless.
It has been said above that the total number of divorces indicates very imperfectly the happiness or unhappiness of married couples. It is also true that the
States in which the wives obtain half or more than half
of the divorces are not necessarily the ones in which husbands are most cruel or unfaithful to their wives. As
one writer has said, '' Divorces to wives measure their
resistance, not their burdens.'' 156 In this respect the
legislative divorces were far ahead of the time in which
they were granted, for thirty-four of the fifty-two divorces granted by the legislature during the period between 1838 and 1846 were in behalf of wives. 157
Unfortunately, statistics concerning the divorces
granted by the courts are not ·a vailable for the State as a
whole until 1867, and it was not until 1887 that the number granted to husbands and wives was separately reported. Even since then, information concerning the
disposition of the children and the division of property
is incomplete. It is probable, however, that the judges
were much more conservative than the legislators, for
they were more influenced by the Common Law.
Statistics concerning the divorces granted in the
United States between 1867 and 1906 have been compiled
by the government. From this report some idea of the
number of divorces granted in Iowa during this period
and the relative number granted to husbands and wives
may be gained. For each of the five-year periods the
numbers are as follows:
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1867-1871
1872-1876
1877-1881
1882-1886

1887-1891
1892-1896
1897-1901
1902-1906

HUSBAND

WIFE

TOTAL

1,058
1,145
1,436
1,588

1,780
2,364
3,178
4,015

2,838
4,509
4,614
5,603

5,227

11,337

16,564

1,649
1,933
2,347
2,561

4,454
5,767
7,466
8,697

6,103
7,700
9,813
11,258

8,490

26,384

34,874 158

From this table it appears that during the twenty
years from 1867 to 1886 a total of 11,337 divorces were
granted to wives in Iowa as compared with 5227 granted
to husbands; while during the next twenty years the
wives received 26,384 divorces and husbands 8490. W omen in Iowa therefore received 68.4 per cent of the divorces
granted during the first twenty-year period and 75.7 of
those granted between 1886 and 1906. In both cases this
is a larger proportion than that for the United States as
a whole - which was 65.8 per cent for the first period
and 66.6 per cent during the second twenty years. As
has been pointed out elsewhere, however, this does not
mean that domestic difficulties are more common in Iowa
than in other localities. 159
The number of divorces granted for each cause and
the division of this number between the husband and
wife also presents some interesting variations, as the
following statistics for Iowa will show: 160
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This table presents two noteworthy features: the
large per cent of divorces granted to husbands on the
ground of adultery, and the increase in the number of
<livorces granted to both husbands and wives because of
cruel treatment; for it will be noted that although for
,other causes, the number of divorces was about twice as
large in the second period as in the first, in the case of
,c ruelty the numbers are approximately five times as
large in the second twenty years.
The larger number of divorces secured by husbands
because of adultery is probably to be explained on other
grounds than the greater immorality of women. Men
are much less inclined to condone their wives' lapses in
morality than wives are those of husbands, and since
they are usually in possession of the family property and
more able to support themselves than married · women
are there is no economic pressure to influence them to
forgive. Besides, men are less likely to be detected in
their unfaithfulness since they are more frequently away
from home and among strangers. Possibly, too, men are
inclined to emphasize this cause, since it is the one which
would arouse the greatest sympathy for the husband;
while women may prefer to base their claims on cruelty
and thus avoid the details connected with a trial for
.adultery.
The increase in the number of divorces granted to
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both husbands and wives on the ground of cruelty is due,
prolbably, to the more lenient judicial definition of cruelty
since 1886. As has already been shown, cruelty, at first
defined only in terms of physical danger, was later enlarged to include mental suffering.
This question may also be studied by a comparison
of the same statistics from a different angle. The proportion of divorces granted for each cause to the entire
number granted to the husband and to the wife for these
two twenty-year periods is as follows : 1 6 1
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It would seem that certain conclusions might be
drawn from these various groups of statistics, though
several conditions probaibly exist in most cases. For example, it will be seen that the nm:nlber of wives obtaining
divorces is about five times the number of husbands in
the cases where there are children and only twice as
many in the cases where no children are reported. Several influences probably contribute to this result. The
women who have children are not so likely to desert their
homes nor to commit many of the acts which justify divorce. This is to be seen in the divorces granted for
adultery where the wives obtain the larger per cent when
there are children, while the husbands receive the majority when there are no children.
Furthermore, the statistics concerning cruelty and
desertion appear to indicate that wives frequently secure
divorces in such cases for the sake of the children, since
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the proportion granted to women with children is much
larger than that to those without. Possibly the fathers
of families find greater reason for escaping their responsitbilities as expenses increase.
There can be little question but that women in Iowa
have received fair treatment in divorce cases, at least
since about 1870. Both laws and court decisions are as
favorable to them as to men, while public opinion has
reversed the Common Law right of the father to the
children and invests the mother with an equal if not a
superior right, although the welfare of the children concerned rather than the right of either parent concerned
is supposed to be the decisive factor in disposing of
minor children involved in divorce cases.

6

7

VIII
GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN
THERE is, perhaps, no right so essential to a woman's
happiness as the control of her own children - at least
on equal terms with the father. And yet there was no
right more flagrantly disregarded by the Common Law,
which failed to recognize the mother's claim upon her
children except in very rare cases. This law, as has been
seen, was still in force when Iowa became a Territory
and it was considered a matter of course that the father
should be the sole gua:vdian of the children while he was
alive. His consent only was required to apprentice a
chi'ld, while the mother's was accepted only in case of his
death or disability.
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

In case the father died leaving minor children possessed or entitled to real or personal property those over
fourteen years of age might choose a guardian, while the
court appointed one for those under fourteen; and it was
only when the mother was thus chosen or appointed that
she became the legal guardian even after the father's
death. Moreover, it appears that he could appoint another as guardian foT his children's property by will and
thus deprive the mother of this authority. 162 It is evident, however, that in cases involving the custody of the
children and not of property, the mother was considered
the natural guardian without formal action of the court.
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The Code of 1851 contained the following provision
concerning the guardianship of children: '' The father is
the natural guardian of the persons of his minor children. If he dies or is incapable of acting the mother becomes the guardian.'' By another provision the natural
and actual guardian of any minor chi1d was given the
right to appoint another guardian for such child by will,
but it is not clear that this gave the father authority to
will a child away from the mother as he could under the
Common Law. The mother was to be the guardian of a
child's property in case of the father's death or disability, if the court deemed her a suitable person. 163
The supreme authority of the father while alive was
not, however, limited either by legislation or judicial decisions. This is illustrated by a case decided soon after
the adoption of the Code of 1851. A wife had obtained a
divorce from her husband and been given the custody of
a daughter three years old, although the two sons were
given to the husband. Later the father claimed the girl
also, and the Supreme Court decided in his favor, since
hi~ interest was considered paramount. In the decision
is found the following comment:
We are aware that in this, our day, the spirit of progress is
abroad in the land, but whilst we would not obstruct its onward
career to triumph over error and oppression, we think that it is
well to observe and maintain those great and cardinal principles
upon whi ch the integrity of the social compact must ever depend.
The just appreciation of the rights and duties of the marriage
contract, and its incidents, is essential to the existence of civil
and christi an society. 164

In other words, the wife must choose between a divorce and the companionship of her children. The
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"rights", apparently, were to be guarded for the husbands; while the ''duties'' were to be impressed upon
the wives.
If the father were dead, however, the legislators and
judges generally recognized the mother's right to the
control of the minor children and to their wages if she
wished to collect them. 165 This right included also the
responsibility of providing for the support of minor
children - the father being responsible if he were alive,
and the mother in case he were dead.
Public sentiment, however, changed radically during
the decade of the Civil War. In 1867 the Iowa Supreme
Court declared that the tendency was to give the children
to the mother in case of divorce, and in 1873 the equal
right of the mother was guaranteed by the Code, in
which it was stated that "the parents are the natural
guardians of their minor children, and are equally entitled to the care and custody of them.'' In case one died,
the other became the sole guardian, and the father,
mother, or a third party might be appointed the guardian
of the property of a minor child in case such property
did not come from the parents. 166
The Supreme Court has passed upon a number of
cases which involved the rights of husband and wife to
their children. As a rule the mother is considered the
proper guardian for young children in case of a separation; and the fact that the father afterwards becomes
wealthy and offers to take the children would not prevent
an increase in alimony which would help the children
although they remained with the mother. 167
The final step in the matter of safe-guarding the
mother's right to her children was the passage of the
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widow's or mother's pension act in 1913. This was an
attempt to secure for every mother, even tliough she were
destitute, an opportunity to keep her children with her
by paying her a weekly stipend for each child under fourteen. The success of this law is not yet assured, but of
its importance there can be no doubt. 168
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

In the matter of the guardianship of illegitimate
children the mother has ·b een somewhat the preferred
parent. Under the early Iowa laws the father could be
compelled to support such a child. The illegitimate child
inherited from the mother and from the father also if
publicly acknowledged, while the mother became the favored one in the matter of inheriting from an illegitimate
child. Very few changes have been made in these provisions since 1851. 169

IX
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF WOMEN
IN THE MATTER OF OWNERSHIP

THE right to own and manage property is one of the
fundamental rights of mankind, but only in recent years
has this right come to be recognized as belonging equally
to women. When the Territory of Iowa was organized
in 1838 it was apparently taken for granted that unmarried women could own and control property on the same
basis as men - the number who did so, however, must
have been very small. Married women, on the other
hand, were not so fortunate; the judges and lawmakers
were slow to recognize their right to control their own
property whether personal or real. They were bound by
the old Common Law, and when on February 1, 1844,
there was introduced into the Legislative Assembly a
bill which promised to married women the right to all
property acquired by them either before or after marriage, the measure failed by a vote of eleven to twelve. 170
Two years later, however, the legislature enacted a
law which gave to a married woman the right to hold
property, provided it did not come from her husband.
Such property was not liable for the husband's debts,
although the control of it was vested in him and all suits
concerning it must be prosecuted jointly and all deeds
signed jointly. 171
Iowa was admitted into the Union on December 28,
1846, but neither the rejected Constitution of 1844 nor
S6
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the Constitution adopted in 1846 made any mention of
the property rights of women. It was not until the adoption of the Code of 1851 that any noteworthy progress
was made. Indeed, it is the general rule that most of
the statute law conferring rights and privileges upon
women is to be found in the codes. According to the
Code of 1851 a married woman's property did not vest
in the husband, nor did he necessarily control it. If the
wife permitted her husband to take charge of her property, she was required to file a record of ownership if
she wished to hold it free from the husband's delbts to
third parties and to collect it from his estate when he
died. 172 Furthermore, it was decreed by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1855 that in case a wife's property were
sold during coverture and the notes and mortgages given
in payment for it made payable to the husband alone, at
his death the wife, who was made executrix, must treat
these notes and mortgages as a part of the estate and not
as belonging to her. 173 The taxable property of married
women was by the Code of 1851 required to be listed by
the husband, or, if he refused, by the wife. The Code
also provided that "married women may receive grants
or gifts of property from their husbands without the
intervention of trustees" .17 4
The Code of 1851, however, did not dislodge the old
Common Law idea from the minds of some people. In a
case before the Iowa Supreme Court in 1860 it was
argued that a wife could not buy property, for all her
money and property belonged to her husband. The
court ruled that a married woman might acquire real and
personal property and hold it in her own right - a decision to be expected under the Code of 1851. The same
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question came up again in 1862, this time involving choses
in action and notes payable to the wife but delivered to
the husband as her agent. Again the court held that
since it was self-evident that they belonged to the wife
the husband and his creditors had no claim upon them. 175
The Revision of 1860 also made several provisions
concerning the property rights of married women most of which were either repetitions of those in the
earlier Code or elaborations of them. It restated the
rule that a wife's personal property did not vest in her
husband, but she was required to file a notice of her
ownership if she wished it to be free from his debts.
Bank stock and other similar personal property, however,
need not be listed unless given to the wife by the husband.176
The courts frequently attempted to distinguish between property acquired by the wife as a gift from the
husband and that received from other sources. For example, in 1864 the Supreme Court of Iowa decided that a
wife could not hold property purchased with her husband's money, or money recognized as his, even though
the title was in her name. "As a rule", declared the
judge who wrote the decision, '' the services of the wife
and the products of her labor belong as much to the husband, under our statute, as at common law." Since
neither the Code of 1851 nor the Revision of 1860 specifically stated that a wife's wages could not be taken by
the husband or his creditors, the courts at this time generally assumed that they belonged to the husband although it does not appear that he could collect them
directly. 177
The very next year, however, the same court ruled
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that if a husband purchased land with his money, putting
the title in his wife's name, the presumption was that he
intended it as a provision for her and not in trust for
himself; and the same rule held, it was declared, in case
the w_ife bought the land using the husband's money. 178
The status of the wife's property in this case was decided
as between husband and wife and not with reference to
third parties; the same was true in two other cases decided about the same time. In one case the court ruled
that money belonging to the wife at marriage did not vest
in the husband - the notice required being merely for
the protection of third persons. Even when such a notice
had not been filed, the wife might maintain an action of
replevin against her husband for the purpose of securing
possession of any property belonging to her, if she left
him for cause or he drove her from home. The wife,
however, might give her money to her husband and thus
bar herself from any claim to it, but a promissory note
executed by the husband to the wife for money furnished
by her was proof that she had not so given away her
money and w~s binding on him or his estate. 179
A little later a question arose as to the validity of a
mortgage given by the husband to the wife for a bona
:fide debt and duly recorded. The court decided in this
case that the wife's claim under the mortgage was superior to that of a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged
property. The judge who wrote the decision said in
part:
The ownership of the wife and the possession of the husband
being inconsistent, the statute provides that the ownership shall,
as to third persons without notice of the real ownership, be presumed to be in the party having the possession. But in this case
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the wife's interest as rnm·tgagee is not inconsistent with the husband's possession when she records her mortgage and thereby
gives notice to the world of such interest. 180

A case which presented a number of unusual features
was decided in 1861. The essential facts were as follows :
a woman with an illegitimate child married, but had no
children by this marriage. She purchased property with
her own money and later sold it without her husband's
joining in the deed, taking a mortgage in her own name.
This the husband collected, and the land was sold. The
court decided that the husband had no right to the land
nor to the mortgage, but that the wife's deed given in
the first place was not valid without the husband's signature. This decision did not, however, invalidate the son's
claim as the heir of his mother. 181
By the close of the Civil War the right of even a married woman to her own property was generally conceded
in Iowa, the emancipation of the negro to some extent
emphasizing the injustice of refusing to white women
rights which former negro slaves possessed. The chief
difficulty in the way of the complete independence of the
wife in respect to her own property was the necessity
for protecting third parties who supposed the property
in the possession of the husband to be his own. Because
of this difficulty, proof of the wife's ownership was frequently required and this proof had to be more definite
in cases involving innocent purchasers than in many
other cases where such persons were not concerned. 182
It appears that the amount of property owned by
women began to attract attention a'bout this time, for an
Iowa newspaper in 1871 after printing the statement
that unmarried women of the United States were said to
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own about $400,000,000 of property added the comment,
'' Here is a large lump of taxation without representation.' ,1sa
The Code of 1873 tended to equalize still more the
property rights of husband and wife, although no important changes were made. A wife might own property
by descent, gift, or purchase, and might manage it under
the same limitations imposed upon the husband. It must
be remembered, however, that the property accumulated
by them jointly was usually in the husband's name.
Property belonging to one and held by the other might
be recovered by law. The Code of 1873, likewise firmly
established the right of married women to their own
wages and to maintain action for them in the section
which provided that a "wife may receive the wages of
her personal labor and maintain an action therefor in
her own name, and hold the same in her own right; and
she may prosecute and defend all actions at law or in
equity for the preservation and protection of her rights
and property, as if unmarried. " 184
In spite of all this the idea that the hus·b and had a
right to the wife's property died out slowly from the
minds of men, although the courts have not usually upheld the claim. In 1877 the Iowa Supreme Court held
that under the Code of 1851 the property of the wife
which she left under the control of her husband did not
become his to such an extent that at his death it descended to his heirs instead of to his wife. 185 Indeed, it has
become an uncontested principle that a wife may hold a
claim against her husband for a bona fide debt even
against other creditors. An illustration of this ruling is
to be found in the case of Stamy v. Lamng et al. in which
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the Supreme Court ruled that if a husband conveyed
property to his wife to whom he was indebted and who
knew of his indebtedness to others, the conveyance would
be legal, but only for the amount owing to the wife. All
in excess of that amount would be subject to the claims
of the other creditors. Moreover, in the case of Jones v.
Brandt, in which the wife gave her husband money to
invest for her, and he invested it in real estate in his own
name, the court held that although under section 2499 of
the Revision of 1860 the property was the husband's in
so far as third parties who were ignorant of the real
ownership were concerned, yet under section 2202 of the
Code of 1873 it constituted a debt from the husband to
the wife and she could collect from him. 186
The various court decisions dealing with the property
rights of women, especially married women, suggest that
they owned a considerable amount of property. In 1886
it was reported that 673 women owned and directed
farms, five owned greenhouses, and ninety managed
market gardens - indeed, it was claimed that three women in Maquoketa paid more taxes than all the city officers
together. 187 Many women were earning money in other
ways. Keeping boarders, for example, was declared to
be an independent business, and the proceeds belonged
to the wife. 188
In a case decided in 1890 the Supreme Court of Iowa
ruled that land purchased by the wife with money paid
her for taking care of her husband's mother and other
money earned by her, could not be taken by the husband's creditors, on the ground that they believed it to be
the husband's; nor could the crops from a farm worked
by the wife and sons be held for the husband's debts,
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even though he attended to the business affairs and listed
the property to the assessor in his own name. 189
It is evident that the courts have usually decided
cases involving the property rights of married women in
accordance with the law of equity rather than with the
Common Law. The failure of husband and wife to have
an understanding concerning financial affairs has made
the decisions more difficult than they otherwise would
have been. For instance, a case came up for decision in
1894 in which the husband had purchased land in his own
name with money derived from his wife's farm. No
agreement that the money so used should be returned
was made and the court decided that the wife could not
claim that the property was held in trust for her. The
next year, on the o.ther hand, the court decided that if the
wife loaned her husband money on condition that he
should convey to her certain land and he conveyed it to
her the same day that a judgment was rendered against
him, the conveyance was legal. 190 By the time the Code
of 1897 was adopted, the right of married women to their
separate property and wages was well established. The
Code summed it up in the following words : '' A married
woman may own in her own right real and personal
property, acquired by descent, gift or purchase, and manage, sell and convey the same, and dispose thereof by
will, to the same extent and in the same manner the husband can property belonging to him." The joint property, however, remained in the husband's control. 191
A brief reference to a few court decisions will complete this discussion. They are, for the most part, very
favorable to the wife's claims. In the case of Clark Bros.
v. Ford, decided in 1905, the court decided that an agree-
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ment made between the husband and the wife's parents
that he should repay her the money they advanced to him
would support a transfer of property to her, even though
there was no other contract and irrespective of the insolvency of the husband. Such a conveyance, it was held,
could be set aside only by showing fraud. 192
Even in case the husband conveyed property to the
wife or purchased it in her name without receiving anything for it, such a conveyance was to be considered a
gift unless contrary to the statute or unless evidence to
the contrary was offered, and she could not at his death
be held to account for it as part of her distributive
share. 193 In this case no third parties, except perhaps
the other heirs, were involved.
The old Common Law gave the husband absolute control over the wife's property, while the Iowa Supreme
Court in 1915 ruled that if the husband took possession
of his wife's property without her consent, she could
bring an action against him to recover it as if he were a
stranger. Even if she consented to his use of the property, she mighf recover it at any time if it was of such a
character that his creditors had no reason to believe that
the property was the husband's. 194
IN THE MATTER OF DOWER

The right of the wife to dower and that of the husband to curtesy under the Common Law have been discussed in a former chapter. The Territorial laws of
Michigan and Wisconsin modified them only slightly, and
at the time of the organization of the Territory of Iowa
these rights remained practically the same as under the
Common Law. Indeed, in January, 1839, the Iowa legis-
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lature passed a law governing the distribution of estates
of deceased persons containing a proviso, '' saving to the
widow, in all cases, her dower, and to the husband his
courtesy, according to the course of the common law." 195
Another law adopted at the same time provided that
any devise of property to the widow by the husband's
will debarred her from dower, unless she renounced the
bequest within six months. Her dower interest at this
time was fixed at one-third of the real estate for life and
she was given a distributive share of one-third of the
personal property "forever". If there were children
they received the remainder, and if not, it went to the
husband's father, or if he were dead, to the mother. A
certain amount of property, including a 'bed, wearing apparel, one cow, one horse, household furniture, and supplies for one year, could not be taken for the husband's
debts. The status of married women is evident from a
clause in this act which declared that wills should be
binding unless protested within five years after being
probated '' saving to infants, femes covert, persons absent from the Territory, or non compos mentis, the like
period after the removal of their respective disabilities.'' 196
The Code of 1851 provided that one-third of all real
estate which had belonged to the husband during the
period of the marriage and to which the wife had made
no relinquishment of her rights should, at the death of
the husband, be set apart for the wife, if she survived,
"as her property in fee simple". This substitution of
permanent ownership of the one-third for the life tenure
is the most important change in the law fixing the wife's
dower made up to this time, but it was repealed in 1853
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and the Common Law right substituted. The husband
was given the same right to the property left by the wife
that the wife had in his property if she survived him that is, one-third of all her real property which he had
not joined in transferring to another and one-third of all
personal property in her possession at the time of her
death. The estate by curtesy, which gave him all of her
property for life, was abolished. 197
The widow's dower could not be affected by will unless
she consented to receive the bequest instead of dower;
and if there were no children and the husband left no
will, the wife received one-half of his estate and his
father the other half. If the man were unmarried, the
father received it all. If the husband's father were dead
the property was to be given to his heirs, and if he left
none, the mother received the property, and if both the
father and mother were dead and left no heirs, the wife
- or her heirs - was to receive the entire estate. 198
It will be noted, however, that only one-third of the
estate was dower; the other one-sixth which the widow
was to receive if there were no children and no will was
in addition to dower. 199
The Code of 1851 appears to be very clear and specific, but the assignment of dower and the disposal of the
remainder of the estate gave rise to a succession of lawsuits. Some of these are of interest because of the points
of law they involve and some because of the curious complications they present. For example, in 1852 a case
came up for decision in which a widow sued the executor
of her husband's estate for $150 - the value of wheat
cut from the land assigned to her as dower. The court
decided that, although under the Common Law growing

•
PROPERTY RIGH'l'S OF WO;\IEN

97

crops went to the executor, the wheat belonged to the
widow, since her dower was hers absolutely and every
thing belonging to the land went with it. 200
Another case presented still another phase of the difficulty of administering laws concerning the disposition
of estates. The story of the dispute may be briefly summarized. In February, 1851, the husband died, and in
the following July, a child was born which died soon
afterwards. According to the Code, the widow received
one-third as dower, and the child the remainder. What
then became of the child's share at its death¥ The
court decided that in conformity with sections 1410 and .
1411 of the Code of 1851, the estate of any child dying
unmarried and intestate went to the father, if living, and
if he were dead, was to be disposed of as if it had been in
the father's possession at his death. Accordingly the
widow in this case received one-third of the child's share
and the husband's father or his heirs the remainder. 201
The General Assembly sometimes passed speciai laws
which were contrary to the general laws. Thus on J anuary 13, 1855, a law was passed giving to Hannah Everall,
the widow of Henry Coats who had died without other
heirs, the right to hold the estate free from the control
of her second husband, and a few days later a man was
given authority to sell his property free from the dower
right of his wife, although she was to have dower in what
he left at his death. 202
Much confusion in the matter of dower arose from
the combination of the Common Law and the statute law.
An illustration is found in a case decided in 1855. A
widow, who held title to real estate for infant children,
remarried and later made a deed of the property to the
7
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children, the husband not joining. Her second husband
took possession of the property and received the rents
and other profits. The guardian of the children brought
suit to recover possession for the children. The def endant claimed the land by right of the Common Law as his
wife's dower, although she herself made no claim to it.
The court decided that the property was never the wife's
in her own right, and so her husband had no right to it.
Moreover, dower could not be claimed in this way, for
land bought by one person with money belonging to another was declared to be held in trust. 203
In 1858 a slight change was made in the disposition of
the property of a man who died intestate. If he left a
wife but no children, one-half of his estate went to his
wife and the remainder to his parents. If no wife survived him, his entire estate went to them; but if the father were dead, the mother received only a life estate the property at her death descending to her children by
the father of the intestate. If there were no such heirs,
the property was to be divided between the heirs of the
father and mother. 204 The Code of 1851, it will be remembered, gave the property to the "father" instead of
to the "parents".
The Revision of 1860 included the law of 1853 which
gave the widow the Common Law right of one-third of
the husband's personal property and a life interest in
-one-third of the husband's real estate instead of an abso1ute title to it. The Revision also gave an alien widow
the right to dower, and declared that no property exempt
from execution in the .hands of the,widow as the head of
a family was to be disposed of by the executor of 1;_he
-estate. Two years later the legislature amended section
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2477 of the Revision and restored the right of the surviving husband or wife to an absolute title in one-third
of the real estate and in one-third of the personal property of the deceased spouse. According to this law the
husband's share in his wife's estate was also known as
dower. 200 In 1867 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that
under section 2437 of the R evision of 1860 a widow would
not inherit the share of a child which died before the
death of the husband. 20 6
In 1862 the General Assembly passed an act providing for the support of the widow and minor children for
one year at the expense of the entire esfate. 207
The majority of the laws concerning the distribution
of estates dealt with those concerning which no will had
been made. Indeed, the chief legal restriction on wills at
this early day was that which assigned the one-third to
the surviving husband or wife. This could not be willed
away unless the survivor voluntarily accepted the provisions of the will. The judicial decisions, however, were
frequently conflicting. In 1867 the court ruled that the
widow could not take both dower and the homestead, but
the following year permitted the widow of a man dying
without issue to receive one-half of the real estate and
the homestead.
Again, the judges decided that a will which gave the
wife one-third of the real estate for life and gave tlr-e remainder to the heirs was in lieu of dower because the
assignment of dower would have interfered with the pro-visions of the will. The next year t'hey ruled that a wife
did not forfeit her right to dower by choosing a will
which bequeathed her one hundred and seventy acres of
land and all the personal property for life or until she
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remarried, when it was to be divided among the husband's heirs. 208
In case a man died without heirs other than his wife,
the Iowa General Assembly sometimes passed special
acts giving the entire estate to the wife instead of permitting one-half of it to escheat to the State, as it would
otherwise have done. 209
Although the law provided that the personal property
of an intestate decedent should be divided in the same
manner as the real estate, the Supreme Court in 1872
decided that section 2435 of the Revision of 1860 did not
apply to personal property and hence the widow could
not obtain her share of such property when the husband
disposed of it by will. 210
On the other hand, it was declared that the widow's
interest in the husband's real estate was not subject to
his debts as was that of the other heirs; and the widow
was under no obligations to pay any portion of the taxes
levied on the lands of her deceased husband before her
dower had been assigned. The allowance of support for
twelve months was held to be superior to the claim of a
creditor on the estate, 'b ut her dower was subject to a
mortgage executed to the grantor for the purchase
price. 211
In 1870 section 2498 of the Revision of 1860 which
limited the right of the mother to a life estate in the
property of a child who died intestate was repealed, and
the mother was given absolute possession of such property. 212
The Code of 1873 made some changes in the property
interest of husband and wife. One-third of all legal or
equitable estates in real property possessed by either
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was to go to the survivor in fee simple at the death of the
owner. The rights of dower and curtesy were abolished
and the part of the property assigned to the survivor is
henceforth known as the distributive share, although the
terms - especially dower - continue to be used in Iowa.
The widow was to be given the home as a part of her
share if she desired it; and the widow of a non-resident
was given the same rights in the estate of her husband
that resident women had except as against purchasers
from the husband. 213
If the property was not easily divided one of the heirs
might take it all and pay off the rest; if no one else wished
to do so, the widow was to have the privilege. The Code
of 1873 reversed the provision in the Revision of 1860 by
providing that the widow should receive her distributive
share instead of the bequest made in the will unless she
consented to take under the will within six months. 214
·It was also provided that the wife of an intestate who
left no children or parents, and whose parents left no
heirs, should receive the entire estate. The General Assembly had sometimes made provisions of this nature in
particular cases and it was made a general rule by the
commissioners who drafted the Code. 215
The interest of the surviving husband and wife in the
property of the other was thus well defined, but the assignment of "dower", as the widow's share was still
called, continued to be a fruitful cause of dissension.
The husband's share does not appear in as many cases probably because few wives left separate estates. A few
court decisions will illustrate some of the questions and
the attitude of the judges toward them. The acceptance
by the widow of a bequest of a life estate in her hus-
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band's lands, it was declared in 1875, did not bar her
right to the distributive share. In case the estate consisted of several tracts, the Supreme Court ruled that it
was proper to assign to the widow so much of one or more
than one as constituted one-third of the whole. 216
The wife's claim on the property in her husband's
name during his life was not so easily determined; but
in 1876 the Iowa Supreme Court held that, although her
right in it was inchoate during his life, she might still
prevent fraudulent alienation of it. In the case directly
under consideration the court ruled that where the husband by negligence or fraud permitted a son by a former
marriage to acquire title by a sheriff's deed, the wife
might subject the property in excess of the amount of
the judgment to her claim to dower. 217
Furthermore, there is evidence that even at that time
there was a movement to include personal property with
real estate in the matter of alienation without the wife's
consent, since in 1880 a petition to require the wife's
signature to a chattel mortgage was introduced into the
Senate. 218
In the following year the court interpreted section
2452 of the Code of 1873 as including personal as well as
real property and decided that the husband could not
by will either before or after marriage deprive the wife
of her one-third. There has, however, been little restriction on his right to dispose of it before his death either
by sale or gift, and the wife's consent is not necessary.
A bill was introduced into the Senate in 1886 which would
have prohibited the sale of household goods without the
consent of both husband and wife, but it failed to become
a law at that time. 219
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Two cases illustrate some of the difficulties in administering estates. In one, decided in 1881, the husband
willed all his property to his wife until the youngest
child attained a certain age. The court ruled that onethird was hers in her own right and the remainder she
held in trust for the children. In the second case, decided in 1900, the wife was given support from the entire
estate by the will, and the court awarded her one-third
absolutely and support from the remainder. 220
The distributive share was not an inheritance according to the decision of Judge J . H. Preston of the District
Court, concerning an insurance policy of $2000 payable
to the "heirs", for the judge ruled that the widow was
not a '' legal heir'' and the daughter received the entire
amount. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in 1890. The Code of 1897, however, specifically
provided that the phrase "legal heirs", when used in insurance policies, should be construed to include the husband or wife of deceased. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court decided in 1904 that where the wife was made the
sole beneficiary under the will, she was entitled to all
money collected for his death, to the exclusion of their
children. 221
In 1896 a case came up for settlement which involved
another technicality. The widow agreed with her husband's executors and the other legatees to accept the
provision of the will in consideration of $10,000. She
afterwards claimed her distributive share, but the court
ruled that she had yielded her right to all real property,
although she might have had both dower and the bequest
if her consent to the will had not been entered on the
records. 222
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The General Assembly in 1896 made the wife's signature necessary on a mortgage of exempt property. This
provision was repeated in the Code of 1897 and is still in
force; but according to a court decision the husband
might sell exempt property or assign exempt earnings
without the wife's consent. In 1906 a law was passed
requiring the wife's signature also for the assignment of
wages. 223
The Code of 1897 made very few changes in the property rights of married women. The legislature in 1913,
however, passed an act which gave the entire estate of
the husband who had no children to the widow if its value
was under $7500. The estate in excess of this amount
was to be divided between the wife and the parents. The
same rule applied to the husband's share in the wife's
estate. 224
The "judge made" laws are much more numerous.
In 1903 the court decided that, in case the husband's will
made the wife sole heir and legatee along with a further
provision that at her death it should go to certain persons, the second devise was invalid since it was repugnant to the first. Another interesting decision was
handed down in the following year. Here the wife had
refused to accept the will and claimed one-half of the
estate, there being no children. The court ruled that if
she refused the will she could have only one-third and the
husband's mother the other two-thirds, for the law giving
the wife one-half was only in case there was no will. 225
In 1882 the widow was declared to have the right to
choose between the homestead for life and her distributive share. Occupancy of the homestead for ten years
was h~ld to be equivalent to an election to take the home-

PROPERTY RIGHTS OF WOMEN

105

stead. A similar decision was handed down in 1890. 226
From these laws and decisions it appears that the distributive share of husband and wife is now the same in
law, except that the property listed as the husband's is
frequently the result of the work of both husband and
wife and in such cases the wife receives one-third or onehalf of the joint accumulation in place of her own share
and the part of the husband's share assigned her by law.
This distributive share can not be alienated except by
divorce, or by a definite and recorded choice of a bequest
by will, or, in some cases, by an election to take the homestead instead of the distributive share. Indeed, the
courts have frequently allowed the distributive share
and either the bequest or the homestead.
ALIENATION OF DOWER

The Common Law, it will be remembered, made the
right of dower difficult to alienate, and this principle was
carried into the laws of Iowa. Apparently the legislators and judges, especially in the early days, took the
attitude that women were accustomed to leave business
affairs entirely to their husbands or fathers and hence
were incapable of acting for their own best interests.
Indeed, the early laws are the severest indictment of the
position of wives and the general attitude of the husbands towards their wives in business matters. Ignorance on the part of the wife and the possibility and even
the probability of coercion on the husband's part were
apparently taken for granted, and so special laws were
made to protect the wife.
The right of husband or wife in the estate of the other
is, of course, destroyed by divorce. It may also be re-
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linquished by the joining of the husband or wife with the
one owning the property in making a deed or mortgage,
or by an agreement entered into before marriage. Likewise it may be voluntarily renounced after the death of
the owner of the property and the will or homestead
right chosen instead. Iowa laws and courts, however,
have almost uniformly prohibited the relinquishment of
the dower right by a contract between husband and wife
during coverture.
The first law concerning the relinquishment of dower
under the Territory of Iowa was passed January 4, 1840.
It was made legal for a married woman to relinquish her
dower interest in her husband's prope:r.:ty by joining with
him in the transfer of the property to another, but she
must be examined apart from her husband and, in the
presence of the judges, one of whom must personally
know her, must declare that she knew the content of the
conveyance and that she signed it voluntarily and not
under the coercion of the husband. A married woman
could convey her own real estate only with the consent
of her husband and must also declare that the act was not
due to his compulsion. 227
This law, moreover, was enforced by the courts: in
1853 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the widow was
entitled to a life estate in property which her husband
had sold in 1840, the wife joining in the deed, because the
officer before whom the deed was made failed to certify
that the contents of the deed had been made known to
the wife and that she voluntarily relinquished her dower
as required by the act of 1840. This decision contained
interpretations of two other points of law, since it declared that the right of dower was governed by the law
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in force at the time the conveyance was made and not by
that in force at the time of the death of the husband.
Consequently the widow received only a life estate as
provided by the act of 1839, instead of an absolute title
as would have been the case under the Code of 1851. 228
In 1853 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a wife,
through a trustee, could contract with her husband for
separate maintenance, releasing her claim for support
and dower; but she could not do so without the trustee. 229
Moreover, when a husband and wife made a postnuptial
contract through a trustee that the wife should have her
separate property in return for $5000, it was decided that
she could make such an agreement since there was consideration.
The fact that a wife joined with her husband in a conveyance of real estate did not, according to the Supreme
Court, make her responsible for the contract; nor did the
fact that she signed a mortgage, without expressly relinquishing her dower right as required by the law of
1840, prevent her from asserting her claim to dower at
the death of her husband. 230
The laws regulating the relinquishment of dower are
interesting in that they illustrate the general movement
towards the greater independence of women and less of
the paternalistic attitude on the part of the government.
In 1858, for example, the requirement that the judge before whom a woman signed a transfer of property, must
personally know her and explain to her the content of
the paper she signed, was repealed. 231
Moreover, the Supreme Court decided in 1862 that
when a wife joined in a trust deed, without reading it,
she could not rely on this to free her from the conse-
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quences as against an innocent purchaser. A decision
involving a different principle was handed down a few
years later: the wife signed a blank mortgage_ with her
husband and he inserted a description of the property
of the wife and delivered it to a third party to negotiate;
the judges decided that this was not the deed of the wife
and was invalid. 232
In line with the general movement to recognize women as responsible for their acts, the Supreme Court, in
1868, decided that a conveyance in which the wife relinquished dower in real estate would be supported unless
there was proof of fraud or coercion. In other words,
the wife would be presumed to have acted voluntarily
unless there was evidence to the contrary; while under
the earlier law it was taken for granted that she was
controlled by the husband. Furthermore, in case of a
separation, the wife might convey her interest in the husband's property to him without the intervention of a
trustee. 233
The courts as a general rule have declared any relinquishment of dower during the marriage as invalid except in case of transfer to another. This has always been
the rule in Iowa, although in 1875 the court decided that
if a wife agreed to accept a certain sum in lieu of dower
and the husband provided for this in a will which the
widow at first accepted, she could not afterwards claim
her dower. This was prevented, however, by the election
of the will and not by the agreement. 234
The Code of 1873 definitely prohibited such relinquishment of "dower" by postnuptial agreement, declaring that "when property is owned by either the husband or wife, the other has no interest therein which can
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be the subject of contract between them, or such interest
as will make the same liable for the contracts or liabilities
or either the husband or wife who is not the owner of the
property, except as provided in this chapter. " 235 In
interpreting this section the Supreme Court upheld the
provision, declaring that ''dower'' was limited to onethird and that the husband or wife might dispose of the
other two-thirds by will, whether there were children or
not. 236 A similar case was decided in 1889. Here the
husband and wife had agreed to divide the estate before
his death. The husband later conveyed his share to a
third party without the wife's signature, and after his
death the wife claimed her one-third of this property,
which was awarded to her on the ground that the agreement was contrary to public policy and therefore void:
the husband could not convey a complete title without
the wife's signature, nor could she before his death relinquish what was merely a contingent right. 237
Again, in 1901 the wife was awarded "dower" al- .
though she had made an agreement to accept certain
lands and an annuity for life in place of her distributive
share. 238 A variation of these postnuptial contracts was
later held valid. A husband and wife agreed to unite
their estates in the creation of a trust for a third party
who was to come into possession at the death of the survivor. The husband survived and remarried. His second wife claimed dower, but the court decided that the
husband held possession only for life and that she could
not recover. 2 3 9 The only exception to this rule is the
interpretation that the husband and wife might contract
concerning alimony (section 2203 of the Code of 1873
notwithstanding), although the proviso was added that
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such a contract would not be held valid unless reasonable
and just to the wife. 240
It appears that the requirement that the wife must
relinquish dower in real estate to complete the transfer .
did not prevent the sale of property in case the wife refused to sign, but the property remained subject to the
claim of the wife for her distributive share. Indeed, it
was decided in 1886 that where a man sold land without
the wife's signature and bought other property, the wife
might claim dower in both. 241
Nor could the dower interest of the wife be alienated
by the husband under power of attorney, for under section 3154 of the Code of 1897 the distributive share can
not be the subject of contract between them. A legalizing act in this matter passed in 1902 was declared to
be unconstitutional and void.242
In 1913, however, a provision concerning post-nuptial agreements was made to read as follows : ''No
conveyance of real estate heretofore made, wherein the
husband or wife conveyed or contracted to convey the
inchoate right or dow{)r to the other spouse, acting as the
attorney in fact, by virtue of a power of attorney executed by such spouse, such power of attorney not having
been executed as a part of a contract of separation, shall
be held invalid as contravening the provisions of section
thirty-one hundred ~fty-four of the code", but all such
conveyances were legalized. 243
The attitude of the lawmakers and judges towards
postnuptial contracts between husband and wife applied
only to those concerning dower: other contracts and conveyances based upon other considerations than the marriage relation were valid. 244
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Antenuptial contracts have, on the whole, been held
valid by the courts, although the rule has been to protect
the widow's one-third interest. For example, in a case
in which the woman had made an antenuptial contract to
claim '' no right of dower or homestead in or to any
property which shall belong to the estate" of the husband, the widow was given one-third of the personal
property and the interest on $3000 for life as provided
for in the contract. 2415
In case the wife made an antenuptial contract to relinquish dower on consideration that the husband should
repay to her children the money he received from her, or
if she outlived him, she was to receive this herself and
$1000 in addition, the contract was declared to , be
valid. 246
A mutual antenuptial relinquishment of interest in
,each other's property was declared in 1910 to be valid,
but only so far as it applied to property owned at the
time of marriage. The allowance for one year's support,
however, was declared to be a part of the cost of administration and the wife could not cut off her right to it by
an antenuptial agreement, providing the allowance itself
was proper. 247
The complexity of these marital property rights may
be shown by a case decided in 1887 where the wife signed
mortgages releasing her dower and afterwards became
the owner of the senior mortgage. The owner of the
junior mortgage attempted to collect from her, but the
court ruled that he could not recover after the statutory
time had expired. 248
These laws and court decisions relate almost entirely
to the voluntary alienation of dower by the wife: the
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husband is usually given the same privileges, but cases
concerning his claim seldom appear in the courts. The
right to the distributive share on the part of either husband or wife may be lost or modified in other ways.
Divorce, for example, automatically extinguished such
claim. One case in which a claim for dower was filed
after a divorce had been granted is found in 1850, but
thi_s was merely a question of the legality of the divorce.249
In 1911 the General Assembly attempted to secure
uniformity and diminish litigation by passing a law that
all conveyances made prior to 1890 should be valid even
though the spouse did not join, unless suit should be
brought within a year after the act went into effect. In
case the one who made the conveyance was still alive, the
time was extended to two years; nor did i_t apply to suits
already instituted. An additional law was passed in
1913 which prohibited action for recovery of the distributive share in property conveyed by a deed of trust before
January 1, 1890, unless suit was begun by March 1,
1914. 250
The "dower" right of either husband or wife may be
alienated in other ways than by voluntary relinquishment. Such alienation, however, is unusual, and nearly
always is brought about by judicial order. In 1884 it
was decided that an assignment for the benefit of creditors was a judicial sale and under section 2440 of the
Code of 1873 cut off the wife's distributive share. The
wife could not, however, be compelled by a court of
chancery to relinquish her interest to property in a suit
to which she was not a party. 251
It was likewise decided in 1908 that an entryman
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under the timber culture laws of the United States had
no vested right in the land until the pat~nt was issued,
and upon his death the widow would have no dower right,
though his heirs might prove up by right of purchase and
not by descent. Under the laws of this State the widow
was not an "heir" and acquired no interest in the premises.252
A sale of land for taxes, it was held in 1910, cut off
the widow's claim to her share - the provision in the
Revision of 1860 that a married woman might redeem
land from tax sale being held to refer to her own property and not to inchoate dower right. 253 On the other
hand, in 1914 the Supreme Court declared that the wife's
distributive share could not be held for a mechanic's lien
if there was sufficient other property to pay the debt. 254
Perhaps the most interesting decision of all was handed down in 1904. Section 3386 of the Code of 1897, which
prohibited a murderer from inheriting from the one
murdered, would not, the judges held, prevent a wife who
had murdered her husband from receiving her distributive share of his estate; but more than one-third was
denied her even if there were no children. 255
Not only have the Iowa courts usually protected the
widow's right to her distributive share; but they have
sometimes, though not always, extended this protection
to transfers of property immediately preceding marriage.
In 1881 a conveyance of real estate to children just prior
to a second marriage, and without the knowledge of the
wife, was held not to be a fraud; but in 1908 this decision
was contradicted and the widow was given dower in such
real estate. When the wife knew of the transfer, however, she was considered to have agreed to it.256
8
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The most striking injustice concerning mutual property rights of husband and wife is the failure to give the
wife a control over personal property similar to that
given her in the real estate in the husband's name. Frequently such personal property has been acquired partly
as the result of the wife's efforts; yet it is usually held
in the husband's name and he has absolute control over
it. An illustration is found in a case decided in 1884.
The wife joined the husband in a deed to real estate and
the husband invested the money in other property which
he put in the name of a son. As a result, the wife received neither dower nor homestead right. 257 Except for
minor restrictions, the husband can dispose of personal
property as he wishes.
IN THE MATTER OF CONTRACTS

The right to make contracts is, of course, closely associated with the ownership and control of property and
involves both civil rights and responsibilities. As in the
matter of property, the laws of Iowa have not discriminated in this matter against unmarried women; but the
status of married women has been a matter of legislation
and court adjudication.
The Common Law gave the wife no right to make
contracts, nor could she be held responsible for one: her
husband had complete authority over her person, her
children, and her property. As her right to hold property in her own name developed, so also her ability to
make contracts concerning it increased and her responsibility was made to correspond.
In Iowa Territorial days the husband was expected to
assume the care of his wife's property and to def end and
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prosecute suits concerning it. Indeed, the Legislative
Assembly passed a law in 1838 making it the duty of the
husband to prosecute a suit begun by the wife before
marriage. 258 This was not intended as a hardship for
women, and indeed it was sometimes offered as a defense
by married women in suits to compel fulfilment of contracts. In 1848 the Iowa Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Mahaska District Court on this very ground.
The facts of the case may be briefly stated. A married
woman who had been living apart from her husband for
two years, although he was within the State, made a contract concerning land which was to be deeded to her when
she had paid a certain sum of money. When payment of
a note was demanded she pleaded the defense of coverture. The Supreme Court ruled that she could not contract except for necessities for which her husband and
not herself was liable. In reply to the claim that since ·
she was living apart from her husband she was responsible for her debts, the court said '' neither will a mutual
agreement of separation release her from the legal restraint which the law has imposed upon her; nor can she
in this way become restored to the rights which attach to
a feme sole. " 259
In a case decided in 1849 a husband and wife had
jointly contracted for buildings on the land belonging to
the wife. An attempt was made to enforce a mechanic's
lien, but the objection was offered that a married woman
could not make a binding contract and her property
could not be encumbered by another, since the law of
1846 declared that a married woman '' shall possess the
same [property] in her own right", although the management aud profits belonged to her husband as at Com-
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mon Law. The court, however, decided that the wife's
property was liable for a debt incurred for such a purpose, since the husband and wife could sell or mortgage
her real estate. 260
The Code of 1851, in addition to the other sections
concerning property rights, included the provision that
'' contracts made by a wife in relation to her separate
property or thor;;e purporting to bind herself only, do not
bind the husband.'' A married woman abandoned by
her husband might secure permission from the district
court to transact business as if unmarried, and this might
include the right to control any property the husband
might have left. The same Code also gave to married
women the right to convey interest in real estate '' in the
same manner as other persons". 261
The last named provision soon required court interpretation. If a married woman had authority to convey
property, did she have power to convey it to her husband 1 A case involving this question was decided in
1858. A wife contracted with her husband to relinquish
all claim to dower for a consideration. The Supreme
Court held that she could contract with her husband even
concerning dower, and under the Code of 1851 she could
be compelled to fulfil the contract, if fairly given, although the decision contained these words : '' courts of
equity will, in such cases, guard with jealous care the
rights of the wife; the husband will be held to the strictest fairness and integrity; and the wife will not be deprived of her property, by any gift or transfer procured
by fraud, circumvention, or undue, or improper influence.
And while policy would dictate in such cases, that a trustee should be appointed, to protect and guard the inter-
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ests of the wife, yet if none should be appointed, we know
no rule which declares such gifts or transfers void, in the
Or, to state
absence of fraud or unfair dealing.
the proposition in another form, if, under the principles
of the common law, courts of equity did in some, and indeed in many instances, give full effect and validity to
her contracts, why should she not be bound by her engagements, in the absence of fraud or unfair dealing,
under a statute which greatly enlarges her powers and
. Having the power to convey her
privileges 7 .
real estate, in the same manner as other persons, no reason is perceived why she might not convey it to her husband, and in return, or in consideration thereof, she
receive from him a grant or conveyance of other, property. If so, why may she not, for a money consideration,
make or execute a release of her interest in his real
estate?'' 262
This decision of the court, however, was reversed two
years later, when the Supreme Court decided that a wife
could not contract with her husband except through a
trustee: the provision in the Code of 1851 that she could
convey property as '' any other persons'', it was held, did
not remove this restriction. In this case the wife had
given the husband $3800 of her own money with the
understanding that he was to account for it. She afterwards left him and sued for the money, but the court
ruled that she could not sue her husband unless she
could prove cruelty or desertion, nor could she obtain
separate support even out of her own money unless one
of these charges was proven. 263
The validity of a married woman's contract with any
one other than her husband and the husband's right to

118

LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN

make contracts for the wife also required judicial interpretation. In one case the husband, claiming the right
of agent, gave a mortgage on his wife's land. The Supreme Court, however, denied his right to bind the wife
by a contract in which she did not join. The court also
ruled that a married woman might maintain an action
relating to her separate property without her husband's
joining in it. 264
Two interesting decisions were handed down at the
following session of this court. In one, the judges ruled
that the Code of 1851 and the Revision of 1860 intended
to protect women in their property rights, but not to enable them to make contracts of all kinds or to carry on a
general business. In the second case the wife's earnings
were declared to belong to the husband. 265
In 1858 the General Assembly empowered courts of
chancery to correct mistakes made in conveying or encumbering a married woman's property or in relinquishing her dower to the same extent that they could correct
errors in the conveyances or mortgages of other persons. 266
The Revision of 1860 provided that whenever a married woman was a party to a suit her husband must be
joined with her, except in the following instances:
1. When the action concerns her separate property, or is
founded on her own contract, she may sue and be sued alone.
2. When the action is between herself and her husband, she
may sue and be sued alone. And in no case need she prosecute
or defend by guardian or next friend.

The commissioners made the following comment on
this section :
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The substantive laws of Iowa, with justice, and but proper
humanity, concede to married women certain rights in property.
These rights, to be of any value, must be accompanied with
adjective rights, which will secure their enjoyment. The right
to sue follows necessarily from the right of property. The only
reason why, under the common law, she could not sue at law
was, that as she had no rights of property, she had no occasion
to do so - as in progress of humanity, she began to have rights
conceded to her - the right to sue, also arose, and as it was not
recognized by common law, she had to go into a court of chancery
to enjoy it. It would have been easier to have enacted a statute,
allowing such suit at law; but there were many reasons why in
that age, the equity court in such affairs was best. But all these
have passed away, and as she is to have substantive rights which
Iowa has already said, we can not see why she should not have
all the rights logically sequent thereto, the same as anybody else.
She also formally had to sue by next friend, and so forth, because she was incapable of making a contract, and had no property to pay costs with, if cast in the suit. But, these reasons no
longer exist, and the disabilities based on them, should also
logically cease.
Besides, if she trades and becomes liable, what sense is there
in not allowing her creditor to sue her, as any other person,
ignoring the fact of marriage, as much as in the case of a man, a
fact which has no longer anything to do with the liability. 2G7

The Revision of 1860 also provided that when a married woman was sued alone, judgment could be enforced
against her separate property only; but if she sued,
judgment might be enforced against her own property
"or her husband being brought in by rule, execution may
issue against him also, unless for cause he show that he
is not interested in the suit by the wife." If the husband
and wife were sued jointly, the wife might defend in her
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own right; and if one neglected to def end, the other
might defend for both. 268
It is noticeable that the courts, also, began to recognize the independence of women so far as contracts were
concerned. This recognition became especially marked
during the period following the Civil War. Neither the
husband nor the wife could convey separate property
without the consent of the other, but married women
gradually acquired freedom in other financial affairs.
In 1865 the Supreme Court decided that a married
woman might execute a mortgage on her separate property to secure certain debts of her husband without becoming liable for other debts, the validity of such a mortgage depending upon whether it was obtained by
improper influence. Nor could a judgment against the
entire estate of the wife be enforced when she had mortgaged certain property to secure a debt of the husband.
At about the same time the judges decided that a conveyance by a married woman had the same effect as one by a
feme sole or by a man- an acknowledgment being necessary as to its validity in the case of third parties, but not
between the parties themselves. 269
In 1870 the section of the Revision of 1860 relating to
contracts by married women was repealed and the following substituted for it: '' Contracts may be made by a
wife, and liabilities incurred, and the same enforced by
or against her to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried.'' 270 . This provision has
remained practically the same in all the legislation concerning the rights of married women since 1870. In 1877
the Iowa Supreme Court made the following comment on
the sections of the Code of 1873 dealing with the subject:
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These provisions, it must be admitted, completely emancipate
the .wife from all the bonds recognized by the common law, saving those of affection, and moral obligation. Being clothed with
all the natural rights enjoyed by the husband which she may
exercise free from his control, the law will hold her subject to
the same rules which restrict and control the rights of the husband, and enforce his obligations assumed by contract or imposed by law for the protection of other members of society.
Coverture, in Iowa, ought to be no shelter to the wife against
the enforcement of the rights of others growing out of her contracts. As she has all the rights of the husband, she must assume
all his obligations. When the law will imply a contract binding
the husband, under the same circumstances it will raise one
against the wife. In short, the statute, in bestowing upon her
equal property rights with the husband, imposes upon her the
:same obligations he bears. 271

The responsibility acquired by women under the law
-0f 1870 and subsequent enactments appears not to have
been entirely appreciated, for in a number of cases during the seventies there is evidence of a desire on the part
,of married women to escape liability by pleading coveriure. The courts, however, nearly always declined to
recognize such a plea as valid. In 1869 the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled that judgments against married women on
,contracts they had a right to make were enforced the
'.Same as those against other persons and property acquired after the making of the contract might be taken
to satisfy the debt. And again, in 1871 the same court
banded down a decision that, if a married woman suffered judgment to be rendered against her in an action
11pon a note in which she was co-maker or surety for her
·husband, she could not escape liability by pleading cov-erture.272
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A husband might act as agent for the wife, the Supreme Court decided in 1868, but could bind her only
when authorized to do so when his acts were subsequently
ratified by her- and such ratification must be proven by
evidence stronger than that required to establish ratification by the husband of an act of the wife or between
third parties. 273
Moreover, the vendor of real estate, it was decided in
1871, was not relieved of his contract to sell land to a
married woman on the ground that she was not bound by
the contract, if she fulfilled her part of the agreement.
To be sure the provision that certain contracts could not
be enforced against married women was for their protection, but in this case the contract could be enforced in
equity and the seller was required to execute the deed. 274
Not only was a married woman permitted to make
contracts with third parties: she might also make them
with her husband. Indeed, in 1872 the Supreme Court
ruled that a transfer of personal property from husband
to wife was valid, although the contract was verbal and
secret. Furthermore, the fact that a wife gave her husband notes or money to deposit for her in the bank did
not subject them to the claims of the husband's creditors,
since the ownership of the notes payable to the wife was
evident without recording. Also, if a wife loaned money
to her husband, taking a promissory note therefor, she
stood as any other creditor and it was not necessary that
the claim be recorded. 276
It is difficult to determine just what the attitude of the
judiciary has been towards the right of contract as regards married women. For example, the court decided in
1879 that under the Revision of 1860 a married woman
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did not subject her property to liability by becoming
surety for her husband on a promissory note, since this
was not a separate debt in the sense of relating to her
separate property or purporting to bind herself only.
"The policy of the statute being the 'more effectual protection of married women,' it must have been designed to
affect such contracts as that of the case at bar, and the
remedy thereon as administered in courts of equity. " 276
A year later, the Supreme Court declared that if a
married woman signed a deed transferring land to her
husband's son, the deed was valid even though the price
was misrepresented to her, unless she would not otherwise have signed it. But if the paper was represented to
her as a sale when it was really a gift, her dower right
would not be barred by the transfer. 277
There seems to be little change in the contract rights
of married women after 1880, and very little litigation.
In 1892 a bill was introduced into the Iowa Senate to
give a wife the right to sue her husband without bond,
but it was indefinitely postponed. 278
The ten years following the adoption of the Code of
1897 furnished a number of court decisions which point
to the conclusion that by this time the wife's right to
make contracts, even with her husband - except concerning dower right - was conceded. The difficulty now
lay in safe-guarding the rights of third parties - particularly creditors of the husband. The courts apparently
adopted the rule that a wife was to be treated as any
other person unless there was evidence of collusion on
the part of husband and wife to defraud third parties.
Naturally such evidence was hard to find, and most of
the decisions are in favor of the wife.
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A man's creditors, it was decided in 1897, could not
object to a married man's paying his wife ten per cent
interest by oral agreement on money loaned by her.
Also, a debt from husband to wife would sustain a chattel mortgage by the former to the latter against the
claims of his creditors, although such a debt arose from a
loan of money which she exacted from him as a condition
of executing a conveyance of the homestead at a time
when he could make her a valid gift, or before he became
insolvent. 279
On the other hand, a conveyance of property by the
husband to the wife was invalid as against the claims of
his creditors if made in consideration of money previously furnished him without special arrangement to
repay it. 280
A more unusual case arose when a man conveyed
property to his divorced wife in consideration of past
support for herself and child, although she had deserted
him without cause. The court here ruled that this transfer was void as against his creditors in so far as the
value of the land exceeded the amount owed. 281
The legal fiction of the oneness of husband and wife
continued to be recognized in the courts, except where
modified or changed by express statutory enactments,
and therefore a wife might not sue her husband on his
personal contract during coverture, though she might
bring action against him for property rights arising from
a partnership. 282
Indeed, it was decided in 1904 that a contract by which
a husband agreed to give his wife one-half interest in all
property coming into their possession in return for
money furnished by her from her separate estate was
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valid under section 3155 of the Code of 1897. This section also entitled a married woman to maintain' an action
against her husband for the payment of a promissory
note given in return for money loaned to the husband;
and if she did not take advantage of this provision, the
statute of limitations would run against this debt as
against any other. 283
One other question concerning this subject requires
brief mention. If contracts or conveyances concern both
husband and wife and one refuses to sign, what is the
status of the one who has made the agreement 7 The
Iowa Supreme Court answered this question in 1905 by
ruling that a contract by the husband alone is void as to
husband and wife, and damages could not be obtained
from the husband for failure to fulfil such a contract. 284
IN THE MATTER OF HOMESTEAD

The lawmakers and judges of Iowa early recognized
the advantage of keeping the family together, even at
the expense of the creditors, and from this idea there
' developed the homestead right or the special exemption
of property owned by the head of a family and used as a
home. The Code of 1851 declared that "the homestead
of every head of a family is exempt from judicial sale''
if there was no law to the contrary. Furthermore, a
widow or widower, though without children, was to be
deemed the head of a family while continuing to occupy
the house used as such at the time of the death of the
husband or wife. These provisions, with some minor
additions, have been repeated in every code since 1851. 285
As a general rule the husband was considered the
head of the family and was entitled to a homestead right,
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If he were dead the right devolved upon the widow, or if
the homestead belonged to the wife the homestead might
still be occupied by the husband after her death. In
either case the debts of the owner, with a few exceptions,
could not be collected from it. The Code of 1897 also included divorced persons in this exemption; and the Supreme Court decided in 1880 that an unmarried woman
who was caring for her sister's children was entitled to
this homestead exemption. 286
To insure this special exemption, however, the homestead must be platted in accordance with law; and this
the husband could do without the wife's consent, although
he could not sell or encumber it, once it was selected,
without her agreement. 287
In 1864 a case was decided which illustrates a peculiar idea of the property rights of the wife. It involved
the legality of a deed to the homestead to which the husband had signed both his own and his wife's name. The
Supreme Court decided that this was not the deed of the
wife, although the evidence showed that the husband had
signed other conveyances in the same way. 288 Furthermore, it was later decided that even if the wife signed a
mortgage on the homestead in relinquishment of dower,
the mortgage was invalid, since the presumption was that
she joined only in the release of dower and not in relation to the homestead right, unless this was definitely
stated. 289 The wife, the court decided, might devise a
homestead in her name, subject to the rights of the surviving husband. 290
In 1878 it was decided that at the death of the husband the wife was entitled to have the homestead assigned to her as a part of her dower if she so desired; but
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she was not entitled to both dower and the homestead.
This was true, the courts decided, even though the husband had promised a son the homestead if he remained
on the farm. But there appears to have been some indecision as to later cases in which both dower and the
homestead were claimed by the widow. At one time the
Supreme Court decided that she could not have both; at
another time it ruled that a widow might occupy the
homestead for ten years and later claim her distributive
share in spite of section 3369 of the Code of 1873. In
case the widow definitely chose one or the other, the
courts usually decided against any claim for the other
share. If the distributive share was chosen, the homestead was no longer exempt and could be taken for debts
contracted by the owner before that time. 291
The husband has the same right to the homestead
owned by the wife at her death. 292 Indeed, in the matter
of homestead right, the law apparently makes no distinction between husband and wife, except to specify that
the husband is the head of the family and entitled to the
homestead right so long as he is alive or not legally disqualified for some reason.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES

In the matter of administering on estates the early
Iowa laws were not especially favorable to married women, although widows and single women were under no
disability in this matter if they were otherwise qualified.
A law passed in January, 1839, provided that the widow
was to have the preference in choosing an administrator,
if she wished to act and no administrator had been appointed by will; at the same time, the legislature enacted
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a law that if the administrator appointed by will were
under seventeen years of age, of unsound mind, convicted of any infamous cr_ime, or a married woman, a new
administrator must be appointed, unless the husband in the case of the married woman - should give bond
with her for faithful performance of duty. 293
In addition to the general laws, the early legislators
felt that it was their duty to oversee the work of the few
women administrators. For example, on January 4,
1842, a, special act was passed permitting an '' administratrix" to sell land belonging to her husband's estate.
Three-tenths of the land was assigned to her as dower
and minute regulations were made for the conduct of the
transaction. 294
The Code of 1851 made a decided change in the status
of married women in respect to this matter. Married
women were to be permitted to act as executors of estates
independently of their husbands and a woman's marriage
subsequent to her appointment did not render her in_capable of serving. 295
Since that time there has been little discrimination
between men and women in the matter of settling estates, though naturally men are more frequently appointed since they are generally more accustomed to
financial responsibilities. In 1884 the Supreme Court
declared that there was no restriction in law upon the
wife's right to act as administrator on her husband's
estate if none had been appointed by will, but some discretion was left with the judge, for the wife might be
insane or incapable of acting. In the case on trial, the
resident mother instead of the non-resident wife had been
appointed. 296
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THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY

The wife's right to dispose of her own property by
will, subject always to the dower or distributive share of
the husband, has been generally recognized in Iowa. As
a rule her right to do this has been the same as that of
the husband. The Code of 1851 provided that a married
woman might "convey her interest in real estate in the
same manner as other persons. " 297
IN THE MATTER OF SUPPORT

Under the Common Law the husband was legally
bound to support his wife and children in accordance
with the social standards of the class to which he belonged; but if she refused to live where he selected the
home, she could not demand support. All property owned
by the wife and all money earned by the wife either before or after marriage became the husband's, and was
liable for his debts. The wife, on the other hand, was
not held responsible either for her own or her husband's
debts or contracts, for she had no property from which
the debt could be collected. The wife could purchase
necessities and charge them to the husband, and he also
became responsible for her debts contracted before
marriage.
It appears that the early lawmakers were interested
in preventing the expenditure of money for poor relief,
and this is doubtless the motive for the law passed by the
Legislative Assembly in 1839, which provided that married vagrants who had been arrested might be released
if they furnished bonds. and promised to support their
families. Money earned by such men during the period
of their arrest was to be used for the benefit of their
!)
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families. Indeed, a husband might be compelled to give
bail to support his wife if she feared that he intended to
abandon her. 298
The Common Law rule that a husband must support
his wife, however, was joined to the provision that the
wife must live with her husband at any place of his
choosing. If she refused he was not compelled to support her. Iowa law did not quite accept this r_ule, for
even before statutes were enacted to that effect it was
generally recognized that some conditions necessitated
the wife's leaving home. However, a Territorial court
decided in 1841 that a husband was not responsible for
the debts of his wife if she left him; but if he drove her
away he virtually gave her a bill of credit for necessaries. 299
· Husbands whose wives left them, whether for good
cause or not, frequently attempted to safeguard themselves and punish the wives by publishing notices such
as the following:
TAKE NOTICE

I hereby forewarn all persons against trusting my wife,
Gratia Hart, on my account, as I am determined to pay no debts
of her contracting unless compelled by law.
HENRY HART. 300

The Code of 1873 provided that if either husband or
wife abandoned the other for a year without providing
for the family, the other might obtain authority from the
district court to administer the property; but the Supreme Court decided that this did not affect the wife's
Common Law agency by which she might carry on his
business in his absence. All contracts thus made were
declared valid. 301
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In 1887 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a wife
who voluntarily left her husband and was not herself
free from fault could not obtain separate support; but in
1894 it decided that the husband was liable for medical
aid furnished the wife while the couple were living apart
by agreement - the physician being ignorant of the separation. 302
That husbands, in many cases, did not voluntarily
provide for their wives and families is evident from the
agitation for a criminal law governing this subject. At
first it aroused only ridicule, as is shown by the following
resolution introduced in the Iowa Senate in connection
with a bill to provide penalties for the crime of desertion:
If any woman, without good cause, abandon or desert her
husband, and shall refuse or neglect to provide for such husband,
she shall be liable to the same penalties, and the same rules of
evidence shall be applicable.aoa

The increasing problem of caring for such families,
however, removed the question from the realm of the
humorous, and in 1902 and 1904 bills to protect wives and
families from such desertion were introduced but failed
of enactment.304
At the next session of the General Assembly, Governor Cummins denounced desertion and urged that steps
be taken to punish it as a crime '' against the fundamental compact of society.'' The House passed a bill making
desertion a misdemeanor, but the measure was indefinitely postponed in the Senate. Governor Cummins in
his message in 1907 urged the passage of an act which
would "make it a crime for a man to desert his family
without good cause, and to refuse to support, without
good reason, his wife and children." "We ought", he
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continued, "to do something to check the rapidly growing habit of repudiating the most sacred obligations
which a man ever assumes.'' A bill making desertion of
a wife or minor children a crime and permitting the husband or wife to testify against the other in such cases
was adopted by the legislature at this session. 305
The General Assembly also incorporated the following section in the supplement to the Code adopted in
1907:
•
Every person who shall, without good cause, wilfully neglect
or refuse to maintain or provide for his wife, she being in a
destitute condition, or who shall, without good cause, abandon
his or her legitimate or legally adopted child or children under
the age of sixteen years, leaving such child or children in a destitute condition, or shall, without good cause, wilfuHy neglect or
refuse to provide for such child or children they being in a
destitute condition, shall be deemed guilty of desertion and, upon
conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than one year, or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than six months.

Furthermore, in all such prosecutions the husband or
wife might testify against each other. 306
In 1906, just before the adoption of the sections above
referred to, the Iowa Supreme Court decided that a husband who expelled his wife from the home must support
her whether the act was justifiable or not. 307 Two years
later it ruled that a man could not lawfully abandon his
wife and minor children except for a cause that would
entitle him to a judicial separation. 30 8 The section in the
Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1907, transfers the
action in case of desertion from a civil action between
husband and wife to a criminal proceeding in which the

PROPERTY RIGHTS OF WOMEN

133

State is the plaintiff but desertion is still one of the
causes for which a divorce may be granted.
LIABiILLTY FOR DEBTS

In America the wife's property has generally not vested in the husband, although the early laws made few restrictions so far as the real control of it by the husband
was concerned. The Code of 1851 provided that the personal property of the wife should remain hers after marriage, although it might be taken for the husband's debts
unless she filed a notice of her ownership with the county
recorder. This action also enabled her to collect her
property from the husband's estate. The intention, of
course, was the protection of third parties; consequently
bank stock and similar securities did not need to be recorded, since the name of the owner was evident. Contracts made by the wife concerning her separate property
did not bind the husband. All these provisions ref erred
to debts other than family expenses, since the Code provided that "the expenses of the family, the education of
the children, and such other obligations as come within
the equity of this provision, are chargeable upon the
property of both husband and wife or of either of them,
and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or the
husband separately." In 1913 it was provided that
either the husband or the wife could be sued separately
as well as jointly. 309
Since it has been possible to collect family expenses
from property belonging to the wife, it will be of interest
to note the court decisions as to what constitute family
expenses. As might be expected the rulings have merely
dealt with particular cases and have not established any
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general standard. The separate property of the wife has
been held liable for the price of a piano used by the family, although it was purchased by the husband on his
individual credit; but a reaping machine was not considered a family expense, nor was the cost of feed for a
horse used in the husband's business but not used by the
family. 310
When the money of the wife was used by the husband
for ordinary living expenses with her consent and without any agreement for repayment, the Supreme Court
held that she could not recover it from the husband's
estate; but one who advanced money to the husband for
family expenses could not claim a lien on the wife's separate property unless the loan was made at her request,
or the original account was assigned to the lender. 311
Neither could the wife be charged with attorney's fees
and interest at ten per cent on a debt, because her husband gave a note to that effect, although the debt itself
could legally have been collected from her property.
Indeed, the court ruled that she could not be charged
with money borrowed by the husband and used for family
expenses. 312
In 1894 an unimportant but interesting question came
before the Supreme Court for decision. vVas a married
woman liable for the price of an atlas purchased by the
husband in spite of the wife's protest 1 The husband
gave a note, and upon his failure to pay the wife was
sued. The court decided that this was not a family expense, especially since she opposed the purchase. This
conclusion was not only reasonable but was supported by
precedent, for in an earlier case the court had decided
that the husband di<l not have to pay for supplies not
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actually necessary when he had for bidden such purchase.313
Some of these cases present peculiar features. For
example, in 1897 the Iowa Supreme Court decided that a
diamond shirt stud, purchased and worn by the husband,
was a family expense chargeable upon the wife's estate
because it was used to fasten clothing. On the other
hand, a later decision ruled that the wife's property
could not be held for the expense of caring for her insane
husband at Independence, since such treatment was not
a family expense. The reason for this conclusion was
based on the Common Law which did not hold the wife
financially responsible for her husband's care or support; since no statute made her liable for such care, the
Common Law was still in force. A case similar to this in
law but not in equity was decided in 1909. This was a
claim against the wife for her husband's board while he
was absent from home in contemplation of a separation.
This, too, was decided in favor of the wife under the
Common Law.314
Under section 3165 of the Code of 1897 it was decided
by the courts that a judgment against the husband alone
for family expenses might be enforced against the property of the wife, but she might refuse to expend professional earni11gs unless her husband promised to repay
her; and the transfer of property as a result of such a
promise was legal and could not be set aside by the husband's creditors.316 From these cases it is evident that
the wife's legal protection in this respect depended on
her ability to make bargains with her husband.
Among the latest decisions concerning the term "family expenses" is one which held that the wife could not be
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compelled to pay for beer purchased by the husband,
evidenqe that it was used upon the table being immaterial.316
It is evident from a study of such cases that nothing
has been decided except that a married woman is responsible for family expenses if she has property in her own
name; but no rule has been established as to what constitutes family expenses.
Another aspect of the question of the :financial responsibilities of husbands and wives relates to their liability for the other's debts when not for family expenses.
It is clear that at the time of the adoption of the Code of
1851 the husband still exercised considerable control over
the wife's property, for in 1853 a case was decided by
the Iowa Supreme Court which involved the validity of a
lease signed by the husband alone, affecting land held by
the wife at the time of her marriage. At the time the
dispute arose the couple were divorced, but the husband
still claimed that the lease was valid. The court decided
that such a lease bound only the husband and ceased
when his interest in the property ended - as it did when
the divorce was granted. Otherwise, the judge who
wrote the decision remarked, the right of curtesy might
be made permanent. 317
Another case decided at about the same time shows
the contrast between the Common Law and statutory law
in regard to the wife's position. The question involved
in this case was whether or not the husband was liable
for debts contracted by the wife before marriage. The
court held that under the Common Law he was responsible for such debts, but under the Code of 1851 he was
not liable if the debts at the time purported to bind her
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only.3 18 Although the Code plainly stated that the wife's
property was not liable for the husband's debts if the
ownership was known, yet that very question came up in
1854 when an attempt was made to hold the property,
bought and managed by the wife, for the husband's debts.
The court had little difficulty in deciding that the wife's
property could not be held, especially since the husband's
creditor knew of the wife's ownership and had himself
had financial dealings with her. 319
The Iowa Supreme Court has been extremely favorable to the property rights of married women as against
the claims of the husband's creditors, and the laws have
attempted to protect her rights without injuring third
parties. It is interesting to follow the steps by which
the lawmakers arrived at the conclusion that it was so
reasonable for a married woman to own property that
special notice need not be given of that fact.
The Revision of 1860 made few changes in the property rights of married women. Notice of the wife's ownership was required except for bank stock and similar
forms, which need not be listed unless given to the wife
by the husband. The husband was not liable for the
debts contracted by the wife concerning her separate
property; nor was she liable for his debts, except for
family expenses. A married woman, if abandoned by
her husband, might secure permission from the court to
act independently and might then manage the husband's
property- if he left any. The husband could obtain
the control of the wife's property in like manner if she
deserted him. 320
A decision which was rather unusual in its interpretation of women's property rights was handed down in
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1864, reversing the decision of the lower court. The case
may be briefly summarized. W. M. Roselle and his wife,
Lucinda Roselle, left a debt of $200 in Piqua, Ohio, when
they came to Iowa. The creditors got a judgment and
levied on a house purchased by the wife in Burlington,
Iowa, with money earned, as she claimed, by millinery
work. The court decided that it did not matter whether
it was her money or her husband's, since the Code of 1851
superseded the Common Law only in respect to property
inherited, and not to that earned by her. By the rules of
the Common Law, which it was declared governed this
case, '' the money which Lucinda earned in dressmaking
vested at once in her husband; and if she purchased real
estate with it, taking the title in her own name, she holds
the property simply in trust for her husband and his
creditors.' ' 321
This reactionary decision practically took away from
the wife her right to her wages and earnings, for it limited the provisions of the Code of 1851 and the R evision of
1860 to inherited property. It was not, however, agreed
to by the General Assembly and in 1866 a law was passed
providing that the earnings of a married woman whose
husband did not support her should be held in her own
right exempt from her husband's debts, although they
could be taken for her own debts and for family expenses
unless protected by special laws. Property purchased
with such earnings was also exempt, and it was not necessary for the wife to file a notice of her ownership. 322 It is
difficult to realize that previous to the passage of this law
a husband might entirely neglect his wife and family, and
yet, if the wife unaided managed to acquire any property, he might incur any indebtedness he pleased and his
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creditors could collect from the wife. Furthermore, it
was decided by the Supreme Court, that same year, that
the wife might sell or trade her separate property for
other property without subjecting the profits to seizure
for the payment of her husband's debts. 323
In 1870 the section of the Revision of 1860 concerning
the liabilities of husband and wife for the debts of the
other was somewhat modified. The new law reads in
part as follows :
Neither husband nor wife is liable for the debts or liabilities
of the other incurred before marriage, and except as herein otherwise declared they are not liable for the separate debts of the
other; nor are the wages, earnings, or property of either, nor is
the rent or income of such property, liable for the separate debts
of the other.324

In spite of this apparently clear rule that neither husband nor wife was responsible for the debts of the other
contracted before marriage, the right to satisfy a judgment against the husband for debts contracted before his
marriage by levying on the wife's property was claimed
in a case decided in 1873. The judge of the lower court
gave the following as a part of his instructions to the
jury: '' The separate and individual property of the wife,
and the income and rent of her property are not subject
to the payment of the debts of the husband that were
contracted prior to their marriage, even though the same
should be left under the control of her husband, and no
notice given of her ownership.' ' 325 The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court and denied the
liability of the wife for such debts.
This case illustrates the difference between the old
Common Law and the statutory law of Iowa concerning
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the liability of the wife for the husband's debts. Under
the Common Law the wife was not responsible for any
of her husband's debts - indeed, she could not be held
responsible for her own debts, for she was not recognized
as a legal person and all property owned by her at marriage or acquired by her after marriage became the
property of her husband. As a result of this rule the
wife's property could be taken for the husband's debts
whether incurred before or after marriage, for it was
not hers but his as soon as the marriage service was
completed. The husband, however, became responsible
for all debts of the wife and for all damages for torts
committed by her. Under the Iowa law, as interpreted
by this decision, the wife's property did not vest in the
husband and could be held for his debts only when she
allowed the husband to manage it and so gave third
parties reason to believe that he owned it. In the case
of debts contracted before marriage the wife's property
could not be held liable under any circumstances.
A notice published in a newspaper in Iowa in 1886
illustrates this chang·e in the status of married women.
It was based upon the public warnings frequently issued
by husbands and had more standing in law than such notices, since the husband could not escape the just debts
incurred by the wife for support by a public statement
while notice of the wife's ownership of property was sufficient to exempt it from the husband's debts. The ironic
parody was as follows :
To whom it may concern:
J. E. Ballard having left my bed and board, without just
cause and provocation, I will pay no more debts of his contracting from this date.
MARY E. BALLARD.~26
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The rule that a wife must :file a notice of her ownership if she wished to hold her property exempt from the
debts of her husband contracted after marriage was
omitted in the Code of 1873. The section dealing with
the question was drafted as follows : "When property is
owned by either husband or wife, the other has no interest therein which can be the subject of contract between
them, or such interest as will make the same liable for
the contracts or liabilities of either the husband or wife
who is not the owner of the property, except as provided
in this chapter.'' This exception referred to debts for
family expenses. No notice of ownership was required.327
It is clear that the attempt to protect the wife's property sometimes led to fraud and injustice to others. For
example, in the case of Miller v. Hollingsworth, decided
in 1873, the wife refused to pay for lumber purchased by
the husband for use on her property with her knowledge
and consent, on the ground that she could not be compelled to pay her husband's debts. The court decided
that the creditor could take a lien on the wife's property,
since the debt was incurred for her benefit and with her
consent.328
In a later case property in the wife's name which had
been paid for with money loaned by the husband who was
insolvent, and was managed by him, was held subject to
the claims of the husband's creditors to whom he owed
money at the time the money was given to the wife. 329
The reason for the decisions in these cases is evidently the appearance of fraud. Where the suggestion
of an agreement between husband and wife for the purpose of defrauding third parties is absent, the courts
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have usually protected the wife's property. For example, in the case of Hoag cf; Steere v. Martin, the Supreme
Court decided that land purchased by the wife with
money paid her for taking care of her husband's mother
and other money earned by her could not be held for the
husband's debts on the ground that his creditors believed
it to be his ; nor could the crops from a farm, worked by
the wife and sons, be held, in spite of the fact that the
husband attended to the business and even listed the
property with the assessor as his own.380
In 1894 section 3072 of the Code of 1873, which provided for the exemption of certain property of a debtor
who was the head of a family, was amended so that any
man who was the head of a family and any woman whether she was the head of a family or not might hold fifty
dollars worth of poultry exempt from execution. Why
this pf1rticular forn1 of property should be specifically
mentioned is not clear. Two years later the General Assembly passed a law that no lien on exempt personal
property was valid unless husband and wife signed it, if
the owner was married. 33 1
The Code of 1897 repeated most of the provisions of
the Code of 1873 concerning the liabilities of husbands
and wives for each other's debts. The Common Law
principle that the husband was held responsible for debts
incurred for or by the wife for necessities suitable to her
station was retained, but it was provided that he was not
responsible for damages for civil injuries committed by
the wife unless he would be liable if the marriage did not
exist. Either husband or wife might bring action against
the other to recover property belonging to them. 313 2 Very
little that is new is to be found either in the Supplem ent
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to the Code of Iowa, 1907 or in the two following supplements ; indeed, very little remains to be done in respect
to women's property rights except in the matter of the
family property which is now almost entirely in the
hands of the husband.
In addition to the cases already cited, several others
deserve mention here, although they involve somewhat
different aspects of the question of :financial responsibility. Two of these cases deal with the responsibility of
a husband for the support of an insane wife who had been
sent to a hospital for the insane. The first decision,
handed down in 1877, was that under Chapter 26 of the
laws of 1874 the husband was not liable for the wife's
expenses. The second, in 1909, declared that under section 2297 of the Code the husband was a ''relative'' and
could be compelled to reimburse the county for the expense of caring for his insane wife at a hospital. 333
A third case involves the duty of a husband to pay
for the support of his wife and also indicates under what
circumstances a wife might refuse to live in the home
selected by the husband and still be entitled to support.
The district court judge ruled that "the husband, in law,
is not bound to furnish board and necessaries at any place
other than at his own qhoosing, and it is the duty of the
wife to accommodate herself to the surroundings and
conditions of the husband". The Supreme Court, however, did not concur in this decision. If this were so,
the Supreme Court declared, the husband might require the wife to live in a totally unfit place.334 In 1910
the Supreme Court ruled that it was the duty of the
husband to see that his wife had proper burial, but if she
left an estate he could recover the amount from it. 336

X
WOMEN IN INDUSTRY
THE women in any community may, for convenience, be
considered in four groups as regards source of support
and employment. Of these the first may be called the
leisure group, since it includes all women who possess
sufficient means to live without working and all married
women whose husbands are able to support them without
any economic contribution from the wives. This does
not mean that these women are idle, but rather that there
is no interrelation between their work and their manner
of living.
From this class, in which the women are almost wholly
free from economic responsibility, we pass by almost imperceptible degrees to a second class which includes all
women working at home without any s·pecified remuneration. Married women, of course, constitute the great
body of this group. They contribute more or less effectively to the economic welfare of the family, but they are
not included in the enumeration of women engaged in
"gainful occupations". Some of these women have sufficient leisure for recreation and intellectual development,
and have enough economic independence to make their
lives very satisfactory; but many, on the other hand, are
overworked and are denied any control of the family
income. The only amount guaranteed to the wife by law
is support and a distributive share in the husband's
estate at his death. The wife's position depends very
144
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largely upon the husband '·s earning ability and upon his
attitude toward her, since, although the law may guarantee a wife certain rights, it is frequently true that the
women whose rights are denied are the ones who are
either ignorant of the laws or are unable to assert their
rights .
. A third class is composed of women engaged in business or in professional pursuits. Here belong lawyers,
physicians, business women, teachers, librarians, trained
nurses, 336 and all women who occupy executive or administrative positions. These women are frequently underpaid; but working conditions are usually good and the
general standard of intelligence and training is above the
average. This class, having already been considered in a
separate chapter, requires no further discussion in this
place.
The women who perform manual labor for wages
make up the class usually in mind when the condition of
working women is discussed. In this group belong factory operatives, telephone employees, workers in laundries, hotels, and restaurants, clerks in stores, and those
employed in unskilled trades.
NUMBER OF WOMEN WAGE EARNERS

It is difficult to secure statistics for the various
branches of industry, since the plans of enumeration differ and the industrial groups change from time to time.
An idea of the number of women employed outside the
home and some of the industries followed may be gained
from the following table which can be only approximately
correct since a wide divergence in the plans of the enumerators is evident. 337
10
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1 23,126
2,758
59
19,953
356
1810
1 44,845
8,442
660
34,357
1,386
1880
1 so,411
16,016
4,431
33,016
18,800
8,094
1890
I 106,883
21,296
·10,820
43,350
23,285
8,132
1900
~19~1_0~_9,_55~7---,._2_8_,8_6_4 ~-4_4,_03_1~_1_3_,2_99~_24__,4_6_6~_1_0_,8_02_1131,514
I 110,115
14,200
28,392
32,318
30,307
4,495
1915

Many of the apparent variations in these statistics
are of interest because of certain changes in status which
they indirectly reveal. For example, the 19,953 women
said to be employed in ''professional and personal'' service in 1870 included the group later classed as domestic
employees; only 44 72 of them were teachers, and a very
small number were in strictly professional work.
The decrease in the total number of women gainfully
employed according to the Iowa census of 1915, as compared with the number given by the Federal census in
1910, is probably due to a less inclusive enumeration of
women occasionally employed outside the home, for it is
most apparent in the number of women engaged in agriculture, domestic service, and manufacturing; while there
is an increase in the number of women in professional
work and in certain commercial lines.
On-the other hand, it is possible that the number of
women employed in Iowa was really smaller in 1915 than
it was in 1910, since the State has been prosperous and
there has been less necessity for women to work outside
of the home. Under war conditions an increase in the
number of women employed is very probable.
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In 1910 it was estimated that 15.5% of the women of
Iowa over ten years of age were engaged in remunerative
employment, and the majority of women so employed belonged to the group of industrial workers. Only ten
States had a smaller per cent of women working at that
time.88 8
PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN INDUSTRY

Since Iowa is not predominantly an industrial State
and the number of women employed is relatively small,
little attention has been paid to conditions surrounding
them while at work. It has been taken for granted that
women were responsible for any contract they made, and
that it was not the duty of the State to interfere if the
work was dangerous, the pay inadequate, or the hours too
long. Competition was considered beneficial, and wqmen
must take the consequences if they ente:r;ed the industrial
field.
Gradually thinking people have awakened to the fact
that competition is not beneficial to those workers who
are too inexperienced or uneducated to determine their
best interests. The limited number of employments open
to women has also handicapped them in the struggle for
a living. But aside from the personal interest of the
women themselves, it has also come to be realized that
many of these women are or will become mothers and
what affects their intelligence, health, or morals concerns
also the future of the State's citizens.
Iowa has been slow to act in this matter, partly because of indifference and partly because women have,
until quite recently, been employed largely in establishments where only a few were needed and where the employer worked with them. It is probable also that the
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opportunity for education and the economic freedom of
women made special protection less necessary than in
States where home conditions forced girls to work at an
early age.
As the number of women workers increased, however,
and conditions changed from rural to urban and manufacturing developed, the need for the special protection
of workers, and especially of women and girls, increased.
As early as 1874 a law was passed excluding children and
women from work in mines. The first act which dealt
with the welfare of women workers was passed in 1892,
when th(;) General Assembly enacted a law requiring employers to provide seats for female employees and to permit them to use them whenever the work would permit.
Violations of this law were punishable by a fine of ten
dollars, and the county attorney was assigned the duty of
prosecuting violators. Ten years later the Commissioner
of Labor was given supervision over the matter,339 but
the law appears to be difficult to enforce, because so much
is left to the employer and the fine is so small.
According to the Code of 1897 no woman could be employed in a mulct saloon. A law passed in 1906 forbade
the employment of any girl under sixteen in any occupation requiring constant standing or at any dangerous
employment.340 What is sometimes called the Factory
Act of 1902 repeated the prohibition as to dangerous employments for children under sixteen and also stated that
no person under that age and no fem ale under eighteen
was to be permitted to clean machinery while in motion.341
These laws include practically all legislation for the
protection of women workers in Iowa. No attempt has
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been made here to cover labor legislation in general, since
this study deals only with laws relating specifically to
women. Neither have child labor laws been included except where distinctions are made _between boys and girls.
As a matter of fact, Iowa has little labor legislation of
any kind. At present this State is one of the six in the
United States without any limitation upon the number of
hours women may work. 3 42
Attempts have been made to remedy this situation,
but either the interest of employers, the indifference of
the legislators, or a failure to realize the importance of
safeguards have thus far prevented the success of such
measures. For example, a bill was introduced in the
Iowa Senate in 1917 to prohibit the employment of women more than ten hours a day or more than fifty-four
hours a week and also between 10 P. M. and 6 A. M.,
except certain groups such as stenographers, managers,
and women in executive or administrative positions. No
women under twenty-one, except telephone and telegraph
operators, were to be permitted to work after 9 P. M. and
these only if over eighteen years of age. Forty-five minutes intermission for dinner was required except in the
case of those working less than eight hours a day, and no
woman employee was to be permitted to work more than
six hours without such intermission. This act did not
apply to women in domestic service, graduate nurses, and
those working on farms and in canning factories. Each
employer was to be required to post a list of the women
employees, together with the hours of work for each.
Small fines were provided for the infraction of any of
these requirements. This bill was lost in the sifting committee, as was a similar one in the House. Another bill
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which was intended to prohibit the employment of either
men or women in hotels or eating houses more than six
days a week was also lost.343
In 1913, however, the General Assembly made provision for a woman factory inspector,344 and Mrs. Ellen M.
Rourke was appointed to this position. Her duty consisted largely of investigation, since there were few laws
to enforce. Her reports of 1914 and 1916 deal largely
with the results of her study of conditions among certain
groups of working women.
The first report dealt with women in stores and in
hotels and restaurants in various cities of the State. Not
all of the employees were reached, nor was the number
of places visited large, but the report, nevertheless, gives
an insight into the working conditions of Iowa women.
The second report took up two other classes of workers,
also presenting different requirements and working conditions. These were telephone operators and women
workers in laundries.
Wages ranged from five dollars a week to twenty-one,
but the larger per cent of these women received between
six and seven dollars a week - the rate being slightly
higher for those living away from home than for those at
home. Iowa, it may be said, has no minimum wage law
for either women or men. Working conditions were reported as fairly good and with a tendency to improve.
The hours of work varied from seven and one-half to
eleven hours a day and from fifty-five to sixty hours a
week, but some women were working thirteen hours a day
in rush seasons.
The relation of education to the kind of work secured
is suggested by the report that forty-two per cent of the

I
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women working in laundries · and fifty-four and fourtenths per cent of those employed in hotels and restaurants had left school between the second and eighth
grades; while forty-nine and eight-tenths per cent of the
store employees and eighteen per cent of the telephone
operators left school between the fourth and eighth
grades, and seventy-eight and five-tenths per cent of the
telephone workers had a grammar school education.345

XI
RECAPITULATION OF LEGAL STATUS
foregoing chapters indicate how, step by step, women in Iowa have secured rights and privileges denied to
their sex by the Common Law. Once acquired, these
rights have seldom, if ever, been lost. As a result the
progress of women towards equality in civil affairs has
been sure although the reform has been gradual. Moreover, this advance has been free from much of the bitterness which has characterized struggles where rights
fully recognized and strongly desired have long been
denied.
It has been seen that, at the beginning of Iowa history,
the rights of women - especially married women - were
largely fixed by the Common Law, which denied to the
wife a separate personality. To-day, women may attend
all State supported schools from the kindergarten to the
University. They may also be employed as teachers in
any of these schools, and the proportion of women teachers is constantly increasing. The professions also are
open to women on equal terms in so far as they are regulated by the State.
In the matter of property rights, men and women are
also theoretically equal. Even married women may own
property, make contracts, and prosecute and defend actions in court without being subject to the control of
their husbands. The distributive share in the property
of the other spouse is the same for husbands and wives,
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and the requirements for the transfer of real estate are
also identical for both. In one respect only does it appear that this rule is unfair to wives. The property acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife is
usually in the husband's name. In the case of real estate
the wife can not be deprived of her distributive share
without her consent; but even this may give her only onethird of the property; while personal property may be
wasted or given away by the husband during his life
without the wife's knowledge or consent.
The husband, however, is still legally responsible for
the support of his wife, as well as of the minor children;
while the wife has no corresponding responsibility for
the husband's maintenance, except that the wife is jointly
liable for the expenses of the home if she has money of
her own. The desertion of a destitute wife or minor children by the husband or of such children by the mother is
now a criminal offence punishable by a penitentiary
sentence.
The mother is joint guardian of her minor children
and is likewise responsible for their support and education. A comparison of the court decrees in divorce cases
shows that the mother is usually preferred to the father
in the awarding of minor children if other things are
equal. Mothers' pensions are also provided to enable
widows or wives whose husbands are inmates of State
institutions to maintain their children at home.
The causes for which divorces may be granted in Iowa
number :five for women and six for men, although the
sixth cause for which a husband may secure a divorce
makes little difference. · The five causes common to both
.are adultery, desertion, drunkenness, inhuman treatment,
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and conviction for a felony. Wives, however, in this
State secure a majority of the divorces. From 1886 to
1906 this proportion was about three to one.
The position of women in criminal affairs is supposed
. to be the same as that of men. As a matter of fact, it is
probable that women are usually treated more leniently
than men. This is partly due to the influence of the Common Law rule that a wife was exempt from punishment
in many cases if the husband was present, and partly to
the fact that decisions in criminal trials are made by
juries of men only and are unconsciously influenced by
the spirit of chivalry. On the other hand, in cases involving certain forms of immorality, the jurors may be
influenced by sex loyalty. Women may testify, however,
on the same terms as men, and may also plead cases in
any Iowa court.
In the field of industry women are free to make contracts and collect their wages even when married. But
Iowa has been slow, indeed, to enact protective legislation. This has been due partly to the fact that comparatively few women in Iowa are engaged in factory work or
similar employments. Doubtless a sense of equal ability
on the part of most Iowa women and the general conservatism of the State have also been factors in retarding such legislation. In 1915 about 110,000 women were
reported as gainfully employed outside the home.
It is evident, therefore, that in civil affairs no marked
injustice to women is to be observed in Iowa: discrimination against them is confined almost entirely to political
matters. The path to this equality, however, has not been
free from laws and court decisions which have threatened
the property rights of wives, their right to obtain justice
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through legal procedure, the claim of mothers to their
children, and the right of all women to choose their occupations or professions without legal restriction or discrimination. That the civil status of women in Iowa is
so fortunate is due to a variety of causes. Pioneer life
fostered independence and equality. Women who settled
here have been, for the most part, intelligent and educated; while the lawmakers and judges have been responsive to the demand for reform when once their attention
has been called to unjust treatment of women.
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XII
EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
So closely are the political movements in one State related to similar movements in other States and throughout the Nation that it will be well to follow briefly the
growth of equal suffrage in the United States before
tracing its history in detail in Iowa.
EQUAL SUFFRAGE PHIIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR

The equal suffrage or equal rights movement may be
said to have appeared in Massachusetts as early as 1638
when the discussion of religious topics by Mrs. Anne
Hutchinson incurred the double condemnation of the
magistrates - first because of her criticism of the teachings of the men in authority, and secondly because, being
a woman, she had, in their opinion, no right to speak at
all,346
Another woman who at an early day asserted her
equality before the law was Margaret Brent of Maryland, a sister of Giles Brent, a prominent planter. She
received a grant of land in 1638 and for a number of
years occupied a position of influence and authority, acting as the administrator of Governor Leonard Calvert's
estate, as the guardian of his children, and as the representative of the absent Lord Baltimore.347
Even during the Revolution there appeared voices
prophetic of the future, although it can not be said that
there were serious demands for equal suffrage at the
159
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time. Abigail Adams wrote to her husband on the occasion of the Declaration of Independence and the discussion of the new government to be established: '' I long
to hear that you have declared an independence .
. And by the way, in the new code of laws .
. I desire you would remember the ladies, and be
more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of
the husbands! Remember, all men would be tyrants if
they could ! '' Mercy Otis Warren was likewise among
the few who urged the recognition of women in the new
Democracy. It was, indeed, a significant coincidence that
Thomas Paine's Rights of Man and Mary Wollstonecraft's A. Vindication of the Rights of Woman were published during the same decade, although in different countries. Thomas Paine was probably the first prominent
man in America to advocate equal political privileges for
women - that is, a real democracy of men and women. 348
It is a curious fact that women were legal voters in
New Jersey from 1776 to 1807, under the Constitution
which was adopted two days before the Declaration of
Independence. This instrument provided that '' all inhabitants" who possessed certain age and property qualifications might vote; and the legislature in 1790 specifically recognized that this provision was intended to
include women by the use of the double pronoun '' he or
she'' in a law concerning residence qualifications. In
1807, however, the legislature disqualified women in
spite of the Constitution; and in 1844 the Constitution
was itself revised so that only "white male citizens"
could vote. 349 This premature grant of suffrage was
largely the result of Quaker influence, since among them
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men and women were considered equal. Its failure was
due partly to the social standards of the time which limited women's activities to household duties, and partly to
the development of the struggle over negro suffrage.
The idea of equal suffrage was not seriously considered, much less adopted, by the founders of the new
republic. Although women were generally treated with
consideration, Harriet Martineau, who visited the United
States in 1837, found the position of the women so dependent and restricted that she raised the question
whether '' the principles of the Declaration of Independence bear no relation to half of the human race f' ' 350
It was not until about 1840 that the women of the
United States began to realize the disadvantages of political inequality. Among those who opposed slavery
there were many women who came to understand the
value of the franchise in securing reforms. At the antislavery conference held in London in 1840 Lucretia Mott,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Esther Moore- American
women delegates - were refused admission in spite of
the protests of Wendell Phillips, Henry B. Blackwell,
William Lloyd Garrison, and others.351 Stung by this
humiliation and by the general disregard of equal rights,
these women began an agitation for the removal of the
political disabilities of women. The question was discussed in the New York constitutional convention in
• 1846, and it is said that later def enders of the equal suffrage cause have seldom added anything to the argument made there by George William Curtis.352
Perhaps the first attempt at organized effort among
the women was the call for a convention to meet at Seneca
Falls, New York, in July, 1848. The call was issued by
11
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Ll!-cretia Mott, Martha Wright, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
and Mary Ann McClintock; and the meeting was presided
over by James Mott, the Quaker reformer. The convention proclaimed the equality of men and women ~nd de.mantled for women their "immediate admission to all
the rights and privileges of citizens of the United
States", including the right to vote. Two years later
there assembled at Worcester, Massachusetts, the first
National Woman's Rights Convention held in this country. The call for this meeting was signed by Lucy Stone
and fifty-five other women and by thirty-three men, many
of whom were prominent in anti-slavery circles.353
It is a fact worthy of notice that the women's rights
movement and the abolition movement were very closely
associated. The social conscience of the people was being slowly awakened, and women resented the fact that
they were without political power to assist in putting
down what some of them felt was a gigantic evil. At the
s~me time Sojourner Truth, the negro woman who traveled through the North advocating the abolition of slavery, dismissed the women's rights question with the
remark that "Ef women want any rights more'n dey's
got, why don't dey jes' take 'em, an' not be talkin' about
it1" 354 .
EQUAL SUFFRAGE SINCE THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War resulted in the freedom and the enfranchisement of the negroes who were for the most part
illiterate and unprepared for the duties of citizenship.
This grant of suffrage to a class of men who were not
p'r epared for citizenship had two results on the woman
suffrage question. The friends of the measure insisted
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that it was unjust to permit the ignorant negro to vote
and at the same time continue the disfranchisement of
white women who were better qualified. On the other
hand, enemies of the extension of suffrage to women
pointed to the failure of negro suffrage as a proof that it
was unwise to further increase the electorate; while those
who were opposed to the enfranchisement of the negroes
frequently urged that it was no more unjust to deprive
the negroes of the suffrage than it was to disfranchise
the white women.
In 1869 Wyoming, then a Territory, granted the franchise to women almost without opposition; and in 1890
the State of Wyoming entered the Union with equal suffrage, thus becoming both the first Territory and the
:first State to fulfil the pledge of democracy in regard
to the franchise. When it was suggested in Congress
that the equal suffrage clause in the Wyoming Constitution might have to be abandoned, the Wyoming legislature replied: ''We will remain out of the Union a hundred
years rather than come in without woman suffrage.' ' 355
Most States, however, preferred a limited application
of the principle of equal suffrage, even if the men were
willing to concede to women the justice of a share in
political power. Thus there developed five general forms
of State or local enfranchisement: complete suffrage,
school suffrage, municipal suffrage, tax suffrage, and
presidential suffrage. In many cases there was a combination of these general forms, so that a great diversity
of provisions is to be found in the various States. A few
instances will illustrate the different forms under which
the principle of equal suffrage has been applied.
· Kansas adopted a limited form of school suffrage in
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1861, an experiment that was later adopted by the following Commonwealths: Michigan in 1875; Minnesota in
1875; Colorado in 1876; New Hampshire in 1878; Oregon
in 1878; Massachusetts in 1879; New York in 1880; Vermont in 1880; Nebraska in 1883; New Jersey in 1887;
Kansas in 1887; North and South Dakota in 1887; Arizona in 1887; Montana in 1887; Oklahoma in 1890; Illinois in 1891; Connecticut in 1893; Ohio in 1894; Delaware in 1898; Wisconsin in 1900; and New Mexico in
1910. Iowa adopted a form of tax suffrage in 1894, and
Louisiana passed a similar law in 1898.
In the meantime, some of the other western States
followed the example of Wyoming by adopting complete
suffrage. Colorado took the step in 1893; while Idaho
and Utah enfranchised their women citizens in 1896.
Then for fourteen years the cause of constitutional equal
suffrage appeared to be unsuccessful, though no serious
attempt was made to abolish it in the four States where
it had been established. It is now evident that this was a
period of growth and not of stagnation, since seven
States adopted constitutional equal suffrage during the
four years between 1910 and 1914: Washington in 1910;
California in 1911 ; Arizona, Kansas, and Oregon in 1912;
and Nevada and Montana in 1914. The Territory of
Alaska adopted equal suffrage in 1913.
By 1914 practically all the far western States had removed the sex qualification for voting. Eastern States
were more conservative, and it was not until 1913 that
any progress - aside from the limited school or bond
suffrage - was made east of the Mississippi River. In
that year the Illinois legislature, acting under authority
of the United States Constitution, which provides that
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the State legi,s latures shall prescribe the method of electing presidential electors, conferred upon the qualified
women of Illinois the right to vote for presidential electors. At the same time the right to vote for certain State
and local officers not provided for in the State Constitution was also included in the act.
The course pursued in Illinois has proven popular in
States whose Constitutions are difficult to amend. In
1917 six States followed the example of Illinois, namely:
Indiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Michigan,
and Nebraska. Three of the six, North Dakota, Ohio,
and Nebraska, included municipal as well as presidential
suffrage. Arkansas, at the same time, extended to women the right to vote at primary elections and Texas adopted a similar law in the following year. Since these are
one-party States, the primary is equivalent to an election,
and so the political power granted by the two statutes is
important. In Indiana, however, the law was declared to
be unconstitutional by'the State Supreme Court; while in
Ohio the bill was submitted to the voters at the election
in November, 1917, under the referendum, and was defeated by a large majority. The supporters of the measure signified their intention of appealing the matter to
the United States Supreme Court on the ground that by
the Federal Constitution, the State legislature and not
the voters determines how and by whom presidential
electors are to be chosen. According to a decision of the
Ohio court Ohio cities under home rule ch~rters may
confer municipal suffrage upon women.
The most important advance, however, was the success of the equal suffrage amendment in New York. Defeated in 1915 by a majority of nearly 195,000 votes, the
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amendment was re-submitted at the November election
in 1917 and was adopted by a majority of over 100,000.
This victory added forty-five presidential electors to the
number already affected by women's votes and gives
promise of the ultimate success of equal suffrage throughout the United States. South Dakota, Michigan, and Oklahoma followed New York's example in November, 1918.
Through these State laws women have secured an influential position in Federal as well a:s local affairs. In
the :fifteen equal suffrage States, together with the four
which have presidential suffrage and the two in which
women may vote at primary elections, women now have a
voice in the election of two hundred and thirteen presidential electors, one hundred and thirty-two members of
the House of Representatives, and thirty-four Senators.
With the two leading parties of nearly equal strength the
women voters can not safely be disregarded by party
leaders, since about ten million women are now (1918)
entitled to vote in the election of President and Vice
President.356
AGITATION FOR FEDERAL AMENDMENT

Early demands for equal suffrage were generally a:
rected toward action by individual States, for the de, u-trine of State sovereignty in such matters was unquestioned before the Civil War. The fourteenth amendment
conferred citizenship upon the negroes; while the :fifteenth amendment was adopted to make their political
rights secure. At the time the women asked that "sex"
be included in this amendment; but their wishes were disregarded, the leaders urging that it would be too much
to ask the voters to grant suffrage to women and to
negroes at the same time.
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There was also an effort made to secure suffrage for
women under the fourteenth amendment, on the ground
that since it recognized the citizenship of both men and
women it must have been the intention of the framers of
the amendment that all citizens should vote. In order to
test this view, Miss Susan B. Anthony, with several other
women, registered and voted at an election for United
States Representatives in New York in 1872. Miss
Anthony was arrested and tried in the United States Circuit Court on the charge that she '' did knowingly, wrongfully, and unlawfully vote for a Representative in the
Congress of the United States .
. without a lawful right to vote in said election district ( the said Susan
B. Anthony being then and there a person of the female
sex)". She was found guilty and fined one hundred dollars and costs.357
Even before the final adoption of the fifteenth amendment, a sixteenth amendment to confer suffrage upon
women wa·s introduced in Congress by Representative
George W. Julian of Indiana. The resolution secured
some support, but not sufficient to bring it to a vote.
Since 1878 the Susan B. Anthony amendment, as this
proposed modification of the Constitution has come to be
called, has been presented again and again in Congress.
In 1882 both houses provided for woman suffrage committees, but the House committee was discontinued in
1884 and was not reestablished until 1918. Equal suffrage matters in the House were usually ref erred to the
judiciary committee, which seldom reported a bill on this
subject and was generally opposed to any change. The
Senate committee was much more active and its reports
were more often favorable. 358
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The history of the struggle for the submission of a
Federal amendment, however, is too long to be recited in
detail in this connection. That supporters of equal
suffrage were not entirely lacking is evident from the
minority reports of committees to which the question was
submitted. In 1884 a minority report written by Mr.
Thomas B. Reed of Maine and signed by Mr. E. B. Taylor of Ohio, Mr. M. A. McCoid of Iowa, and Mr. T. M.
Browne of Indiana was submitted to the House of Representatives. No one can accuse Thomas B. Reed, long the
"Czar" of the House of Representatives, of being ultraradical, sentimental, or visionary. This expression of
approval by men from conservative States, although representing the minority of the committee, contains some
pertinent comments on the merits of equal suffrage.
Some of the striking sentences in this report read as
follows:
· No one who listens to the reasons given by the superior class
for the continuance of any system of subjection can fail to be
impressed with the noble disinterestedness of mankind. . . .
Hence, when it is proposed to give to the women of this country
an opportunity to present their case to the various State legislatures to demand of the people of the country equality of political rights, it is not surprising to find that the reasons on which
the continuance of the inferiority of women is urged, are drawn
almost entirely from a tender consideration for their own good.
The anxiety felt lei;;t they should thereby deteriorate, would be
an honor to human nature were it not an historical fact that the
same sweet solicitude has been put up as a barrier against every
prbgress which women have made ever since civilization began.
. . . Words change nothing. Prejudices are none the less
p'r ejudices because we vaguely call them ' ' nature-'' and prate
about what nature has forbidden when we only mean that the
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thing we are opposing has not been hitherto done. "Nature"
forbade a steamship to cross the Atlantic the very moment it was
crossing, and yet it arrived just the same .
We believe in the educating and improving effect of participation in government. We believe that every citizen in the
United States is made more intelligent, more learned, and better
educated by his participation in politics and political campaigns
·
If, then, discussion of public affairs among men has
elevated them in knowledge and intelligence, why will it not lead
to the same results among women? It is not merely education
that makes civilization, but diffusion of education .
Every improvement in the status of women in the matter of
education has been an improvement to the whole race.
It is sometimes asserted that women now have a great influence in politics through their husbands and brothers. That is
undoubtedly true. But that is just the kind of influence which
is not wholesome for the community, for it is influence unaccompanied by responsibility .
We conclude, then, every reason which in this country bestows the ballot upon man is equally applicable to the proposition to bestow the ballot upon woman, that in our judgment there
is no foundation for the fear that woman will thereby become
unfitted for all the duties she has hitherto performed. 359

The first vote upon the Susan B. Anthony amendment was taken in the Senate on January 25, 1887, and
resulted in the defeat of the measure by a vote of sixteen
to thirty-four - twenty-six Senators being absent. The
Senate again defeated equal suffrage on March 19,
1914.360 In 1915 the Mondell Resolution, as the House
bill for equal suffrage by Federal amendment was called,
was brought to a vote in the House of Representatives
for the first time in the history of the United States, and
though it was defeated by a vote of 174 to 204, the debate
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in which equal suffrage was championed by men like
Frank W. Mondell of Wyoming, Edward Keating of
Colorado, E. A. Hayes of California, Nicholas J. Sinnott
of Oregon, and Martin B. Madden of Illinois, has had
some influence in later State campaigns. The first section of the proposed amendment read as follows : '' The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of •s ex.' ' 361
The campaign of 1916 brought the suffrage question
still more plainly before the people, though it was not a
vital issue. Both Republicans and Democrats, as well as
the minor parties, favored equal suffrage in some form in
their platforms. The Republican candidate for President announced that he was in favor of Federal action;
President Wilson went only so far as to favor State
action. 362
The entrance of the United States into the World
War in 1917 brought new influences to bear upon the men
and women of the country. The emphasis on democracy
and the ·sacrifices and ability of the women of the country
strongly re enforced their claim for a share in the government. This influence combined with the political
power of the States in which women enjoy more or less
enfranchisement secured a marked success in Congress
in spite of the concentration of attention on the war. On
January 10, 1918, the constitutional amendment providing that political rights should not be denied on account
of sex was passed by the House of Representatives by a
vote of 274 to 136 ~ exactly the necessary majority.
On the first of October, however, this amendment failed
of adoption in the Senate by a vote of 53 to 31, in spite of

EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

171

a strong plea for its passage on the part of President
Wilson. Later this vote was reconsidered and the amendment still awaits the final action of the Senate.
NOTE ON EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Equally noteworthy has been the progress of equal suffrage
in foreign countries. In New Zealand women were enfranchised
in 1893; the Australian provinces granted full suffrage to women
between 1895 and 1908. Finland, a Russian province, followed
in 1906, Norway in 1913, and Denmark in 1915; while Iceland,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia granted
full suffrage in 1916, and Ontario followed in 1917. English
women have had local suffrage for many years, and in 1917
Parliament by vote of 387 to 57, granted full political rights
to all women over thirty years of age who have certain other
qualifications. Canada also enacted a suffrage law as a war
measure, giving the parliamentary franchise to all properly
qualified women in the Dominion who have close relatives
serving in the Canadian army. Other countries have various forms of restricted suffrage for women. The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought theoretical equality in political affairs;
but in the chaotic state of the government at the close of its first
year, the right to vote does not appear to be effective in deciding
vital public questions. The question of equal suffrage has become one of importance in all European countries because of the
emphasis on democracy during the war. 364

XIII
EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN IOWA
1838-1865

WHEN Iowa became a Territory in 1838 the struggle for
"women's rights", as the movement ;was then called, was
just beginning. Like all new movements it was unorganized. and chaotic, its advocates being scarcely conscious
of the end desired and lacking any agreement as to the
means to be employed. Dress reform, the abolition of
the institution of marriage, and similar radical measures
were demanded by a few extremists; while the majority
of the people looked with suspicion upon even the reasonable demands for reform.
Only a few women and fewer men were interested in
bringing about more equitable provisions in the laws for
women and removing unjust discriminations against
them. In the frontier Territory, where the struggle with
the wilderness was most acute, the interest was even less
than in the more thickly settled communities where there
was more leisure. The laws of the Territory permitted
only free white male citizens to vote - a condition which
was accepted at :first without question. Indeed, it is
probable that the language of the law was intended to
disfranchise colored men, rather than women, who were
not even expected to want to vote.365
It seems that the question of equal suffrage :first arose
in the Iowa legislature in the session of 1843-1844. On
one occasion the House of Representatives passed a reso112
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lution that "the ladies be permitted to take seats within
the Bar of this House at pleasure, and that the Sergeantat-Arms be instructed to furnish seats for their accommodation.' ' 366 There was some discussion of the subject
of equal suffrage at this time; but the legislators had no
intention of changing the electoral qualifications, although it was said that '' two or three went into regular
spread-eaglism and aired their shallowness, their conceit
and their devotion to women, as a parlor ornament. " 367
Even the request for political enfranchisement was at
that time unusual - nor was it taken seriously when presented. As the question of negro slavery became more
and more a threat of national division, people became
less inclined to look with favor upon attempts to overthrow the established order. No two classes of society
in America were more widely separated from each other
than the negro slaves of the South and the white women
of Iowa; yet somehow ' men -s eemed to feel that any
change in the status of one group might result in the
overthrow of the whole social order.
,vhen the Constitution of 1844 was being drafted a
disagreement arose over the question of negro suffrage.
A committee appointed to investigate the subject reported adversely to the negroes, basing its conclusion on
the principle that suffrage was not a natural right. The
report reads in part as follows:
Females by the arbitrary rules of society are excluded and
debarred from many things which males consider rights and high
privileges - such as the elective franchise, holding office, &c.
Now in these cases the female and infant are denied what we
abstractedly term unalienable rights and they submit without
complaint or murmur. No one thinks of sympathizing with them
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in their deprivations.- The philanthropist has never had occasion to commiserate their fate; - still it is in those respects the
same as the citizen of color. The negro is surely no better than
our wives and children, and should not excite sympathy when
they desire the political rights which they are deprived of. 368

This report doubtless expressed the opinion of the
members of the convention, since the Constitution which
they framed gave only white male citizens the right to
vote, although it declared that '' all men are by nature
free and independent, and have certain unalienable
rights ".369
In connection with certain provisions of the Code of
1851 there is an interesting illustration of the influence
of custom in the interpretation of laws: it is provided in
one section that if '' any person'' is challenged at an election, he must take an oath that he is a citizen of the
United States; and in another section it is prbvided that
'' if any person utter or pass or tender in payment as true
any false, altered, forged, or counterfeit note .
he shall be punished by imprisonment".370 In the first
case '' any person'' has been construed as ref erring only
to men; in the second instance the same phrase used with
the masculine gender was held to mean either a man or a
woman.
Moreover, in those early days attempts of women to
influence legislation even indirectly were frequently received with ridicule - as when a member of the House
of Representatives moved to refer petitions from women
and boys on the subject of prohibition to a committee on
"women's rights and children's follies. " 371 Even among
school teachers where the women nearly equalled the men
in number there was little support of equal suffrage:
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thus a resolution that '' females should enjoy the right
of suffrage in school matters'' introduced in the State
Teachers' Association in 1859 was tabled. 372
In the constitutional convention of 1857 advocates of
equal suffrage were met ·with the same argument which
had been used in 1844, but the real question to be settled
was that relating to the political status of free negroes.
The report of the committee of the Convention of 1844
was urged against any change and it was :fin.a lly decided
to retain the words '' white male'' in the new Constitution. As a matter of fact there was no serious consideration of the proposition to confer the suffrage upon
women, although some of the delegates doubtless would
have voted for the reform. 373
An effort to arouse interest in women's rights, however, was being made. In 1854 Frances Dana Gage of
Ohio gave a series of lectures in the southeastern part of
Iowa on temperance and the status of women; and in the
following year Mrs. Amelia Bloomer of Council Bluffs
began her work here as a lecturer and writer.374 Before
the work along this line had been well organized, there
came the four years of war which were to decide the fate
of the institution of slavery and the question of State
sovereignty.

XIV
EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN IOWA

1865-1890
THE Civil War temporarily overshadowed the struggle
for the equality of women in civil and political affairs;
but in the end the war gave an added impetus to the
movement by giving theoretical equality to the freed
slaves. Thus, the debate over the status of the colored
men involved many other questions and aroused .a new
interest in the duties and privileges of citizens and the
qualifications for the franchise. Various restrictions
were proposed by those who feared the extension of the
electorate by the :fifteenth amendment. The payment of
taxes and the ability to read and write were among the
tests proposed, and these qualifications were cited as
arguments for the admission of women to the suffrage.
Women who paid taxes protested against "taxation
without representation", and many who had hitherto
ignored the claims of women to a part in what claimed
to be a democracy began to recognize the injustice of disfranchising educated ·women while permitting the most
ignorant men to vote. At the same time those who opposed negro suffrage sometimes advocated woman suffrage merely to emphasize what they regarded as the
absurdity of universal suffrage.
The most striking characteristic of the d~scussions of
this period was the confusion of ideas, which may be
illustrated by two quotations from an Iowa newspaper.
176

EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN IOWA

177

One concerned the relation of suffrage and the holding
of property and read as follows :
Miss Dr. Harriet R. Hunt, of Boston has issued her twelfth
annual protest against taxation without suffrage. The natural
right of woman to be man is as evident as the right of a hen to
crow; there is no use arguing the case.

The other item was a reply to a suggestion that only
those who could read and write should be permitted to
vote. The editor opposed the suggestion with the following comment:
Do the gentlemen propose to restrict taxation to those who
can read?
No ! they desire to create a governing, aristocratic class, who
shall do the voting, and create taxes to be paid by emigrants who
can't read english, or natives [who] are so unfortunate as to
· have no education. This attack upon universal suffrage is one
of the means by which the '' public debt is to be made effective.''

At the same time there was a movement to enfranchise foreigners. The platform of the Democratic State
Convention in 1867 contained a plank favoring an amendment to the Constitution giving foreign-born men the
right to vote, providing they had declared their intention
of becoming citizens and had resided one year in the
State. 375
Women, too, now began to realize more fully the significance of the ballot. In 1866 there was presented in
the Iowa House of Representatives a petition from some
women of Clinton County '' praying for an amendment to
the Constitution so that the women of Iowa may have the
right of suffrage; claiming that they represent nearly
one-half of the entire population of the State, and also
12
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one-half of its stability, intelligence, and virtue; that they
are counted in the basis of representation, yet are governed and taxed without their consent, and punished for
violation of law without judge or jury; and claiming
further, that life, liberty, and property, are uncertain so
long as the ballot, the only weapon of self-protection, is
not in the hands of every citizen.'' A resolution was
also introduced in the House providing that the '' Committee on Constitutional Amendments be instructed to
inquire into the expediency of striking out the word
'male' where it occurs in the Constitution in relation to
franchise.' ' 376
During the discussion over the proposed extension of
the franchise in the General Assembly in 1868 a more
definite resolution was introduced by Representative
Wilson of Davis County, which read as follows:
WHEREAS, We hold these truths to be self evident, that all
men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that to secure these rights governments
are instituted deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed ; and,
WHEREAS, We believe ''men,'' in the memorable document
from which we quote, refers to the whole human race, r egardless
of nationality, or sex; and
WHEREAS, We recognize the fact, that as a general principle,
taxation and representation should be co-extensive; and
·WHEREAS, It is a fact that women are compelled to give
allegiance, and pay taxes, to a government, in the enactment of
whose laws, they have been, and still are, denied a voice. Therefore,
Be it Resolved as the sense of this House, That steps should
be taken looking towards a change in the constitution of this
State so as to allow women the right of franchise, for the proper
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use of which, her quick perception, strong intellect, and above
all, her high sense of right and justice, have proven her so well
qualified.

Although favorably reported by the committee on
constitutional amendments, this resolution was not even
voted upon. At the same time, the legislators voted for
an amendment to strike out the word "white" from the
Constitution - an amendment which was later adopted
by a popular vote of 105,384 to 81,119.377
The adoption of this amendment emphasized the inequality in the position of women and aroused a number
of women to begin a campaign of education among the
people of the State. In 1868 Mrs. Martha H. Brinkerhoff
made a lecture tour through the northern counties, organizing societies for the promotion of equal suffrage. Mrs.
Annie C. Savery of Des Moines also gave a lecture at that
place on equal suffrage, and in February, 1870, she gave
a toast on the same subject at a Masonic banquet.378
The first resolution providing for the submission of
a constitutional amendment conferring suffrage upon
women in Iowa was introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr.John P. Irish in 1870; and the journals
show that it was passed by both houses - the vote being
fifty-four to thirty-five in the House of Representatives
and thirty-two to eleven in the Senate. A motion to submit the question to a vote of the women before the
amendment ·s hould be presented to the next General Assembly was voted down in the Senate. The Republican
State Convention, which met at Des Moines in July, 1871,
approved the submission of the amendment to the voters;
but there is little evidence that the majority of the delegates were in favor of its adoption.379
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According to constitutional requirements the resolution was presented to the General Assembly in 1872.
The members at this time, however, were either new men
or they had changed their minds in the interval for the
resolution was defeated in the Senate by a vote of
twenty-two to twenty-four, although it received a vote of
:fifty-five to thirty-nine in its favor in the House. Later
the House recommitted the bill to provide for the popular vote on the amendment. The fact that at least :five
Senators who had voted for the measure in 1870 voted
against it in 1872 suggests that perhaps the General Assembly did not really intend to make the resolution
effective: the members may have been merely bidding
for the good will of the women and the support of certain
groups of men by political log-rolling when there was no
immediate danger of the realization of equal suffrage.380
There was also a facetious proposal in the House in
1872 to strike out the word "male" from the law regulating work on roads. This too was rejected. A resolution to permit Mrs. J. G. Swisshelm to use the hall of the
House for the purpose of delivering a lecture on woman
suffrage was adopted. But the most interesting bill in
the light of recent developments was the one introduced
by Mr. John P. Irish, the sponsor of the suffrage resolution: it provided that women should be given the right to
vote for presidential electors. This bill was never reported, and so there is no vote recorded thereon :381 as
usual, the General Assembly avoided decisive action.
1n the meantime a curious though unimportant incident occurred at Clarinda, where the registry board in
March, 1871, decided that women over twenty-one years
of age wer e entitled to vote. It appears that the names
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of the women considered eligible were, according to the
informal system of registration then in use, placed on the
roll. "Several gentlemen", reported a contemporary
newspaper, " 'got on their ear' about it and erased their
wives' names. Several ladies got their precious backs up
also, and erased their own names. None but the sons of
Adam, however, offered to vote, and Clarinda is now as
peaceable as Mary's little lamb.' ' 382
It is evident that at this time the demand for equal
political rights was not widespread even among the women of Iowa.3 83 A peculiar feature of the suffrage discussion at this time possibly accounts for the attitude of
many of the opponents of suffrage. This was the association of political equality with "free love", which was
largely the result of the teachings of some eastern extremists who believed that the total emancipation of
women demanded the dissolution of permanent marriage
ties. There is no evidence that any such views were held
by the Iowa suffrage workers, but their advocacy in
other places influenced many women to oppose equal
suffrage because they feared that its adoption meant a
social revolution. On the contrary, the majority of the
Iowa suffrage leaders - like Mrs. Margaret W. Campbell and Mrs. Amelia Bloomer - were happily married
and were being assisted in the work by their husbands.
To many, however, there was no middle ground between
free love and the complete subordination of women.
The trepidation with which the triumph of political
equality was contemplated is evident from a letter
signed "R. W. T." and published in the Iowa State
Weekly Register in 1871. Asserting that equal suffrage
meant the overthrow of the institution of marriage, the
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writer expressed the hope that the women of Iowa would
'' remember that it involves every principle of morality
and religion. Tis true, that anti-suffrage women in general, shun notoriety and are not willing to have their
names go before the public, but a sacrifice must be made,
if we would preserve inviolate the Republic, that our
husbands, sons and brothers have so recently given their
lives to serve. Allow the principles that suffragists are
promulgating to take firm root in society, become the law
of our land, and our choicest treasures, the dear little
daughters of to-day, will before the close of the next
decade become a prey to the licentious libertine.' ' 384
In another letter the same writer declared: '' I would
have every woman educated in the best schools, and in
the highest manner possible, and wherever and whenever
she is capable of performing men's labor equally as well
as men, I would have her have the same pay; but there is
something revolting and unwomanly in this uproar and
clamor for the ballot, and demanding all of men's so
called privileges - free love not excepted.' ' 385
That the majority of the American equal suffrage
leaders repudiated any connection between the demand
for the franchise and the extreme social views held by
some · of the reformers of the day is evidenced by the
following resolution which was adopted at the meeting
of the American Woman Suffrage Association in 1871:
That the claim of women to participate in making the laws
she is required to obey, and to equality of rights in all directions,
has nothing to do with special social theories, and that the recent
attempts in this city and elsewhere to associate the Woman
Suffrage cause with the doctrines of Free Love, and to hold it
responsible for the crimes and follies of individuals, is an out-
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rage upon common sense and decency, and a slander upon the
virtue and intelligence of the women of America. 386

It is, however, a fact that the suspicion that in some
mysterious way equal suffrage meant the overthrow of
the whole social order deterred many women from seeking the franchise. It was not, of course, clear how this
moral catastrophe was to result from the simple act of
dropping a ballot in a box; but the suggestion had been
made and arguments pointing out the lack of any relationship between voting and immorality were ineffective
until the common sense of the majority of women gradu~
ally recognized the absurdity of the objection. Indeed,
it was said that in 1871 when Susan B. Anthony lectured
on woman suffrage at Cedar Rapids and asked all the
women who were favorable to signify their conviction
by rising, only one "fair Rapidan arose ".387
Inside the Iowa equal suffrage ranks there were leaders who proposed the repudiation of the doctrines of
enthusiasts like Mrs. Victoria 0. Woodhull. Others insisted that the charge of immorality should be merely
disregarded :388 they argued that it was unnecessary for
the women of Iowa to publicly assert that they were not
working for free love, since it was as impossible ,a s an
organized movement to legalize murder.
This dread of social anarchy wa·s not, however, universal. The Iowa Press Convention at Marshalltown in
1871 permitted the women visitors to vote for the president, and the comment of one of the editors present was
distinctly favorable. "We noticed several gentlemen",
he declared, '' rising from their seats to shake hands
with their wives over their first vote. It was a picture
for an Anna Dickinson or a Tilton, but not much of a

184 LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN

picture for Judge Clagett and his fellow-believer, Snyder, of the Cedar Falls Gazette. It will be nothing when
they get used to it, as it seems foreordained they some
day shall.' ' 3 89
Nor were all women deterred from participation in
political interests by the prophecies of evil: five women
appeared in the Republican County Convention in Montgomery County in 1871, where a Mrs. Flagg was a candidate for the nomination as county superintendent.390
Women also took some part in the presidential campaign of 1872. Indeed, a notice of a Republican rally at
Des Moines informed the people that the meeting "will
be addressed hy Iowa's most gifted woman orator,
Matilda Fletcher .
The ladies are especially
invited to be present, and hear the good cause of Republicanism eloquently advocated by one of their own sex.''
A Democratic paper commented on the fact that the
woman who was making speeches in favor of President
Grant had formerly written "poetry" protesting against
the corruption of his first administration. '' A lady'',
the editor conceded, "is fortunately not required to be
consistent.' ' 391
Furthermore, about this time there developed in the
State of Iowa an organization which was to have great
influence on the suffrage question - especially in the
matter of training women in organized public work.
'This was the association first organized at Dubuque on
April 17, 1869, under the name of the "Northern Woman
·suffrage Association", of which Mrs. D. S. Wilson was
the president. In June of the following year the first
·state convention met at Mount Pleasant where the
·'' Iowa Woman Suffrage Association'' was organized.
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The first president of the new organization was General
Henry O'Connor, then Attorney General of Iowa. Mrs.
Amelia Bloomer, Miss Nettie 'Sanford, Mrs. F. W.
Palmer, Joseph Dugdale, and John P. Irish were the first
vice presidents. Mrs. Arabella Mansfield was chosen
:secretary, and Mrs. Annie C. Savery was named corresponding secretary.392
At the second convention held at Des Moines in October, 1871, a resolution was adopted claiming the right of
suffrage for women, on the ground that women are persons and that under the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, they had the right to vote.
Among the speakers at this time were Mr. Ruttkay of
Des Moines (a nephew of Louis Kossuth) and Mrs.
Annie C. Savery, also of Des Moines. Mrs. Savery denied any connection between the propaganda for free
love and the demand for equal suffrage; and she declared
that if the ballot was the source of corruption, men also
-should be protected against the infection. Mrs. Bloomer
was elected president for the following year.
The third convention, it appears, was not held until
March, 1873. Of this meeting a prominent editor wrote
these words: ''While we have always been favorable to
woman suffrage as a principle, we confess we think these
-associations and conventions and leagues formed for the
furtherance of this principle alone, do more harm than
-good".393
Among the activities of the suffrage workers in these
·early years was the organization of local societies and
the distribution of literature from a cottage on the State
fair grounds. One of the first of the local societies was
-the Polk County Suffrage Society, organized on October
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25, 1870. About the same time another society with :fifty
members was organized at Burlington. Societies were
also formed at Algona, and at Independence, where Mrs.
N arcissa T.. Bemis, who was later president of the State
association, was an active leader.394
Equal suffrage petitions continued to reach the legislature; and the suffrage amendment was almost without
fail introduced in ea.ch General Assembly from 1870 to
the present time (1918). The legislators seem to have
pursued the policy of passing the resolution in one house
and rejecting it in the other, or of passing it in both
houses of one General Assembly and rejecting it at the
next session. Many of the influential members were
doubtless sincere in their support of the proposed change,
but few of them were willing to make the adoption of the
amendment an important issue in a political campaign.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed the equal suffrage amendment in 1874. The vote
was similar to that of 1870 - being :fifty-six to thirtyeight in the House, and twenty-seven to twenty-one in
the Senate. Furthermore, the Republican State Convention at its meeting in July, 1874, went on record as favorable to the submission of the equal suffrage amendment.395
Samuel J. Kirkwood, ex-Governor of the State, when
questioned concerning his attitude toward equal suffrage
during the campaign of 1875, replied that he "honestly
hoped to see the day when in going to the polls we shall
take our wives, daughters, and sisters with us", and he
believed that '' many of us would live to see such a
day.'' 396 Governor Cyrus C. Carpenter also pledged his
support, declaring that he had never been able to dis-
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cover any argument to sustain his own right to vote that
did not equally apply to women.
Indeed, sentiment ran more strongly in favor of woman suffrage in 1876 than for many years thereafter.' The
appeal of the Centennial celebration and the recognition
of the injustice of enfranchising the ex-slaves while refusing equal privileges to white women made many
friends for the suffrage cause, although the majority of
both men and women remained hostile or indifferent. In
the spring of 1876 an Iowa paper copied from an editorial which appeared in the Minneapolis Tribune the
following statement concerning equal suffrage in school
affairs in Minnesota: "Nearly all the ladies voting came
in groups from four to six in number, the men stepping
aside until their ballots were placed in the special deposit provided for them, and then the party would leave
for home, leaving their brothers somewhat astounded
that 'woman's suffrage' could be so courteously and effectively demonstrated." Upon which the Iowa editor
commented: '' Come to think of it, however, it is not marvellously strange that American men do not maltreat
their wives and sisters and mothers when assembling to
exercise their legal rights at the ballot-box. Civility to
women is not an exceptional trait in this country.' ' 397
Governor Carpenter in his biennial message in J anuary, 1876, favored the adoption of the suffrage amendment and suggested that the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence was a very appropriate time to
celebrate "the doctrine that taxation and representation
· are of right inseparable''; but in spite of this appeal the
Senate defeated the resolution to submit the amendment
to the voters first by a vote of twenty-two to twenty-four
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and upon reconsideration by a vote of twenty-two to
twenty-three. The House of Representatives passed the
resolution by a vote of fifty-four to forty, but the adverse
action of the Senate killed the proposed amendment.398
Two years later the House of Representatives, after
rejecting the amendment, reconsidered the resolution
and adopted it by a vote of fifty-five to forty-two. Apparently the Senate did not vote upon the question,
although a resolution was introduced and ref erred to the
committee on constitutional amendments which recom. mended indefinite postponement. In 1880 the House
again favored the amendment of the Constitution to give
women the right to vote and to sit in the legislature; but
to this resolution the Senate refused to agree. A resolution giving school suffrage to women was also favored
by the House committee 'b ut not by the House, although
the Senate approved this measure by a vote of twentyseven to seventeen. 399
Various petitions presented at this session of the General Assembly indicate that the suffrage advocates were
planning attacks on different fronts. In addition to the
numerous requests for constitutional suffrage, there was
a petition for woman suffrage in educational matters and
one for a law to exempt women property-owners from
taxation until they were given the right to vote.400
Moreover, the equal suffrage movement was attracting attention outside the legislature and the suffrage
organizations. The State Temperance Convention in
1877 and again in 1879 declared for equal suffrage as a
means of enabling women to aid in the protection of the
homes; and the Greenback State Convention in its meeting at Marshalltown in 1881 advocated '' equal political
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rights for all men and women'', and emphasized their
conviction by nominating a woman for Superintendent of
Public Instruction, although lawyers in the convention
declared that she could not qualify if elected. The nominee, however, solved the difficulty by refusing to serve,
declaring that she did not want to vote and that she
favored the Republican party rather than the Greenback.
A similar declaration of support was made by this party
in 1883.401
The next few years saw the parties in Iowa engaged
in a struggle over the question of prohibition. Equal
suffrage was, indeed, much discussed, but chiefly as it was
supposed to affect or be influenced by the liquor question.
The Nineteenth General Assembly in 1882 passed the
much introduced resolution for equal suffrage; but the
House of the Twentieth General Assembly indefinitely
postponed the measure, although the Senate at this time
passed it by a vote of twenty-six to twenty-four. This, it
may be noted, gave the women a victory in three of the
five necessary votes on the subject - two in the House,
two in the Senate, and the :final vote by the men of the
State. Possibly the success of the resolution might have
been even greater had the Governor aided in any way;
but Buren R. Sherman, in his message to the legislature
in 1884, refused to approve equal suffrage, although he
declared that he was in favor of submitting the amendment to the voters as a question of '' important and general interest". Some of the newspapers of the State
adopted the same policy, but it is possible that their
object was rather to divert attention from the debate
over prohibition than to assist the equal suffrage
cause.402
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The report of the Senate committee on constitutional
amendments in 1884 contained the following endorsement
of equal suffrage:
First. The principle is axiomatic, that the just powers of a
free representative government are derived from the consent of
the governed.
Second. That American civilization, law and conscience recognize woman as a subject of government, as a person and as a
citizen in many respects equally, and in some respects more
directly interested in the enactment and enforcement of law and
in giving direction to the administration of government than
man.
Third. That it is only fairness and justice to determine, as
a general principle, that burdens and privileges, taxation and
representation, if not altogether identical, should be equal and
coextensive.
Fourth. That woman would doubtless vote quite as intelligently as man.
Fifth. That her participation in the elective franchise would
tend to elevate rather than degrade politics.
Sixth. That there is no sufficient reason why her admission
to share with man in the direction and control of governmental
a~airs may not and will not tend to advance the best interests of
all classes in the commonwealth.
The majority of the committee therefore recommend the
adoption of the joint resolution in order that the proposed
amendment may be submitted to the people. 403

In the meantime, the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association had been holding a State meeting each year, endeavoring to arouse interest in what the members felt was the
next step towards democracy. They adopted as their
slogan a variation of the Iowa State motto which read,
'' Our liberties we prize, our rights we will secure'', and
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made efforts to secure publicity for their side of the
question through the newspapers. At first it was difficult
to interest these organs of public opinion because the
editors refused to consider the subject of equal suffrage
seriously: they were inclined rather to ridicule the activities of the women. By 1884, however, one hundred and
fifty newspapers had signified their willingness to print
suffrage articles, although they generally made it clear
that they disapproved of the proposed addition to the
· electorate.404
There is something pathetic in the efforts of the women who gathered year after year to consider the cause so
important to them, handicapped as they were by the lack
of votes which men have ever relied upon to further reform. Among the women who stood out because of their
devotion to this work were Mrs. Margaret W. Campbell,
Mrs. Martha 0. Callanan, Miss Roma W•oods, Mrs. Mary
B. Welch, Mrs. B. F. Gue, and a long list of others who
braved ridicule and discouragement without giving up
the fight. 405
Local suffrage clubs, or political equality clubs as
they were coming to be called, were also organized in
various towns and counties throughout the State; and in
1888 the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association adopted the
plan of choosing a president for every congressional district and a superintendent for every county. The clubs
thus organized were of various types, but most of them
were open to all who cared to join or to attend. Their
object was chiefly to get the women interested in government and to develop in them a sense of civic responsibility. By this time, in other words, the suffrage forces
had practically abandoned the claim that political rights
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were conferred on women by the fourteenth amendment
to the Federal Constitution or by natural right: they
were beginning to realize that participation in ,t he government could be secured only when the demand for it
was general and the women were qualified to vote. In
Iowa there was happily no inferiority of women in general education or intelligence; it was necessary, however,
that women should acquire familiarity with forms of
organization, with the administration of the government,
and with social conditions. Thus, the development of the
general women's clubs, while wholly distinct from the
suffrage movement as such, was really an impol"tant factor in creating a wider interest for women. 406
Mrs. Carrie Lane Chapman (Catt), who was chosen
State lecturer and organizer for the Suffrage Association in 1889, gave a strong impetus to the suffrage propaganda. She began her work on November 18, 1889, by
organizing a Political Equality Club at Sioux City; and
she continued in the work until 1890, when she removed
from Iowa. 407
The organization of local clubs with active members
continued, although the number of such associations was
never exactly known since many were not reported, while
others broke up soon after their organization. Their
chief work was the distribution of literature and the discussion of public questions. Nor were women the only
speakers. President Aylesworth of Drake University
gave the evening address at one of the meetings of the
Marion County Political Equality Association, and General James B. Weaver spoke at one of the Polk County
meetings. Similar addresses were given by other prominent men at various places, serving the double purpose
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of educating the women in public affairs and awakening
the men to the justice of the claims of the women. 408
One of the men asked to give an address before the
Woman Suffrage Association in 1889 was George A.
Gates, then President of Grinnell College. He was compelled to refuse because of other duties, but he concluded
his letter by saying: '' The cause of extending suffrage
to women is one in which I am considerably interested,
never having been able to discover worthy reasons why
suffrage should be denied them. Indeed, I have thought
that after awhile we may come around and ask them to
help us - a change from the present condition of things
- rather than think of allowing them to do so.' ' 409
In 1879 the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association was
affiliated with the American Woman Suffrage Association and sent delegates to its meeting. The Iowa representatives to the meeting at Washington in 1890, for example, were Mrs. Margaret W. Campbell of Des Moines,
Mr. and Mrs. James Callanan of Des Moines, Mrs. Narcissa T. Bemis of Independence, and Mrs. Carrie Lane
Chapman of Charles City. Mrs. Amelia Bloomer of
Council Bluffs and Mrs. Margaret S. Cowgill of West
Liberty were made honorary vice presidents of the national organization.410 In November, 1891, the Iowa
Woman Suffrage Association was incorporated. Six
years later its name was changed to the Iowa Equal
Suffrage Association, since it was felt that equal suffrage
and not woman suffrage was the principle for which the
Association was working. 411
In the meantime, the old story of the constitutional
amendment was being repeated in the legislature. Governor William Larrabee in his inaugural message on
I:!
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January 14, 1886, declared that a "large number of our
best people favor the extension of suffrage to women",
but he advocated municipal or school suffrage as an experiment. Moreover, the chief executive emphasized
property rights rather than the franchise in the following words:
It is clear to me that one thing is of vastly more importance
to them [the women] than the ballot,. and that is to acquire and
to hold in their own name and right a larger share of property.
This is essential to secure their real independence. 412

In spite of the recommendations of the Governor and
the flood of petitions sent to the legislature, equal suffrage was not favored hy the Twenty-first General Assembly. The Senate passed the joint resolution looking
towards a constitutional amendment by a vote of twentynine to seventeen; while the bill to grant municipal
suffrage to women did not get beyond the judiciary committee to which it was ref erred. The House failed to act
upon the constitutional amendment resolution, and a bill
granting both municipal and school suffrage to women
was never called up for a vote, although the committee
which considered it recommended its passage. 413
Interest in the cause, however, remained unabated on
the part of the women who felt the injustice of disfranchisement. It was in 1886 that the publication of The
Woman's Standard, a paper devoted to the suffrage cause
and to political news of interest to suffrage workers, was
begun by a group of Iowa women. The paper was partly
supported by the Woman Suffrage Association. Two
comments will illustrate the reaction of newspaper editors towards this enterprise. One paper contained the
following endorsement:
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It shows that the idea of woman suffrage is taking hold here,
and that it is going to be fought out in Iowa. We never could
understand why a woman didn't have just as much right as a
man has to vote.

A different opinion was expressed by an editor who
described the new organ in these words :
The Woman's ST.A.ND.A.RD is a nicely printed eight-page journal, with able-bodied editorials, and communications by women
who are tired making soap and rocking the cradle. From this
on many a man will be going around with his suspenders
fastened by a shingle nail. So far as we are concerned we are
willing women should have the ballot if they can get it, and do
away with side-saddles if they prefer to ride the other way. 414

In general the Iowa newspapers opposed suffrage for
women at this time, although some of them gave the
matter consideraible publicity. The Cedar Rapids Republican employed Mrs. L. M. Latham to conduct a woman suffrage department in its columns. When the St.andard was first issued it was said that equal suffrage was
favored by only one Democratic paper in the State - the
Keokuk Constitution. Many Republican papers opposed
the movement. One of the papers published in the German language denounced the entire movement because
the editor believed only bad women would vote if they
were given the ballot.415
Moreover, on the part of the equal suffrage leaders at
this time there was an inclination to claim municipal
suffrage without a specific act of the General Assembly,
on the ground that women were entitled to the privilege
by the Constitution. The Attorney General, however,
decided that this interpretation of the Constitution was
not sound.416
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Some encouragement was given to the women by Governor William Larrabee, who in an address at Strawberry Point, on October 26, 1886, commented upon the
large number of women present at a political speech and
upon the lack of women tramps and the few women prisoners. Indeed, it appears that equal suffrage was publicly endorsed by the men who supported the fusion
ticket of the Prohibition-Republican-Knights-of-Labor
forces in the election of 1886. In commenting upon one
of the candidates for Congress, a Democratic paper declared that "the democratic party stands as the opponent
of female suffrage, and we think will maintain that stand.
If Mr. O'Meara supports his platform, then he supports
woman suffrage and has no claim on the vote of any
democrat, or any one who opposes woman suffrage.
This doctrine is distinctively republican.''
In his first biennial message delivered in January,
1888, Governor Larrabee again mentioned equal suffrage,
emphasizing especially municipal suffrage, which he declared was "favored by many of our best citizens." "It
is claimed", continued the Governor, "by those who advocate this that it is not only right and just, but that it
would so reenforce the better element of the population
of our cities as to secure a more perfect enforcement of
the criminal laws and greatly improve the government
of our municipalities. The experiment might be a safe
one, for if women should not avail themselves of the
privilege when conferred, or if the results were unsatisfactory, the same power that bestowed the franchise
could revoke it.' ' 417 This statement could scarcely be
considered a recommendation, although it was more
favorable than omitting the subject altogether, as most
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messages had done and the Governor was criticized for
what he had said by the papers opposed to suffrage.
Expressing approval of municipal suffrage, the Cedar
Rapids Republican declared that the Governor had not
gone far enough. "Then," said the editor, "if they don't
take enough interest in city government, city schools,
city improvements, etc., to vote their preferences for
men to execute the public will, why then - But we '11 not
~ttempt to cross a stream before we come to it. " 418
Another paper declared that the "time is ripe for woman suffrage. Other States are adopting it. Let not Iowa
remain behind. " 419
It is evident, however, that many of the legislators
were not favorable to the extension of the suffrage, for
the House bill granting municipal suffrage to women was
defeated by a vote of fifty-three to forty-four. Various
reasons were given in explanation of the negative votes:
some declared that they believed the bill to be unconstitutional; others considered it inexpedient; while still
others objected to permitting women in one place to vote
while those in another could not. A joint resolution providing for a constitutional amendment, which was not
open to at least two of these objections, was finally
adopted by a vote of sixty-six to twenty-six after having
been once rejected. The Senate apparently did not discuss the subject during this session, although a resolution was introduced and recommended for passage by
the committee. It is said that on February 16, 1888,
Mrs. Helen M. Gougar addressed the House committee
on municipal suffrage - the first time a woman had
spoken in the hall of the House of Representatives in the
new capitol bui]ding.42"
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Among the opponents of equal suffrage during this
session was J. S. Clarkson of the Iowa State Register,
who based his opposition on the ground of policy. The
Republicans having taken a progressive stand on the
matter of prohibition now hesitated to take a step forward in suffrage reform, since in advocating prohibition
they had already left a large number of their constituents
far in the rear. Another advance, it was feared, would
alienate still other members - a risk which the party
could not afford to take. Of course there were no votes
of women to lose; but the men who opposed equal suffrage were invaluable to the party's success and must
not be offended. The position of the Register on equal
suffrage did not, however, prevent the editor from urging the women of Iowa to aid in the election of Harrison
and Morton. 421
When the General Assembly convened in 1890 the
equal suffrage forces concentrated their efforts on school
and municipal suffrage, no determined attempt being
made to secure action on the constitutional amendment.
Governor Larrabee again advocated the limited form of
enfranchisement, this time calling attention to the status
of women in other States. His observations had apparently convinced him that equal suffrage, where it was in
vogue, was at least reasonably successful for his message
contained the following conservative endorsement:
The continued good results of its exercise in our sister state
Kansas re-enforce the arguments in favor of trying the experiment in Iowa. In many of the states women vote for members
of school-boards, and I see no reason why they should not do so
here. It is worthy of note that the territory of Wyoming, after
years of experience with woman suffrage at all elections, has
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recently with great unanimity ingrafted the principle into the
constitution with which it is now seeking to enter the Union. 422

This argument did not prove sufficient to overcome
the active opposition or inertia of the legislature, which
found other questions more important. Two bills on the
subject were introduced in both House and Senate: one,
to give women school suffrage, and another granting
them municipal suffrage. Neither proposition came to a
vote in the Senate. The bill granting school suffrage
was reported favorably by the House committee, but was
defeated by a vote of eight to thirty-one; while the proposition for municipal suffrage was smothered in the committee to which it had been referred. 423 The constitutional amendment to give women the franchise did not
come up at this session.
When the Iowa Suffrage Association met for its
nineteenth annual convention in December, 1890, the
members drew up resolutions ignoring the failure of
equal suffrage in the preceding General Assembly and
declaring that "we recognize in Wyoming the true and
just form of State government, and congratulate the
nation upon its admission with unrestricted suffrage''.
These resolutions also included a vote of thanks to certain Des Moines papers for their complete reports of the
proceedings; and to one of them the committee extended
"our further appreciation of the free advertising given
our cause through its disparaging editorials.' ' 424

xv
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1890-1918
IN some respects the outlook for equal suffrage in 1890
was more discouraging than it had been at any time
since the Civil War. The interest aroused by the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and :fifteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution had been counteracted
by the early failure of negro suffrage: the country had
begun to realize that to confer political rights upon unfit
persons was a mistake - a state of mind which seemed
to strengthen opposition to equal suffrage. On the other
hand, the example of the western States was encouraging; but failures in government usually occupy a much
greater share of attention than successes - especially
when an excuse for inaction is desired.
Governor Boies, who did not mention equal suffrage
in any of his messages, was considered an opponent of
the measure, so that the indifference of the General Assembly during his administration was proba:bly not displeasing to him. At the same time prejudice and indifference were being gradually overcome by the education of
women in the methods of handling public affairs and by
the slowly increasing emphasis on social rather than
purely economic problems. In the summer of 1890 Mr.
Terence V. Powderly, the leader of the Knights of Labor,
advocated the admission of women to that order - which
was rea}ly a political organization. He also championed
200
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equal suffrage and equal pay for the same work, but his
party was not sufficiently successful to challenge action
on the part of the two leading parties.425
Several bills were introduced in the Twenty-fourth
General Assembly concerning equal suffrage. One, presented by Senator Engle, proposed to give women the
ballot by statutory enactment; another revived the proposition first made by Mr. Irish and provided for equal
suffrage in voting for presidential electors. A Senate
joint resolution proposed a constitutional amendment to
strike out the word "male" in the sections relating to the
franchise and membership in the Gelleral Assembly; but
all these measures 'were smothered in committees in the
Senate. Four bills on the same subject were introduced
in the House: one to confer municipal suffrage upon
women; another granting them school suffrage; a third,
giving them general suffrage; and a fourth, to give women the right to vote for presidential electors. The
municipal suffrage bill was lost by a vote of twenty-seven
to fifty-four; the one for school suffrage failed by a vote
of twenty-nine to fifty-three; while the others were indefinitely postponed.426
The friends of equal suffrage now began to realize
that the attainment of their ideal of complete democracy
meant the expenditure of a large amount of energy,
money, and labor. When the Woman Suffrage Association met for its twenty-second annual convention at
Webster City in November, 1893, the officers reported
1070 letters written, thirty-three new political equality
clubs organized, and seventy-two lectures given. The
Dunlap club at this time reported the largest membership - one hundred and forty-three. Gratification was
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expressed over the planks in favor of equal suffrage in
the Populist and Prohibition platforms. 427
'When the General Assembly met in 1894 an unusually
active campaign was begun and petitions poured into the
legislature - as many as fifty being presented in the
Senate in a single day. A bill granting municipal and
school suffrage to women was introduced in the House,
and after much debate was passed in a greatly amended
form and was then favorably considered by the Senate.
As finally adopted this bill gave women the privilege of
voting at municipal and school elections involving the
issuing of bonds, borrowing money, or increasing the tax
levy. In such matters the General Assembly decreed
'' the right of any citizen to vote sh~ll not be denied or
abridged on account of sex, and women may vote at such
elections the same as men, under the same restrictions
and qualifications.'' Two other bills - one for school
suffrage and one for municipar suffrage - were introduced in the Senate, but neither came to a vote. By a
vote of twenty to twenty-six a joint resolution to amend
the Constitution was def eated.428
The petition sent to the General Assembly by Mrs.
Eva S. Gilchrist of Sioux City may be quoted as typical
of the views of many other women :
Gentlemen:
The undersigned petitioner, born in the United States, and
a citizen of Iowa since 1868, respectfully submits to your honoruble body for consideration the following causes for grievance;
referring you first, as a basis for these deductions to the grand
principles upon which the foundation of our Republic and the
constitution of Iowa rests, as enunciated in the Declaration of
Independence which expressly states that '' governments derive
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their just powers from the consent of the governed; that taxation without representation is tyranny; that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.''
1st. Your petitioner meets all the requirements of the Constitution of Iowa, and not belonging to the classes set apart as
disqualified voters; therefore, being denied the ballot, is unconstitutionally and unlawfully disfranchised - injuriously discriminated against - and is deprived of the Divine right of
self-representation, true liberty, happiness, and the prerogatives
of a responsible citizen, all in direct opposition to the principles
upon which this government of the people, by the people, and for
the people is founded.
2nd. Your petitioner is personally injured in feelings, influence, and power by being politically classed with the minor,
insane, criminal, Jefferson Davis, idiot and slave, and is, therefore, compelled to stand before the government of both State
and Nation, humiliated and reproached because created a woman.
3rd. Believing class-legislation unconstitutional, wrong in
principle and injurious in practice, your petitioner protests
against its further continuance, - as all men having the privilege of suffrage, no matter how densely ignorant, nor how corrupt in character, (only so they are out of prison,) nor how
lately emigrated to my native land, are my political superiors,they choose the rulers, and make laws to govern me without my
consent, and, feeling more and more the ignominy of this unenviable position in our so-called Republic.
I do, therefore, humbly pray your honorable body to redress
these grievous wrongs, and so far as you are legally qualified, to
confer the elective franchise upon me, that I may represent myself equally with all those who now enjoy its advantages and
blessings and respectfully request that favorable action may be
taken upon my petition at this session of the legislature. 429
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In the debate on the suffrage bill which finally became
a law in an amended form, various explanations were
offered for negative votes, among which the two most
frequently given were: that the bill was unconstitutional;
and that the women did not want to vote. One Representative, however, was more original and handed in the
following reason for his vote:
I have always been taught and Scripture says, God first made
man and afterwards he took a rib out of the man's side, out of
which he made a woman. Now it seems to me a disgrace and an
injustice to let that rib control or dictate to men in any way,
shape or form whatsoever in regard to the law making power in
this State. Therefore, I vote no.
P . STILLMUNKEs4so

The fact that the men who dictated party policies
were unwilling to admit women to the suffrage did not,
however, prevent their asking for the aid of women in
the campaign of the autumn of 1895. The Iowa State
Register printed the following appeal to the women who
favored Republican candidates in the State election:
The Republican women of the state should see to it that Republican men go to the -polls to vote on Tuesday, Novemb~r 5,
even if the women have to run the threshing machines and do
the husking for a few hours. Here is an opportunity for the
women to vote. Every vote that they cause to be deposited in
the ballot boxes on that day will be written to their credit. It
is a lamentable fact that many men are so indifferent to the
rights and duties of citizenship that they refuse to take a few
minutes or a few hours to vote . . . . We appeal to the
women to see to it that the men exercise their right and discharge
their duty well on the fifth of November. 43 1

This appeal to the women, together with some of the
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statements made in connection therewith, apparently provoked some comment, for some three weeks later a defense of the paper's stand was published in the editorial
columns. When compared with the above statement as
to the indifference of the men voters, the explanation is
rather interesting. The Register, it was asserted, '' has
frequently stated that it will be in favor of the extension
of full suffrage to the women of the state when the majority of the women want to vote and will vote
The Register is wholly indifferent on the matter of unsexed suffrage, except that the majority of the women
shall decide the matter and then, if they declare in favor
of voting, vote as generally as the men do.' ' 432
As the prohibition question had overshadowed equa)
suffrage during the years following 1882, so the excitement over the free silver issue and the debate in Iowa on
the proposed changes in the State government absorbed
the attention of Iowa politicians and legislators in 1896
- indeed, it seems that very little was required to divert
the attention of most of them from the suffrage issue.
Apparently no action was taken in the House during this
session; while in the Senate a joint resolution in relation
to equal suffrage was defeated by a vote of twenty-three
to twenty-three. 433
While the legislators were considering necessary
changes in the State laws, another assembly met in Des
Moines. This was the meeting of the National Woman
Suffrage Association which convened in January, 1897,
to discuss what its members considered the most necessary change in political administration. Among the
speakers was Miss Susan B. Anthony, a woman of great
ability and of better judgment than suffrage agitators
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frequently employed. The meeting brought to the attention of the men and women of Iowa the number and the
class of women interested in suffrage and the powerful
organization they had effected to secure it. The Iowa
State Register printed the following comment on the
meeting:
The convention in this city this week will, no doubt, exert a
large influence on this community and state. There is something
infectious in a cause which has so many capable women pleading
for it constantly. Other women are influenced by it and every
time we lose a woman ( we speak now from the anti-suffrage
side) we are in danger of losing from one to half a dozen
men . . . .
But the women who believe in suffrage are entitled to a full
hearing . . . . The very chivalry which is the stronghold,
or at least the boast of the anti-suffrage side, compels us all to
yield them that. In the meanwhile we hope that the good women
will not all desert us and go over to the side of '' Our Susan,''
for we would be lonesome and powerless without them. For the
success of the anti-suffrage cause reliance must be placed in
women, not in men. The women are the final arbiters - the men
are merely instruments in their hands. This is the sad truth.43 4

Miss Anthony even presided over a joint meeting of
the two houses of the General Assembly in February,
1897, and a newspaper declared that she "did so well,
that no man could have done better.'' Indeed, it was
said that "the session Friday presided over by the inimitable Miss Susan B. Anthony will long be remembered by
those who were present. And all the remembrances are
pleasant ones. But, of course, this does not mean that we
ought to extend the suffrage to women. " 4 3 5
The national suffrage leaders urged a concerted effort
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on the part of the Iowa association to elect a legislature
favorable to equal suffrage. "That campaign has already been begun", said an Iowa editor in May, 1897,
"by the organization of suffrage societies and the holding
of suffrage conventions in a number of the counties of
the state, at which Miss Hay of New York, Rev. Anna
Shaw of Philadelphia, our own Mrs. Carrie Lane-Chapman-Catt - the brightest woman enlisted in the woman
suffrage cause - and other speakers of National reputation have been present to instruct and inspire the supporters of unsexed suffrage. The ladies opposed to the
extension of suffrage to their sex are not so well organized, but they are beginning to make themselves manifest
and will doubtless soon be as actively engaged in the contest as their opponents.' ' 436
The activity of the suffragists was chiefly directed towards the organization of local suffrage clubs: more
than a hundred such groups were reported during the
latter part of 1897. In 1899 there were said to be some
two thousand women enrolled in these clubs. 437
The work of these local organizations may be illus- .
trated by the program of the Sioux City Political Equality Club which met each month in the city building. The
subjects for discussion were: Iowa; parliamentary drill;
the suffrage movement in Iowa; club methods in Iowa;
history of legislative work in Iowa; history of bond
suffrage in Iowa and what it has accomplished; and
Iowa women office-holders. There w~s an open debate
upon woman suffrage in which the club challenged the
anti-suffragists. The meeting devoted to parliamentary
drill took the form of scenes from the Republican State
Convention with Mrs. Julia C. Hallam presiding. 4 38
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Thus the women obtained training in the practical
problems of administration and political tactics. In
these years of struggle they gained much in knowledge of
affairs and in self-confidence, although the only concession of political power was the right to vote on the question of bonds and the right to hold certain offices.
The Code of 1897 perpetuated the provisions concerning voting on bonds; but it expressly denied to women
the right to vote for school officers, thus deciding against
a claim made by some persons that the right to vote on
bonds included the right to vote for school officers. The
procedure in all elections at which women were allowed
to vote was described in these words :
At all elections where women may vote, no registration of
women shall be required ; separate ballots shall be furnished for
the question on which they are entitled to vote; a separate ballot
box shall be provided in which all ballots cast by them shall be
deposited, and a separate canvass thereof made by the judges of
the election, and the returns thereof shall show such vote.430

An interesting incident was reported in 1897 concerning an election at McGregor in Clayton County on the
question of issuing bonds for the erection of a plant to
provide the city with water. This was, of course, one of
the questions upon which women were entitled to vote;
but the judges were not aware of the provisions of the
law and at first refused to permit any woman to cast a
ballot, so that only four women succeeded in voting. As
a result of this irregularity the election was declared
illegal. Again, in 1916 the election on the question of
establishing a municipal court at Des Moines was contested because women were allowed to vote, but the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the vote.440
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When the General AssE:!mbly met in 1898 two joint
resolutions for a constitutional amendment were introduced in the House of Representatives. One failed to
survive reference to the committee ; while the other received only forty-nine affirmative votes, forty-eight Representatives voting against it and three failing to vote
- thus giving less than the constitutional majority.
Before the vote was taken the resolution was amended by
inserting the provision that "women shall not be eligible
to perform jury, police, military or road duty.' ' 441 A
Senate resolution to strike out the word ''male'' from
'' section 1, article 3 '' was evidently intended to apply to
Article II, but no action was taken upon it.
While the suffrage resolution was under consideration, the House and Senate committees on constitutional
amendments granted a hearing to the equal suffragists
and the anti-suffragists on February 3, 1898, at which a
number of prominent women spoke on each side of the
question. Among those in favor of the resolution were
Mrs. Mary J. Coggeshall, president of the Des Moines
Equal Suffrage Club, Mrs. Evelyn H. Belden of Sioux
City, Mrs. Nellie Purcell of Des Moines, and Mrs. D. S.
Wright of Cedar Falls. The anti-suffrage side was represented by a number of women, among whom were Miss
Emilie Stowe, Mrs. Martin Flynn, and Mrs. H. A. Foster
of Des Moines.
Exact reports of the speeches made before the committees are not available, but some of the points made
were preserved by the newspapers. According to the .
report printed in the Woman's Standard Mrs. Coggeshall
said:
14
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Anti-suffragists tell us that it is easy to get by the votes of
men every right to which we are entitled; but the facts are that
every inch of advanced ground has been contested .
It is less than sixty-five years since a change in the laws favorable to women has taken place in any part of the United States,
and none of these occurred until women began to ask for the
ballot. The remnants of old-time restrictions remain. Were it
not so, this company would not be here this afternoon.
Prejudices die hard. The creed of all nations has made the
subordination of women the cornerstone of her religious character. The literature of all our past is saturated with this idea.
If we accept the story of Genesis that a woman set up the world
in the clothing business, furnishing the fig leaves for herself and
husband, it is pathetic that the growth of 6,000 years does not
yet in many states of this union allow the wife to own her fig
leaves. You probably read in the daily papers a short time ago
of the man in Connecticut who was so tired of the fancy gowns
his wife persisted in wearing that he burned them. He was
arrested for this destruction of property, but nothing could be
done with him, because, as was plainly showed, a man has a
right to do what he pleases with his own clothes.
The suffrage women are taunted with the assertion that they
are seeking to don their husbands' clothes, while the facts are
that women have always worn men's clothes - the suffragists
are only trying to get women the right to wear their own.

Miss Emilie Stowe, the first "remonstrant", is reported to have begun by declaring that theY, would all
rather be at home with their knitting, but feared the
members of the legislature might be misled, and their
minds biased toward equal suffrage, if they did not appear and protest against submitting the proposed
amendment to the voters. She declared that the right to
vote had become a "very shibboleth" with the suffra-
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gists, but asserted that '' from our point of view that
word 'right' pales into insignificance - becomes nil,
when pitted against the word 'expediency,' in connection
with this question.''
Mrs. H. A. Foster declared that the women had left
their homes very reluctantly to speak in behalf of the
contented wives and mothers who felt that their social
duties in connection with home cares, taxed to their fullest capacity their mental, moral, and physical strength.
She thought all arguments in favor of female suffrage
'' illogical and sophistical.'' In reference to the suffrage
petitions that had gone to the legislature, Mrs. Foster
made the following statement:
[They] bear the signatures of not only women of mature
years, but of girls, of men, and of the dead. I mention the latter
class because these petitions have been many years in preparation, and a large number of the original signers have passed
away, leaving their signatures to be used in a manner which
they, no doubt, by this time, sadly regret. As a matter of fact,
these petitions indicate nothing but the craft and indomitable
energy of the women engaged in securing them, and the good
natured carelessness of the signers.

Mrs. Day began with the sarcastic reflection that
those "least qualified to speak on legislative matters
were the most prompt to offer suggestions to law makers.'' Instead of lessening the qualifications for the
suffrage, she declared, such qualifications should be increased.
In her concluding remarks Mrs. Belden discussed thR
argument that voting would degrade women, saying:
I feel almost like speaking a word or two for man's suffrage,
so much has been said against it this afternoon. I have never

I
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known that a particular crowd of men was let loose on election
day to corrupt, who are shut up the rest of the time. I have
never believed a man was less a gentleman at the polls than at
the opera and circus, nor that there was anything at the polls to
endanger women which they do not meet elsewhere daily. I
must resent the imputation regarding the petitions, for it hurt
me deeply. I hate to think that I live in a state where the men
are so careless about signing a petition on a great question, and
[I] refuse to admit such is the case. That this movement is
backed by poor house-keepers and discontented women, I also
deny. We have in our ranks some of the best home makers and
housekeepers in Iowa.4 4 2

In 1900 a similar resolution providing for equality of
suffrage and office-holding failed to receive the necessary
constitutional majority in the Senate; and in the House,
the equal suffrage amendment was rejected by a vote of
forty-three to :fifty-six. 443 The amendment, indeed, fared
a little better in the Twenty-ninth General Assembly in
1902, for it was then adopted in the Senate by a vote of
twenty-eight to sixteen, although it was indefinitely postponed by the House of Representatives. 444 Indifference
was largely responsible for the action of the legislators.
The interest in public affairs which had been aroused by
the Civil War had largely died down, while thousands of
women now found an outlet for their energies in home
work or in the clubs which were organized- at first, for
individual culture rather than for the public welfare.
There is some evidence, however, that popular sentiment was slowly becoming more favorable to universal
suffrage. The extension of the franchise to the women of
the ,vest was a strong argument in favor of the Iowa
amendment. The emphasis on social problems which de-
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veloped in the decade from 1890 to 1900 inevitably di. rected attention to the non-voting group which included
approximately one-half the adult population. Newspapers began to take a more favorable attitude towards
equality of men and women in political affairs. Most important of all, women began to exhibit more self-confidence. They seldom talked of "women's rights", but
more often vindicated them in the courts. The men of
the seventies sometimes, no doubt, voted for equal suffrage to please the women - especially when they did
not believe it would be successful or permanent. Twenty
years later, men were just beginning to realize that political equality was inevitable.
The General Assembly, however, was very conservative and continued to vote down the constitutional amendment until 1913. In 1904 the resolution was defeated in
the House, while the Senate permitted it to be buried in
the sifting committee after being unfavorably reported
by the committee to which it had been re~erred. Moreover, the following explanation of an affirmative vote
made by a member of the House of Representatives indicates that the legislators were becoming desirous of
shifting the rejecting of equal suffrage to the voters of
the State:
I have voted in the affirmative for the reason that this question has been presented to many past sessions of the General
Assembly; and, in all probability will be urged on every future
session until finally submitted to the electors for their determination.
Personally, I am opposed to the proposition, but do not wish
to array myself against the submission to the people - having
abiding faith in the defeat of the measure at the polls.445
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This prophecy concerning the re-submission of the
amendment was at fault only in inferring that the question would be settled by a defeat at the hands of the
voters of the State. His advice, however, was not followed, and the General Assembly which met in 1906 defeated not only the joint resolution for the constitutional
amendment, but also a bill granting presidential suffrage
to women. 446
In 1907 Senator Gale introduced a resolution for constitutional equal suffrage, but his measure was defeated
in the Senate by a vote of twenty-one to twenty-six. A
bill introduced in the House by Representative C. A.
Meredith to give women school suffrage was passed by a
vote of seventy-seven to nine, with twenty-two not voting; but the amendment resolution was not even considered by the Senate. Another bill aiming at presidential
suffrage was referred to a committee where it was
smotbered.447
In the Thirty-third General Assembly a bill was introduced in the Senate providing "That the right of any
citizen to vote at any election upon any question, except
nomination and election of officers, or amendments to the
constitution, shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex, and women may vote thereon the same as men".
But this bill was deprived of any meaning it might otherwise have possessed by the striking out of its enacting
clause. A resolution for the much discussed constitutional amendment was indefinitely postponed; and a similar resolution in the House failed to survive reference
to the committee. 448
The House of the Thirty-fourth General Assembly defeated the equal suffrage amendment by a close vote of
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forty-eight to fifty-three; while a bill to permit women
to vote on the question of establishing county hospitals
did not secure definite action. A similar bill in the Senate was lost in the sifting committee; and a school suffrage bill was introduced and indefinitely postponed. It
was during this session of the legislature that Miss
Sylvia Pankhurst of England, then visiting in Des
Moines, was invited to address a joint convention of the
General Assembly and on February 1st, after a ballot on
United States Senator, the members listened to "Lady
Pankhurst' '.449
It was about this time that a group of men organized
a State association for the '' approval of the movement of
women to attain the full suffrage in this state and country; and to aid them in their efforts toward that end by
public appearance in behalf of the cause, and by circulation of literature and holding of meetings". This Men's
League for Woman Suffrage held its first meeting in
July, 1910, and included in its membership list at that
time the names of Edwin A. Nye, John J. Hamilton, H. C.
Evans, Henry ·wallace, Edgar R. Harlan, A. L. Urick,
R. D. Emory, Johnson Brigham, Leon Brown, E. T.
Meredith, James Nugent, Harvey Ingham, and J. F.
Riggs. These men were not demonstratively enthusiastic, but their organization showed tha t they were really
in sympathy w~th the equal suffrage workers. 450
When the Thirty-fifth General Assembly met in 1913
the advocates of equal suffrage, still hopeful, again presented their demands for the removal of political discrimination against women. A joint convention of the
two houses listened to an argument by Mrs. Trout of the
Illinois Suffrage Association. She discussed the various
1
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objections to suffrage: women do not want to vote; a
woman's place is in the home; women can not fight; the
ballot would coarsen women; bad women only would
vote; wives would be quarrelsome; and other fears of the
anti-suffragists. The speech is too long to be repeated at
length, but the following paragraph will illustrate its
character:
Some people object to equal suffrage because they fear that if
women were allowed to handle that dangerous piece of paper
called a "ballot," they would grow coarse and masculine, because they would be associated in such a horrible and degrading
way with men. Still women ride in our cars and in our autos
every day, side by side with men, and seem to enjoy it. They
work in our stores, teach in our schools, side by side with men.
They go to church, side by side with men. 'l'hey even live under
the same roof with men, and yet this constant association has
failed to make them either coarse or masculine. But, voting is,
of course, different. 4 5 1

It is unlikely that this speech had any large effect, but
the general increase in opinion favorable to equal suffrage at this time made possible the adoption of a proposed constitutional amendment that '' Every citizen of
the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, who
shall have been a resident of this state six months next
preceding the election, and of the county in which he or
she claims his or her vote, sixty days, shall be entitled to
vote at all elections which are now or hereafter may be
authorized by law." This amendment was to take the
place of Section 1, Article II, of the Constitution, which
had so long disfranchised the women of the State: it was
adopted by a vote of eighty-one to twenty-six in the
Rouse, and thirty-one to fifteen in the Senate.452
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The Supplem ent to the Code of Iowa, 1913, provided
that voters at school elections in corporations of over
5000 inhabitants must register; but this clause was not
to be "construed to prohibit women from voting at all
elections at which they are entitled to vote.' ' 453
Two years later it was provided that in voting at
elections under the drainage act '' the owner of each tract
of land, if he or she is over twenty-one years of age, shall,
without regard to sex .
. be entitled to at least
one vote". 4 54
According to the Constitution an amendment to the
fundamental law must pass two successive General Assemblies before being submitted to the people, and so the
equal suffrage amendment passed in 1913 came before
the Thirty-sixth General Assembly. The anti-suffragists
made a determined effort to defeat the resolution; but in
this they failed. By a vote of thirty-eight to eleven in
the Senate, and eighty-four to nineteen in the House, the
suffrage amendment was approved by the legislature. 455
At the committee hearing on the resolution in the
House, advocates and opponents of the amendment appeared, and two of the speeches, both by anti-suffragists,
were printed in the Journal of the House in accordance
with a motion by Representative Klinker who was opposed to equal suffrage. These objectors to equal suffrage urged that women could best serve the State by
staying at home; that men and women have different
functions, and therefore women should be content to let
men vote alone; that a mother's influence is greater than
a voter's; that eighty per cent of the women over twentyfour years of age are married and have interests identical with their husbands; that if a wife voted against

•
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her husband she would nullify his vote; that the franchise is not a right but a privilege delegated to whomsoever the government wishes; that the majority of the
women do not want to vote anyway; that taxation without votes is not tyranny, since women are represented by
the men; that women can carry on philanthropic work
better without the aid of the ballot; and that women are
no better off in suffrage States than they are in nonsuffrage States. "The suffrage states", declared Miss
Bronson, '' are for the most part black.'' Furthermore ,
'' Pasadena, saloonless throughout its history, voted in
the saloons at the first election held after women
voted.' ' 456
Mrs. Cullums of Des Moines based her objections to
suffrage upon the difference between the sexes and the
apparent intention of God that women were to dominate
the world as mothers. The suffragists, she asserted, were
intent upon breaking up the home. Some of her arg11ments were as follows :
If I were explaining a weed to a class of young girls and
married women, I would say a weed and a suffragist look alike,
and history has proven a suffragette is detrimental and injurious
to home and home life, and that her silent aim seems to be an
upheaval of the home and places sprags in the mental wheels of
all young girls and married women by saying, any expectant
mother should have pay for producing a child, and then I would
dismiss the class and enter into a silent prayer, asking Lord God
Almighty to give me strength to go on and teach purity and
morality and motherhood in this sinful, twisted, carnal minded
old world . . . .
The best rights that a woman can own she already has in her
possession. The grandeur and power of her realm have never
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yet been appreciated. She sits today on a throne so high that all
the thrones of earth piled on top of each other, would not make
for her a foot stool. Here is the platform on which she stands.
Away down below it are the ballot box and the congressional
assemblage and the legislative hall . . . . I am positive the
minister who proclaims suffrage from his pulpit is of the world
worldly. 'l'he ministers may preach prohibition and may see the
saloons go, but more than that, back of all, is broken homes and
immorality, which always drives imperfect humanity to drink. 457

Arrangements were made by the General Assembly
for the submission of the amendment to the voters of
Iowa at the primary election on June 5, 1916, by a vote of .
sixty-seven to thirty-six in the House, and thirty to fourteen in the Senate. The resolution as passed by the legislature was signed on April 16, 1915, by Governor George
W. Clarke.458
An exciting campaign followed. Miss Flora Dunlap459 of Des Moines, the president of the Iowa Equal
Suffrage Association, was in charge of the suffrage
forces. She was assisted by a large corps of local speakers and by a number from outside the State, including
Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt and Mr. Owen R. Lovejoy.
There was less speaking and fewer organizations on the
anti-suffrage side. A majority of the opposition speakers were from outside the State; among them were Miss
Minnie Bronson of New York and Mr. John P. Irish of
California - the same Mr. Irish who in 1870 had introduced into the Iowa legislature the first resolution for
the submission of an equal suffrage amendment to the
Constitution.
Opposition and inertia proved more effective than
suffrage propaganda and the measure was defeated at
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the polls by a vote of 162,849 to 172,990. 460 Indifference
and suspicion of any unusual step in public affairs were
probably the chief reasons for this unfavorable vote;
although the predominance of negative majorities on
both this amendment and the later prohibitory amendment in counties with a large foreign element seems to
afford some grounds for the opinion that the influence of
the liquor interests and the opposition of foreign-born
voters and voters of foreign parentage were partially
responsible for the result.
The census report of 1915 shows that Clinton, Des
Moines, Dubuque, and Scott counties contained at that
time a total of 62,252 male citizens over twenty-one years
of age. Of this number, 22,512 had been born in the
United States of native American parents: the other
39,740 had either been born in foreign countries or, if
born in this country, were of foreign parentage. The
vote in these four counties stood 8061 for the suffrage
amend~ent, and 19,031 against it; while the vote on the
prohibitory amendment was 9635 for the measure, and
27,206 against it. Thus, in these counties the majority
against suffrage was 10,970, and the majority against
prohibition was 17,571. At the same time it appears that
the total majority in the State as a whole was only
10,141 against suffrage, and 887 against prohibition.461
Immediately following the defeat of the suffrage
amendment at the polls preparations were made to urge
the General Assembly to provide for the submission of a
new amendment. In spite of the popular defeat of the
previous amendment, the members of the Thirty-seventh
General Assembly were of the opinion that the decision
at the polls did not close the case for equal suffrage, and
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so they passed the new resolution by a vote of eighty-six
to twenty in the House and thirty-five to thirteen in the
Senate.
Attempts were made to include in this resolution a
provision for submitting the question to the women of
the State at the 1918 election, and also to add a provision
that if defeated by a popular vote the amendmen t should
not be re-submitt ed within ten years. The former motion
was withdrawn , and the second was declared out of order
on the ground that it attempted to bind future legislation. The amendmen t, however, was not published as
provided by law previous to the election of 1918, and was
thus rendered invalid. 462
Thus, the year 1918 finds the women of Iowa possessed of the following political rights :
The right to vote at municipal and school elections on
questions involving the issuing of bonds or the
increase of the tax levy.
The right of women owning property within certain
drainage districts to vote at the elections concerning the administra tion of such districts.
In Iowa women citizens still lack these essential political rights :
The right to vote for presidentia l electors and members of the United States Congress.
The right to vote for the Governor of the State and
all other State officers.
The right to vote for county and township officers.
The right to vote for municipal officers.
The right to vote for school officers.
The right to vote on constitutio nal amendmen ts.

XVI
WOMEN IN APPOINTIVE OFFICES IN

rowA

IN a democracy there is a close connection between
voting and office-holding: indeed, with the exception of
an additional age requirement for certain important offices, there has developed in America a general rule of
law that anyone who is qualified to vote is qualified to
hold office. Consequently women have been interested in
office-holding as well as in the franchise. But in the
early history of Iowa it was scarcely ever suggested that
women should have the right to hold office. Indeed, it
was considered ''unladylike'' for her to want to vote and
quite beyond her proper sphere to hold a public office.
As a general rule American women, especially those
of pioneer localities, did not aspire to office-holding until
after the Civil War. At that time the increase in the
number of women employed to take the places of the men
who entered the army and the resulting confidence of
women in their own abilities began to arouse an interest
in public offices among the women of Iowa. Furthermore, during the war women began to take a large part
in the philanthropic and educational work of the State
and to occupy some of the clerical and administrative
positions in this field of endeavor.
In accordance with a generally understood principle
that elective offices can be held only by electors, unless
otherwise specifically stated,463 women in Iowa have been
generally excluded from such positions - although the
222
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only offices specifically denied to women by the Constitution are those of State Senator and Representative. On
the other hand, no such restrictions have regulated appointive positions in the government, since the qualifications for such officers are :fixed by the law creating the
office or are left to the discretion. of the appointing officer
or board.
It appears that in the relief work made necessary by
the Civil War so efficient did some of the women become
in organizing the work of soliciting and distributing supplies that when the legislature, in September, 1862, made
provision for the appointment of two or more sanitary
agents by the Governor, it was specifically directed that
one of these should be Mrs. Annie Wittenmyer. 464
Miss Linda M. Ramsey of Tipton, employed as a
clerk by Adjutant General Baker in 1864, is said to have
been the first woman regularly employed and paid for
clerical services by the State government of Iowa. Miss
Augusta Matthews also served as military secretary to
Governor Stone during the war. In 1870 Miss Mary E.
Spencer of Clinton County was elected engrossing clerk
of the House of Representatives,465 and in 1872 each
house appointed one woman among its officers. Succeeding General Assemblies have increased the number of
women employed in clerical work during the session.
Among the positions frequently held by women in the
legislature are those of post mistress and her assistants,
enrolling and engrossing clerks, and stenographers.
Other appointments soon followed. Mrs. Ada E.
North was employed as a clerk in one of the State offices
in 1871; and later she was appointed State Librarian by
· Governor Carpenter, serving from 1871 to 1878. She is
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probably the first woman to be included among the State
officers, not only in Iowa but in the United States. She
was followed by a number of women in the same office:
Mrs. S. B. Maxwell, 1878-1888; Mrs. Mary H. Miller,
1888-1894; Mrs. Laura C. Creighton, 1894-1896; and
Mrs. Lena H. Cope, 1896-1898.466
Likewise women have frequently served as notaries
public, court reporters, and as members of certain committees appointed to visit penal or charitable institutions
where women or girls are detained. Many of the early
appointments were for special purposes. Thus, Governor Carpenter in 1874 appointed Mrs. Deborah Cattell
a commissioner to investigate charges of mistreatment of
the inmates of the Reform School at Eldora. 467
It is probable that the first woman notary public was
Mrs. Nancy R. Allen, appointed by Governor Kirkwood
in 1876. He also appointed Mrs. Anna C. Merrill as
librarian and teacher at the Anamosa penitentiary, and
Dr. Jennie McCowen and Dr. Sara A. Pangborn on the
staff of physicians at the hospitals for the insane. In
1880 Governor Gear designated Dr. M. Abbie Cleaves as
delegate from Iowa to the National Conference of Charities and Correction and to the National Association for
the Protection of the Insane. It was in the same year
that Mrs. Jane C. McKinney was chosen by the General
Assembly as one of the trustees of the hospital for the
insane at Independence. 468
In the matter of public service, women have usually
taken up work similar to that done by them in commercial and professional circles. Offices which are political
stepping stones or rewards for political influence are for
the most part still filled by men. A few women, however,
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have been desirous of holding such positions. In 1897
the Iowa State Register publi~hed the statement that a
woman from Muscatine had offered to accept a place as
United States consul. Another Iowa woman was said to
have requested that President Grant appoint her as consul at Havre. Her request was refused because the
President feared that the precedent would be unsatisfactory to the French government - although, as the editor
suggested, a nation which recognized a queen might recognize a woman consul. 469
Recognition of women in legal and judicial circles has
also been slow, largely because women themselves have
not been attracted to such work. Women lawyers have
not been numerous. In ·s pite of this fact it appears that
women have occupied some positions of importance even
in this field. In 1900 Mrs. M. Lloyd Kennedy of Sioux
City was appointed by the Iowa Supreme Court as one
of the examining committee for the graduating law class
at the State University-the first woman thus honored
by the State.470 In 1907 seven of the fifty-three court
reporters in Iowa were women.471
Indeed, the laws of Iowa have sometimes made it a
specific requirement that a woman should hold a certain
position. In 1873 the Code provided that one of the three
members of the committee appointed by the Governor to
visit the hospitals for the insane must be a woman - a
provision that was repeated in later Codes. In 1882 the
General Assembly passed a law concerning the Board of
Educational Examiners, providing that one of the two
members to be appointed must be a woman. 472 The visiting committee for the hospitals for the insane was abolished in 1898, but the Board of Control was authorized to
15
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appoint a woman residing within fifty miles of any hospital to visit it and report on conditions there. In 1915
the salary of such women visitors was fixed at four dollars a day and expenses.473
Probation officers, according to the law enacted in
1904, must be ''persons'' of good character; and in 1917
it was required that in counties having two deputy probation officers, one must be a woman. The law of 1894
creating boards of library trustees specified that members must be "male or female" bona :fide citizens and
residents over twenty-one ye'ars of age. The law adopted
in 1913 providing for county hospitals permitted the
county supervisors to appoint three women on the first
hospital board, but it was not stated whether women were
eligible as members of the succeeding elective boards.4 74
When provision was made for facfory inspectors in
1913 the law stated that one of the three should be a woman; · and it was made her duty to investigate the sanitary
and moral conditions under which women and children
were working- although neither the inspector nor the
Commissioner of Labor have much authority to remedy
conditions which are found to be undesirable. In accordance with this act Mrs. Ellen M. Rourke of Des
Moines was appointed the woman factory inspector.
She began her work on July 4, 1913, confining her investigations chiefly to certain selected industries such as
laundries, telephone exchanges, stores, and hotels. As a
result she has made two reports - one in 1914 and a second in 1916. It is probable that one result of these investigations will be an effort to bring Iowa in line with
the more progressive States in the matter of industrial
protection of women and children.475
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The increasing interest of women in municipal administration was recognized in 1915 when the General Assembly enacted a law in reference to city playgrounds,
providing that it shall be the duty of the city council
where such playground was established to '' appoint a
woman, peculiarly fitted for such work, who shall be
known as 'Playground Superintendent' '' and who shall
have charge of the children and playground. Her salary
was to be fixed by the city council. 476 Two years later
the Assembly repealed the provision requiring that a
woman should be employed in this work by substituting
the words '' suitable person' '.477
The Thirty-seventh General Assembly also provided
that one of the three commissioners to be appointed by
the mayor to manage public comfort stations must be a
woman. Likewise one of the nine members of the State
advisory committee to be appointed by the State Board
of Vocational Education must be a '' woman experienced
in woman's work".478

XVII
WOMEN IN ELECTIVE OFFICES IN

rowA

IN the case of appointive •offices, as has been stated,
women were seldom legally ineligible : public opinion and
lack of political influence were the chief disqualifying
factors. Elective offices, on the contrary, have been generally closed to women by the interpretation of the Constitution if not by a definite sex qualification. Besides
providing that only male citizens may vote, the Iowa
Constitution states that only men may be elected to the
legislature. By the general rule that only electors may
hold office, unless it is otherwise definitely stated in the
law, women have been excluded from all elective offices in
Iowa except in the few cases which will be discussed in
the paragraphs that follow. 479
The :first woman to serve in an elective office in Iowa
was Miss Julia C. Addington who was appointed county
superintendent of Mitchell County in 1869 and elected to
the same office at the October election of that year. Some
question as to her eligibility seems to have arisen, which
elicited an opinion from .Attorney General Henry O 'Connor. In this opinion the Attorney General declared that
women were made ineligible to seats in the legislature by
the Constitution and that "time honored usage" had
interpreted the words "person" and "citizen" used in
connection with office-holding to mean men only. "But",
he observed, '' a recent decision in the Court of Exchequer, England, holding that the generic term man in22s
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eluded women also, indicates our progress from a crude
barbarism to a better civilization.'' Furthermore, he
expressed the opinion that "Neither in that act [Laws of
Iowa, 1862, Oh. 172], nor in any subsequent legisl ation on
the subject, have I been able to find any express provision.
making male citizenship a test of eligibility for the place,
or excluding women; and when I look over the duties to
I deem it exbe performed by that officer .
ceedingly fortunate for the cause of education in Iowa
that there is no provision in the law preventing women
from holding the office of County Superintendent of
Common Schools.
"I know that the pronoun he is frequently used in
different sections of the act, ref erring to the officer; but,
as stated above, this privilege of the citizen cannot be
taken away or denied by intendment or implication; and
women are citizens as well and as much as men.' ' 480
There seems to have ·b een no desire to disqualify Miss
Addington, and as a result of this ruling by the Attorney
General she continued to fill the position without further
question. Moreover, in 1871 two other women were
elected to the office of county superintendent; and by
1874 five women were acting in this capacity. Indeed, if
the argument presented by Mr. 0 'Connor had been generally accepted, all offices in the State except membership in the General Assembly might have been opened to
women.
The ruling of the Attorney General, however, was not
permitted to go unchallenged, as is seen in the contest
which developed after the election in 1875. Among the
ten women chosen as county superintendents at that time
was Miss Elizabeth S. Cook, who secured a majority of
1
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the votes in Warren County. Her opponent, Mr. Howard
A. Huff, contesting the election on the ground that a
woman was ineligible, claimed the office for himself.
Judge John Mitchell of the Circuit Court decided that
Miss Cook could not qualify, since '' a woman was ineligible to the office of superintendent''; but he also denied Mr. Huff's claim to the position since he had not
received the majority of the votes which the law required.
The case was appealed by Miss Cook; but before the
Supreme Court had passed upon it, the General Assembly, in March, 1876, enacted a law containing the provis~on that '' no person shall be deemed ineligible by reason
of sex, to any school office in the state of Iowa.'' Furthermore, the law was made retro-active and thus applied to
all women county superintendents who had been elected
before this tim~ as well as to those chosen at future
elections.481
Thus, when the case came be£ore the Supreme Court
in December, 1876; the status of the appellant had been
changed and the question for decision was the validity of
the law legalizing the election of women as school officers rather than the eligibility of a woman to the office
of county superintendent. The Supreme Court did not
pass upon the original question at issue, but merely
affirmed the power of the legislature to admit women to
any office from which the Constitution did not specifically
exclude them and to legalize past elections.482
A few years later another attempt was made to exclude women from any elective office in Iowa : the contention was ·b ased upon the requirement that any person
filing notice of his intention of contesting an election
must be an "elector", according to the Code of 1873
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which was then in force. Since no woman could be an
"elector", it was claimed that a woman could not contest
an election.483 The test case arose in 1887 when Miss
Ella S. Brown and Mr. J. R. McCollum were the candidates for county superintendent in Wright County. The
board of canvassers having declared that Mr. McCollum
was elected, Miss Brown contested the decision on the
ground that the judges had thrown out a number of ballots which should have been counted for her. When the
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Mr. McCollum appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
The appellant claimed that he was declared elected
by the judges of the election and thart his opponent, being
a woman, could not legally contest this decision. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
and declared Miss Bl'own elected. In making this decision, the court held that all names clearly indicating
the intention of the voter should be counted, even though
the name was incorrectly written. The chief point in the
ruling, however, was that the statute which made women
eligible to school offices repe:aled by implication '' s-o much
of the statute before that time in force as required the
technical statement that the contestant is an elector.' ' 484
Thus there developed in Iowa the anomaly of a class
of citizens who were permitted to hold offices of some
importance and yet were denied the right of voting for
candidates for the same offices. Since 1869 women have
served as county superintendents; and since 1876 other
educational offices have been open to them.
The number of women occupying the office of county
superintendent has increased rapidly, as the following
statistics will show :4 85
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1870- 1
1872- 3
1874- 5
1876-10
1878- 7
1880- 5
1882- 9
1884-11

1886-10
1888- 8
1890-14
1892-12
1894-13
1896-15
1898-11
1900-14

1902-17
1904-18
1907-29
1909-31
1911-46
1913-59
1915-59
1917-54

Concerning the work of women county superintendents -a report made in 1898 by State Superintendent of
Public Instru0tion Henry Sabin declared that "women
have uniformly filled this office with a painstaking conscientious fidelity to duty which has rendered their work
of great benefit to the schools under their charge.' ' 486
Furthermore, an Iowa editor, whose paper opposed equal
suffrage, commented upon the •a ppearance of women in
this field of endeavor by saying that it "will give to all
of us something like a satisfactory foretaste of the good
time coming when the people shall no longer hold that an
ignorant man will make •a better officer than an intelligent woman.' '4 81
A comment by the Louisville Courier-Journal on the
situation in Iowa in 1876 suggests that conditions in
some of the other Stwtes were not so favorable to women.
'' The women are county superintendents of schools in
Iowa", wrote the editor, "and no person is deemed ineligible on account of sex to any school office in the State.
Any woman there can practice law, sue and be sued, and
do business in her own name, if she likes. The males will
doubtless gradually drift back to agricul,ture, wander off
to the Black Hills, or marry the lawyers and school
superintendents.' '4 88
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It is evident that the men of Iowa did not share in this
pessimistic outlook, for in 1880 the General Assembly
opened the office of county recorder also to women. The
number of women who have served in this position has
been only about one-half that of the women who have
filled the office of county superintendent. This is partly
due to the fact that there is no technical qualification required in the case of the recorder similar to the certificate
requirement for the superintendent and partly to the
more general familiarity of men with business and political affairs. At the same session of the legisl ature, a
bill to permit women to qualify as county auditors was
passed by the House of Representatives, but the Senate
refused to give its approval. 489
Two women, Mrs. C. I. Hill and Miss Addie Hayden,
were chosen as county recorders at the election following
the passage of the law of 1880. Ten years later six women were serving in this capacity. In 1902 there were five
women county recorders in Iowa; in 1912 there were
seventeen; and in 1917 the number was thirty-two. Thus,
approximately one-third of the incumbents of this office
at the present time are women.490 It is interesting to
observe in this connection that the Code of 1897 contains
the provision that in counties with a population of ten
thousand or less '' the same person may hold the office of
county recorder and treasurer, and no person shall be
disqualified on account of sex from holding the office of
recorder.' ' 491 It is difficult to see how any woman could
be elected to this combination of offices so long as the law
does not authorize their election as county treasurers.
Women have, moreover, been largely employed as
deputies - especially in county offices. Mrs. J. H. Latty
1
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is said to have acted as deputy sheriff in Des Moines
County in 1870 and to have surprised the officials at Fort
Madison by conveying a prisoner to the penitentiary.492
In the case of offices to which women are eligible the position as deputy has frequenrtly led to their subsequent
election to the office. Even when a woman may not be
elected to an office it appears that she may be appointed
to :fill a vacancy. Thus Miss Mae Freeman served as
auditor of Johnson County from Septemiber 19, 1915,
until January 1, 1917, completing the term of her brother
who died in office.493
It appears that women became candidates for members of school boards at the time Attorney General
0 'Connor ruled that they could serve as county superintendents. In March, 1871, Mrs. Lydia V,an Hyning was
chosen as a member of the board of directors of Polk
City. The following year the president of the board, deciding that a woman could not legally serve, appointed a
man to :fill the va0ancy. Mrs. Van Hyning, however, secured a temporary injunction reinstating her, and at the
following term of the district court was declared competent to act. 494
Women were definitely made eligible to positions on
school boards by the law of 1876, but they have not served
in this capacity in large numbers. In 1877 Mrs. Mary
Fisher was elected one of the three directors in Frederica, Bremer County. One of the men on the board immediately resigned, it is reported, declaring that "woman's place was to hum; she was out of her spear to school
meetin 's, holdin' office,'' and in similar work. Three
years later Mrs. Mary A. Work was chosen as sub-direetor of one of the districts of Delaware Township in Polk
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County and was made president of the board.495 At
Rockford in 1894 two women, who had secured the majority of the votes, were refused their offices ·b ecause the
officials did not know that the law permitted women to
aci; but the Attorney General decided in favor of the
women 496 and the right has not since been questioned.
The Code of 1897 contains the provision that a
'' school officer or member of the board may be of either
sex, and must, at the time of election or appointment be a
citizen and a resident of the corporation or subdistrict,
and over twenty-one years of age, and, if a man, he must
be a qualified voter of the corporation or subdistrict.' ' 497
It seems that a woman is also eligible to the position
of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, but none
have as yet been elected, although several have been nominated - generally by minor or third parties. In 1881
the Greenback party supported its endorsement of equal
political rights by nominating Mrs. A. M. Swain of Fort
Dodge as the party candidate for the office of State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 408 The party was unsuccessful and so the nomination was not followed by
election. Two years later the same party nominated
Miss Abbie 0. Canfield of Des Moines County for the
same office, but was unable to secure her election by the
voters of the State. In 1889 the Prohibition party likewise nominated a woman, Mrs. C. A. Dunham of Burlington, for the position of Superintendent of Public
Instruction.499
All offices, except those of State Senator and Representative, would be automatically opened to women if
they were enfranchised; and even without enfranchisement the right to hold such offices may be conferred upon
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women by statute. The section of the Constitution which
disqualifies women from membership in the General Assembly is section four of article three which specifies
that members of the House of Representatives must be
"male citizens". Another section provides that Senators must have similar qualifications. In order to remove this disqualification, a constitutional amendment
will, of course, be necessary. A number of attempts to
bring about the change have already been made - especially during the decade between 1870 and 1880 when at
each session of the General Assembly a proposed revision of the section in question was included in the suffrage resolution. 500 The fate of these proposed amendments has already tbeen discussed in connection with
equal suffrage.
Since 1880 it appears that the question of office-holding by women - particularly in reference to eligibility
to membership in the General Assembly - has not 'been
emphasized in Iowa. To be sure, the suffrage resolution
of 1898 in the House included office-holding; and again
in 1904 and 1906 an attempt was made to permit women
to serve as legislators, but the measure failed along with
the suffrage resolution. 501 Later amendments have, for
the mo,st part, not included an office-holding provision.
Friends of equal suffrage have decided that it is best to
concentrate effort~ on the main issue. Furthermore, it
has been observed that women in equal suffrage States
are largely interested in ,school offices : comparatively
few seek election to the legislature. As a result, many
women who strongly desire a voice in the selection of
legislators do not feel that the office is worth the effort
necessary to secure it under present conditions.
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It is probable that women are not legally disqualified
from serving as presidential electors, or as members of
either house of Congress : sex is not mentioned in the
Constitution of the United States which prescribes the
qualifications for these offices, and the States are not
given authority to prescribe other qualifications. This
question, however, has never been definitely settled, since
there has been no case of a woman's election to Congress
in a State where women are denied the franchise.

XVIII
RECAPITULATION OF POLITICAL STATU:::;
THE history of the struggle for the political equality of
men and women discloses three stages: ridicule; argument; and adoption. When Iowa was admitted into the
Union, the demand for "women's rights" was just becoming articulate and the suggestion that women should
vote and hold office was frankly ridiculed. It must be
noted, however, that from the beginning the division of
opinion was not between men and women, but between
the progressives and conservatives of ·b oth sexes. There
were men who admitted the justice of the enfranchisement of women before the Civil War: there are still women in Iowa who oppose it.
When the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States was first discussed the friends of women suffrage urged that ''sex'' should be included, but the
claims of the women were sacrificed to expediency. The
adoption of that amendment, however, resulted in bringing the subject of women's political status clearly before
the people, and attempts were soon made to secure ,suffrage for women by Commonwealth action. Wyoming
Territory adopted equal suffrage in 1869, and at about
the same time the question became prominent in Iowa.
In Iowa the first suffrage amendment to the Constitution
was proposed in the General As•s embly in 1870 - the
year that witnessed the beginning of the Iowa Woman
Suffrage A sRoci ati on.
238
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Since 1870 the proposal to enfranchise the women of
Iowa has been the subjeet of much de'bate in the legislature. The resolution for a suffrage amendment has
been passed ten times by the House of Representatives
and nine times by the Senate, but only five times by both
houses at the same session. It was not until 1913-1915
that the resolution passed both ho1,1ses at two consecutive
ses,sions of the General Assembly. Even then it was
voted down at the polls in June, 1916. There is now the
possibility that the suffrage may be conferred upon the
women of this State through Federal a:mendment before
the question is again submitted to the voters.
In 1894 Iowa women were granted the right to vote at
school or municipal elections on the question of issuing bonds or raising taxes. Propositions for granting
school suffrage, municipal suffrage, and presidential suffrage have also been made, but these suggestions have
found little favor with either friends or opponents of
-equal suffrage - partly because half-way measures are
unsatisfactory, and partly because it is doubtful whether
most of the proposed changes would be constitutional.
In the matter of office-holding it appears that the
General Assembly has the right to admit women to all
offices except mem bership in the General Assembly. In
1869 for the first time in Iowa a woman was elected
•c ounty superintendent. Under a ruling of the Attorney
General, a number of women superintendents were elected and qualified between 1869 and 1876. In 1876, when
this right was threatened by judicial ruling, the General
Assembly passed a law specifically opening educational
offices to women. In 1880 women were also declared
e ligible as to the office of county recorder. Probably
1
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women may legally serve as presidential electors, United
States Representatives, and United States Senators, but
there is little likelihood that women will be nominated for
these offices until the franchise is secured. Practically
all elective offices in Iowa are still closed to women, under
the rule that unless it is otherwise specifically provided
only electors may fill public offices.
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os Fairchild's
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Medicine in Iowa, p. 80.

Medical and Surgical Directory of Iowa, 1878-1879, pp. 80, 84, 87, 91,

92, 98, 100, 102, 105, 112, 114, 116, 121.
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Laws of Iowa, 1886, Ch. 104; Laws of Iowa, 1880, Ch. 75.

96 Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. I, p. 733; Tenth Census
<>f the United States, 1880, Vol. I, p. 822; Compendium of the Eleventh
Census of the United States, 1890, Part III, p. 408; Twelfth Census of the
United States, 1900, Vol. II, p. 520; Thirteenth Census of the United States,

1910, Vol. IV, p. 461.
91 Laws of Iowa, 1907, Ch. 139; Twelfth Census of the United States,
1900, Vol. II, p. 520; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol.
TV, p. 461.
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os Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. III,
pp. 401, 402, 631.
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Code of 1851, Sec. 1610.

101 Laws of Iowa, 1870, Ch. 21; Stanton, Anthony, and Gage 's History
of Woman Suffrage, Vol. III, p. 626; Iowa Historical Record, Vol. VII,
p. 63.
Arabella Mansfield was said to be the first woman lawyer in the United
States. One writer states that she was admitted to the bar in 1864.Hecker 's A Short History of Women's Rights, p. 171.
Mrs. Emma H. Haddock was the first woman admitted to practice in
the Federal courts of Iowa.- Iowa Historical Record, Vol. X, p. 96.
102 Iowa State University Alumni Register, 1847-1911, pp. 99-164.
Women were first allowed to plead in the United States Supreme Court
in 1879. In 1917 Judge H. K. Evans and his wife of Corydon, Iowa, were
admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court - the first
time that a husband and wife have been granted that privilege. Mrs. Evans
is a law partner of her husband.-1'he Burlington Hawk-Eye, copied in the
Chicago Herald, January 15, 1918; Hecker's A Short History of Women's
Rights, p. 171.
10a Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. I, p. 733; Tenth Census
of the United States, 1880, Vol. I, p. 822; Compendvum of the Eleventh Census of the United States, 1890, Part III, p. 408; Twelfth Census of the
United States, 1900, Vol. II, p. 520; Thirteenth Census of the United States,
Vol. IV, p. 122.
104 Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. I, p. 733; Tenth Census
of the United States, 1880, Vol. I, p. 822; Compendium of the Eleventh Census of the United States, 1890, Part III, pp. 408-412; Twelfth Census of '
the United States, 1900, Vol. II, p. 520; Thirteenth Census of the United
States, Vol. IV, pp. 120, 122, 460, 461.
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index; House Bills, 1915, No. 483.
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Laws of Iowa, 1894, Ch. 100.
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10s Code of 1851, Secs. 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2710, 2713.

The Revision of 1860 practically repeated these provisions.
In 1882, the Iowa Supreme Court decided that in case of rape accomplished by the use of stupefying drugs, it was immaterial whether or not
the woman knew of the defendant's bad repufation.-The State v. Porter,
57 Iowa 691.
109

Laws of Iowa, 1884, Ch. 142.

110

Code of 1851, Sec. 2586.
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The State v. Tarr, 28 Iowa 397.

The State v. Shean, 32 Iowa 88; The State v. Reilly, 104 Iowa 13.
Seduction could also be made the basis of a civil action for damages.
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Code of 1897, Sec. 4764; Morris v . Stout, llO Iowa 659.

114 Laws of Iowa, 1907, Ch. 170.
For further mention of this law concerning desertion see Chapter IX.
116 Code of 1851, Sec. 2605; Revision of 1860, Sec. 4229; Code of 1897,
Sec. 4783; The State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589; 'l'he State v. Fertig, 98 Iowa
139; The State v. Gill, 150 Iowa 210.
The rule which held the wife equally responsible for such crimes as the
keeping of a disorderly house is an old principle of law. In such cases the
presumption of the husband's influence does not hold since a woman might
reasonably commit such a crime without coercion.
116

Briggs's Social Legislation in Iowa, p. 30.

117

Laws of Iowa, 1894, Ch. 15; Laws of Iowa, 1898, Ch. 18.

11s House Journal, 1882, pp. 610, 611. For examples of petitions in 1872
see Senate Journal, 1872, pp. 140, 155, 180, 209, 241, 288.
110 For examples of such petitions see Senate Journal, 1884, pp. 81, 128,
136, 178, 202, 272, 299, 319, 322; Senate Joiirnal, 1907, pp. 102, 385, 386,
387, 388, 407, 501, 646.
120 Laws of Iowa, 1890, Ch. 69; Code of 1897, Sec. 567 4; Laws of Iowa,
1900, Ch. 102; Laws of Iowa, 1907, Ch. 193; Supplement to the Code of
Iowa, 1907, Sec. 2713-e, 2713-f; Laws of Iowa, 1904, Ch. 80.
For later provisions concerning female inebriates see Supplement to the
Code of Iowa, 1913, Secs. 2310-al9a, 2310-a22.
121 Laws of Iowa, 1913, Ch. 17; Supplemental Supplement to the Code of
Iowa, 1915, Secs. 2713-nl to 2713-nl9.
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123 Laws of Iowa, 1868, Ch. 59; Report of the Iowa Reform School, pp.
4, 21, in the Iowa Legislative Documents, 1872, Vol. II.
124 Laws of Iowa (General), 1872, Ch. 77; Laws of Iowa, 1876, Ch. 38;
Laws of Iowa, 1880, Ch. 171; Aurner's History of Education in Iowa, Vol.
V, Part IV.
125 Code of 1897, Secs. 2702-2713; Laws of Iowa, 1900, Chs. 100, 101;
Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1913, Secs. 2701-a-2713-4a.

The State v. Rayburn, 170 Iowa 514.
This was an interpretation of Sec. 4943 of the Code of 1897.
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Laws of Iowa, 1890, Ch. 43.
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See Chapter I.

CHAPTER VII

129

Laws of Iowa, 1839-1840, Ch. 25.

130

Code of 1851, Secs. 1464, 1466, 1487.

131 Revision of 1860, Secs. 2516, 2539; Code of 1873, Secs. 2186, 2191,
2237; Code of 1897, Secs. 3140, 3141, 3188.
132 For a complete discussion of the causes for divorce in Iowa, see
Patton's History of Divorce Legislation in Iowa (a manuscript thesis in
the possession of the library of the State University of Iowa).
183

Iowa Capitol Reporter (Iowa City), September 9, 1843.

184 Code of 1851, Secs. 1482, 1483; Laws of Iowa, 1854-1855, Ch. 76;
Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 64; Revision of 1860, Secs. 2534, 2535; Code of
1873, Secs. 2223, 2224; Code of 1897, Secs. 317 4, 3175.
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Code of 1873, Sec. 2224.

186

Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa 451, at 456.

1s7

Doolittle v. Doolittle, 78 Iowa 691.

Turner v. Turner, 122 Iowa 113; Pfannebecker v. Pfannebecker, 133
Iowa 425; May v. May, 108 Iowa 1.
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Laws of Iowa, 1838-1839, p. 179.

140

Laws of Iowa, 1839-1840, Ch. 81.

141

Code of 1851, Sec. 1485.
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H2 Jolly v. Jolly, 1 Iowa 9, at 13.
Another case which showed an advance over the Common Law was decided in 1859, when the judges ruled that a man who brought an immoral
woman into his home might be compelled to pay for his wife's support elsewhere, even though she was insane part of the time and unconscious of the
insult.- Descelles v. Kadmus, 8 Iowa 51.
H3

Fivecoat v. Fivecoat, 32 Iowa 198, at 199.

1H

Code of 1873, Sec. 2226.

H 5

Barnes v. Barnes, 59 Iowa 456.

H6

Klaes v. Klaes, 103 Iowa 689.
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Dayton v. Drake, 64 Iowa 714; Picket v. Garrison, 76 Iowa 347.
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Aitchison v. Aitchison, 99 Iowa 93; Vey v. Vey, 150 Iowa 166.
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Rouse v. Rouse, 47 Iowa 422; Wilson v. Wilson, 40 Iowa 230.

150 Preston v. Johnson, 65 Iowa 285; Doolittle v. Doolittle, 78 Iowa 691;
Sherwin & Schermerhorn v. Maben, 78 Iowa 467; Stockman & Hamilton et
al. v. Whitmore, 140 Iowa 378; Gordon and Belsheim v. Brackey, 143 Iowa
102; Read & Read v. Dickinson, 151 Iowa 369; Wick v. Beck, 171 Iowa 115.
These decisions are not uniform. It appears that the courts have attempted to enable the wife to bring a suit for divorce when there is justification for so doing even though the husband controls the financial resources
of the family. At the same time the husband is protected against charges
for suits which are either not supported by reasonable evidence or are not
carried through.

u1 Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310; Finn v. Finn, 62 Iowa 482.
152 Laws of Iowa, 1840 (Extra Session), Ch. 14; Laws of Iowa, 18411842, Chs. 2, 13, 18, 37, 40, 41, 77, 85; Laws of Iowa, 1842-1843 (Local
Laws), Ch. 77; Laws of Iowa, 1845-1846, Ch. 86.

1as United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
II, p. 623.
For further discussion of the mother's claim to the custody of her children in case of divorce see Chapter VIII. See also Patton's History of

Divorce Legislation in Iowa.
1u United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
I, pp. 437, 485.
155

Laws of Iowa, 1842-1843 (Local Laws), Ch. 77.
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156 Willcox's The Divorce Problem, p. 35, in the Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. I.
157

Patton's History of Divorce Legislation in Iowa, p. 32.

United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
II, pp. 576, 577. See also Part I, pp. 62-65.
15s

150 United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
I, pp. 92, 93, 94, 95.
Four States - Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina showed a larger per cent of divorces granted to the husband than to the
wife in 1887-1906, while seven showed a preponderance in favor of the
husbands during the period between 1867 and 1887. South Carolina has
had no divorces since 1878. The State with the highest per cent of divorces
granted to women from 1887 to 1906, was not a western Commonwealth, as
might be expected, but Rhode Island, where women were granted 78.2 per
cent of the divorces. Iowa ranked third in this respect, with 75.7 per cent
of the divorces granted to wives. Utah was second with 77.5 per cent.
1 60 United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
I, pp. 86, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95.
In this table only the statistics concerning the four most important
causes of divorce are given.
161 United States Census Report, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part
I, pp. 92, 93.

During the period between 1867 and 1886 neglect to provide was the
cause specified in one-tenth of one per cent of the divorces granted to wives.
This was not legal grounds for a divorce to a husband.

rn2

CHAPTER VIII
Laws of Iowa, 1838-1839, pp. 47, 347.

16a

Code of 1851, Ch. 88.

164

Hunt v. Hunt, 4 Greene 216, at 222, 223.

Cain v. Devitt, 8 Iowa 116; Revision of 1860, Sec. 2543.
The father was not liable, however, for necessities furnished an adult,
unmarried daughter who lived at his home although he made no objection.
- Blachley v. Laba, 63 Iowa 22.
16 5

1 66 Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433; Code of 1873, Secs. 2241, 2242, 2243;
Code of 1897, Secs. 3192, 3193, 3194.
For decisions concerning this equal guardianship, see The State v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa 373. See also Laws of Iowa, 1882, Ch. 40.
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101 Ostheimer v. Ostheimer, 125 Iowa 523; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 141
Iowa 192; The State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa 469.
168

Laws of Iowa, 1913, Ch. 31.

Laws of Iowa, 1839-1840, Ch. 24; Code of 1851, Secs. 855, 14151418; Revision of 1860, Ch. 58; Black Hawk County v. Cotter, 32 Iowa 125.
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110 House Journal, 1843-1844, February 1, 1844, p. 170.
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was James W. Grimes, afterwards Governor of Iowa.

Law~ of Iowa, 1845-1846, Ch. 5.
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Cude of 1851, Secs. 1192, 1207, 1304, 1447-1450, 1453.
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McCrory v. Foster, 1 Iowa 271.
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175 Suiter v. Turner et al., 10 Iowa 517, at 521; Peck v. Hendershott, 14
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Revision of 1860, Secs. 2499-2504.
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et al., 17 Iowa 510. See also Duncan v. Roselle et ux., 15 Iowa 501.
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Sunderland et al. v. Sunderland et al., 19 Iowa 325.
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Jones v. Jones, 19 Iowa 236. Logan v. Hall, Administrator, 19 Iowa

491.
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Goodrich v. Munger et al., 30 Iowa 343, at 349.
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Miller v. Wetherby, 12 Iowa 415.
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Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa 486.
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Daily E vening P ress (Iowa City), May 17, 1871.
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Code of 1873 , Secs. 2202, 22_Q4, 2206, 2211.
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Lower v. Lower, 46 Iowa 525.
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Stamy v. Laning et al., 58 Iowa 662; Jones v. Brandt, 59 Iowa 332.
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The Woman's Standard, Vol. I, No. 3, November, 1886; Vol. I, No.

10, June, 1887.
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188 Gilbert, Hedge & Co. v. Glenny et al., 75 Iowa 513; Code of 1879,
Sec. 2211. See also Mewhirter v. Hatten, 42 Iowa 288.
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Hoag & Steere v. Martin et al., 80 Iowa 714.

Jones v. Storms et al., 90 Iowa 369; Garr, Scott & Co. v. Klein et ux.,
93 Iowa 313.
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Code of 1897, Secs. 3153, 3162.
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Clark Bros. v. Ford, 126 Iowa 460.
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In re Estate of Kennedy, 154 Iowa 460.
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Miller, Watt & Co. v. Mercer, 170 Iowa 166.
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Laws of Iowa, 1838-1839, p. 485, Sec. 44.

Laws of Iowa, 1838-1839, pp. 473, 484-486.
Illegitimate children inherited from the mother, but not from the father
unless definitely recognized by him.
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Code of 1851, Secs. 1390, 1394, 1421; Laws of Iowa, 1852-1853, Ch.

61, Sec. 1.
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Code of 1851, Secs. 1407, 1410, 1411, 1412, 1413.
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Ralston et al. v. Ralston, 3 Greene 535.
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Ralston v. Ralston et al., 3 Greene 533.
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Rowland v. Rowland et al., 4 Greene 183.
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Laws of Iowa, 1854-1855, Ohs. 12, 13.
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Claussen, Guardian, v. La Franz, 1 Iowa 226.
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Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 63.
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Revision of 1860, Secs. 2361, 2422, 2477, 2490; Laws of Iowa, 1862,

Ch. 151.
200

McMenomy v. McMenomy, 22 Iowa 148.
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Laws of Iowa, 1862, Ch. 22.

2 08 Meyer v. Meyer et al., 23 Iowa 359; Dodds et al. v. Dodds, 26 Iowa
311; Sully v. Neberball et al., 26 Iowa 338; Cain v. Cain et al., 23 Iowa 31.
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Laws of Iowa, 1868, Ch. 50; Laws of Iowa, 1872, Ch. 51.
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In re Estate of Jacob Davis, 36 Iowa 24.

Mock v. Watson et al., 41 Iowa 241; Felch v. Finch, 52 Iowa 563;
In re Estate of Dennis, 67 Iowa 110; Thomas v. Hanson et al., 44 Iowa 651.
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In 1914 the exempt personal property of the decedent, the Supreme
Court ruled, should be held exempt in the hands of the widow and the expenses of the last sickness, etc., together with the allowance for the widow's
maintenance during the year, should be paid out of the remaining personal
property.- In re Estate of Smith, 165 Iowa 614.
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Laws of Iowa, 1870, Ch. 7.

2 13

Code of 1873, Secs. 2436, 2440, 2441, 2442.
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625.
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158; Code of 1897, Sec. 3313.
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Iowa 273.
233
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Shane v. McNeill et al., 76 Iowa 459.

Newberry v. Newberry, 114 Iowa 704.
In 1892, a contract between husband and wife providing for the division
of property in case of a divorce was held valid.- Nieukirk v. Nieukirk, 84
Iowa 367.
It is difficult to see why a contract looking toward divorce should be
valid while one concerned with a simple division of the property before
death is not.
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Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49.
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Martin v. Martin, 65 Iowa 255; Blake v. Blake, 7 Iowa 46,
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249 Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene 604.
The court ruled that a divorce granted by the legislature in 1843 was
valid and dower right was cancelled.
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Rodman, 5 low& 426. See also Revision of 1860, Sec. 2507; Code of 1879,
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719.
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Haggard v. Holmes et al., 90 Iowa 308.
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Iowa 190; Vose v. Myott, 141 Iowa 506.
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315 Boss, Administrator, v. Jordan, 118 Iowa 204; The Aultman Engine
and Thresher Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa 368.
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O'Neil v. Cardina, 159 Iowa 78.
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Reunecker v. Scott, 4 Greene 185.
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Cheuvete et al. v. Mason, 4 Greene 231.
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Patterson v. Spearman, Clark, and Seeley, 37 Iowa 36.
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OUurnwa Daily Dernocrat, November 2, 1886.

Code of. 1873, Secs. 2203, 2212.
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found in the court reports.- Myers v. McDonald, Sheriff, 27 Iowa 391;
Stewart v. Bishop et al., 33 Iowa 584; Schmidt v. Holtz, 44 Iowa 446.
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Miller v. Hollings-worth, 36 Iowa 163.
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Hoag & Steere v. Martin et al., 80 Iowa 714.
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Code of 1897, Secs. 3155, 3156.
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v. Eikelberg, 140 Iowa 736.
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Tibbetts v. Wadden, 94 Iowa 173 at 174.
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Skillman v. Wilson, 146 Iowa 601.
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33G Trained nursing was classed as personal or domestic service in 1900
and as a profession in 1910. At the former date there were only 160
women in Iowa in this profession who were classed as trained nurses: ten
years later the number is given as l,710.- l'welfth Census of the United
States, 1900, Vol. II, p. 522; Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910,
Vol. IV, p. 122.

837 Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Vol. I, pp. 686-690; Tenth
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the United States, 1910, Vol. IV, pp. 110-123; Census of Iowa, 1915, pp.
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Code of 1897, Sec. 2448; Laws of Iowa, 1906, Ch. 103.
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Laws of Iowa, 1902, Ch. 149.

The American Labor Legislation Review, Vol. VI, pp. 359, 372-381.
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and History of Senate and House Bills, 1917, pp. 90, 142, 296 .
See also House Journal, 1915, pp. 191, 192, 999, 1000.
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Supplement to the Code of Iowa, 1913, Sec. 2477.

845 Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1914, pp. 112185; 1916, pp. 180-303.
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The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XI, p. 479.
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855 Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. IV,
pp. 994-1000.
356 McLaughlin and Hart's Cyclopedia of American Government, Vol.
III, pp. 694, 695; The American Political Science Review, Vol. XII, pp.
102-105; Information, Vol. III, p. 325; Catt's Woman Suffrage by Federal
, oman Suffrage Amendment ProConstitutional Amendment, pp. 93, 94; W
ceedings in the United States Senate, July 31, 1913; Ogg's National
Progress, 1907-1917, pp. 152, 153; The Survey, Vol. XXXIX, p. 144; The
American Year Book, 1917, pp. 180-182; The Literary Digest, Vol. LVII,
No. 6, p. 14; The Des Moines Register, November 23, 30, 1918.
The Territory of Washington enfranchised its women citizens in 1883,
but the act was declared unconstitutional by the Territorial Supreme Court.
The amendment was later rejected by a State vote.- The Outlook, Vol.
LXV, p. 430; Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage,
Vol. IV, pp. 967-969.
Vermont, in 1917, permitted women tax-payers to vote for certain town
officers and on appropriations.
857 Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. II,
pp. 648-689.
858 Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. II,
pp. 333, 363; The Congressional Globe, 1st Se~sion, 41st Congress, p. 72.
It is said that Senator Harlan of Iowa was in favor of this amendment,
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359 House Reports, 1st Session, 48th Congress, Vol. V, No. 1330, pp. 4-7;
Horack's Equal Suffrage in Iowa, pp. 23, 24; Catt's Woman Suffrage by
Federal Constitutional Amendment, Introduction; Hearing Before the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives, 2nd Session, 63rd Congress, 1913, p. 11.
360 Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. IV,
pp. 110, lll; Catt's Woman Suffrage by Federal Constitutional A mendment, Introduction.
Among the yeas was Senator Wilson of Iowa. Senator William B.
Allison was among those absent.
361

Congressional Record, 3rd Session, 63rd Congress, pp. 1483, 1484.

362

Information, Vol. II, p. 492.

303 The Review of Reviews, Vol. LVII, p. 137; Congressional Record, 2nd
Session, 65th Congress, pp. 836, ll914, ll984. For an account of the vote
see The Searchlight on Congress, Vol. II, Nos. ll-12, p. 9.
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E. Hull.
364 Catt's Woman Suffrage by Federal Constitutional Amendment, pp.
93-95; Information, Vol. III, p. 424; American Year Book, 1917, pp. 87,
91; Ray's W01nan Suffrage in Foreign Countries in The American Political
Science Review, Vol. XII, pp. 469-474.
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House Journal, 1843-1844, p. 23.

367 Booth's Reminiscences of Twenty-sei,en Years A.go in The Annals of
Iowa (First Series), Vol. IX, pp. 564, 565.
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See also the

369 Constitution of Iowa, 1844, Art. II, Sec. 1, Art. III, Sec. 1; Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. II, Sec. 1.
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Code of 1851, Secs. 258, 259, 2631.

an House Journal, 1852-1853, pp. 82, 83.
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Aurner's History of Education in Iowa, Vol. II, p. 197.

Journal of the Constitutional Convention, 1857, pp. 240-243.
Mr. Arthur Springer is authority for the statement that his father, Mr.
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374 The Woman's Standard, Vol. VIII, No. 11, July, 1894; Bloomer's
Life and Writings of Amelia Bloomer, pp. 211, 212.
Mrs. D. C. Bloomer, one of the pioneers in the woman suffrage movement, was born in New York in 1818 and came to Iowa with her husband in
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and, in order to accomplish this purpose, she joined the ranks of the dress
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tributions to the reforms of temperance and woman suffrage. She died in
1894.- Bloomer's Life and Writings of Amelia Bloomer, pp. 9, 67, 332.
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The State Press (Iowa City), January 18, February 1, 1865; Fairall 's
Manual of Iowa Politics, 1881, p. 78.
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376 House Journal, 1866, pp. 188, 442.
For a summary of the proposed equal suffrage amendments see Van der
Zee's Proposed Constitutional Amendments in Iowa 1857-1909 in The Iowa
Journal of History and Politics, Vol. VIII, pp. 192-196.
1!77 Shambaugh 's The Constitution of the State of Iowa (Pocket Edition, 1914), p. 105; House Journal, 1868, pp, 530, 605; Fairall's Manual of
Iowa Politics, 1881, p. 80.
378 The Woman's Standard, Vol. VIII, No. 11, July, 1894.
s10 House Journal, 1870, pp. 95, 417, 469, 470; Senate Journal, 1870, pp.
113, 388, 389, 394, 395; The Woman's Standard, Vol. VIII, No. 12, August,
1894.
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s8o House Journal, 1872, pp. 191, 211, 248, 249, 377; Senate Journal,
1872, p. 421.
381 House Journal, 1872, pp. 381, 479, 573.
382 Iowa State Weekly Register (Des Moines), March 15, 1871,
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suffrage workers of this period came to Iowa. This was Mrs. Margaret W.
Campbell, who served as lecturer and organizer for the cause of political
equality for many years. In 1875 Mrs. Campbell and her husband made a
series of speeches on political reform throughout northern Iowa.- The
Woman's Standard, Vol. VIII, No. 11, July, 1894.
384 Iowa State W eelcly Register (Des Moines), August 16, 1871.
885 Iowa State Weekly Register (Des Moines), September 1, 1871.
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For the election of the first woman county superintendent in Iowa, see
Chapter XVI.
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302Gue's History of Iowa, Vol. III, pp. 252,253; The Woman's Standard, Vol. XI, No. 4, June, 1898; Stanton, Anthony, and Gage's History of
Woman Suffrage, Vol. III, pp. 614-617.
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The name of this association is given in various ways - the two most
frequent terms being the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association and the Iowa
Woman's Suffrage Association. The Constitution not being available, the
writer has adopted the former name since it corresponds with the national
organizations. One of these, the National Woman Suffrage Association,
was founded in 1869 under the leadership of Miss Susan B. Anthony and
Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton; another association organized at the same
time under the leadership of Mrs. Lucy Stone was called the American
Woman Suffrage Association. In 1890, these two organizations combined
under the name National American Woman Suffrage Association.- Anthony
and Harper's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. IV, pp. 14, 164.
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Iowa State Weekly Register (Des Moines), October 5, 1871, March 7,

1873.
394

The Woman's Standard, Vol. VIII, No. 11, July, 1894.

395 Iowa State Weekly Register (Des Moines), July 3, 1874; House
Journal, 187 4, pp. 102, 251, 324, 364, 365, 462, 491; Senate Journal, 187 4,
pp. 280, 321; Fairall 's Manual of Iowa . Politics, 1881, p. 96; Stanton,
Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. III, p. 621.
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From a report of speech by Samuel J. Kirkwood in the Iowa State
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897 Iowa State Weekly Register (Des Moines), April 21, 1876; Stanton,
. Anthony, and Gage's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. III, p. 621.

3os Laws of Iowa, 1874 (Private), Joint Resolution No. 18, p. 85; Shambaugh 's Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of Iowa, Vol. IV,
p. 168; Senate Journal, 1876, pp. 351, 352, 386, 387; House Journal, 1876,
pp. 296, 297, 298, 396.
309 House Journal, 1878, pp. 381, 382, 493; House Journal, 1880, pp. 124,
126, 637; Senate Journal, 1878, pp. 188, 253, 417; Senate Journal, 1880,
pp. 385, 386, 387, 412.
400 House Journal, 1880, pp. 39, 112, 118, 119; Senate Journal, 1880,
pp. 59, 90, 112, 132, 171, 200, 224, 230, 256.
401 Haynes's Third Party Movements Since the Civil War, p. 181; Fairall's Manual of Iowa Politics, 1881, pp. 107, 116, 124; 1883, p. 49.
The National Union Greenback Labor Convention had put an equal
suffrage plank in their platform in 1880, and women from the National
Woman Suffrage Association were given seats on the platform at one of
the meetings. The Union Labor Party also favored equal suffrage in 1888.
- Haynes 's Third Party Movements, pp. 134, 135, 136, 208.
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40 2 Shambaugh 's Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of Iowa,
Vol. V, p. 256; Laws of Iowa, 1882 1 Joint Resolution No. 11, p. 180; House
Journal, 1882, pp. 310, 311; House Journal, 1882, p. 524; Senate Journal,
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Senate Journal, 18841 pp. 279, 280.
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of this incident was made.-1'he Annals of Iowa (Howe's), Vol. III, p. 112.
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The Annals of Iowa (Howe's), Vol. III, pp. 111, 112.

4 0 5 For the work of these women see The Woman's Standard and the
Records of the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association.
,
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Mrs. Lucy Stone, and her husband Henry B. Blackwell. Their daughter,
Alice Stone Blackwell, was secretary of the National American Woman
Suffrage Association in 1890.- Records of the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association, Sixteenth to Thirty-sixth Meetings, p. 43 et passim.
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406 The Woman's Standard, Vol. III, No. 7, March, 1889.
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the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association, Sixteenth to Thirty-sixth Meetings,
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409 Records of the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association, Sixteenth to Thirty-sixth Meetings, p. 19. This was a letter to Mrs. Margaret Campbell.

:no

LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN

410 The Woman's Standard, Vol. IV, No. 8, April, 1890; Stanton,
Anthony, and Gage 's History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. III, p. 625.
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Senate Journal, 1902, pp. 134, 269, 403, 404, 610.

272 LEGAL AND POLITICAL STA'rus OF WOMEN
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456

House Journal, 1915, pp. 546-565.

457

House Journal, 1915, pp. 547, 549, 551.
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INDEX
Abbott, Abbie S., position held by, 44
Abduction, punishment for, 11
Abolition, relation of women's rights
movement to, 162
Adams, Abigail, request of, for equal
rights, 160
Adams, Austin, 50, 51
Addington, Julia C., election of, as county superintendent, 228, 229, 274
Administration of estates, right of women
in, 127, 128
Administrator, right of women to act as, 7
Administratrix, special act concerning,
128

Adultery, divorce for, 12, 18, 66, 68, 153 ;
number of divorces granted for, 74, 79,
80; punishment for, 243
Age, minimum required, for marriage, 64,
65

Age of consent, 11, 19, 55
Agent, power of, 122
Agriculture, number of women employed
in, 146
Alabama, divorces in, 254; labor laws in,
264

Alaska, equal suffrage adopted by, 164
Alberta, equal suffrage granted by, 171
Algona, suffrage society organized at, 186
Alienation of affections, right of wife to
sue for, 38
Alienation of dower, 105-114 (see also
Dower)
Aliens, movement to enfranchise, 177
Alimony, provision for, to wife, 19; who
entitled to, 68-73; definition of, 68,
70, 71; obligation to pay, 71; right of
husband and wife to contract concerning, 109, 110
Allen, Mrs. Nancy R., appointment of, as
notary public, 224
Allison, William B., 265
Amendment, Susan B. Anthony, history
of, 167-170

American men, attitude of, toward women, 187
American Woman Suffrage Association,
connection between equal suffrage and
free love denied by, 182, 183; affiliation of Iowa Association with, 193;
organization of, 268

Anamosa, building for women convicts at,
60; woman employed in penitentiary
at, 224

Antenuptial contracts, validity of, 111
Anthony, Susan B., attempt of, to vote,
167; history of amendment named for,
167-170; lecture of, at Cedar Rapids,
183; suffrage work of, 205, 206, 268;
General Assembly presided over by,
206 ·; speech by, 269
Anti-suffragists, speeches by, 209, 210,
211, 217; protest of, 269
Appointive offices, women in, 222-227;
women eligible to, 228
Arizona, school suffrage adopted by, 164;
equal suffrage adopted by, 164
Arkansas, primary suffrage adopted by,
165

Arson, punishment
for, 58

of married

woman

Assault and battery, recovery for injuries
in case of, 3 3
Assignment, alienation of dower by, 112
Atlas, responsibility of wife for price of,
134

Attorney General of Iowa, decision of, on
municipal suffrage, 195; ruling of, on
office-holding, 228, 239
Attorney's fees, wife not responsible for,
134

Augusta, seminary at, 22
Australia, enfranchisement of women of,
171

Aylesworth, Barton 0., address by, 192
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Baker, Nathaniel B., woman clerk em•
ployed by, 223
Ballard, J. E., notice concerning, 140
Ballard, Mary E., notice by, 140
Baltimore, Lord, woman representative
of, 159
Bank stock, right of wife to, 88; notice
of ownership of, not required, 137
Bar, admission of women to, 50, 51, 250
Beer, wife not liable for price of, 135,
136

Belden, Mrs. Evelyn H., speech by, 209,
211, 212
Belmont, 22
Bemis, Mrs. Narcissa T., suffrage work
of, 186; choice of, as delegate, 193
Bigamy, divorce granted for, 66
Black Hills, 232
Blackstone, William, comment of, on status of women, 13
Blackwell, Alice Stone, position of, 269
Blackwell, Henry B ., protest of, against
exclusion of women, 161; speech by,
269
Bloomer, Mrs. Amelia, work of, for equal
suffrage, 175; assistance given to, by
husband, 181; offices of, in suffrage
association, 185, 193; sketch of life
of, 266
Bloomer, D. C., 181, 266
Boies, Horace, attitude of, toward equal
suffrage, 200
Bond suffrage, history of, 207
Bonds, women to vote on, 202, 221;
women refused right to vote on, 208
Borrowing money, women to vote on, 202
Breach of promise, right of man to sue
for, 248
Bremer County, woman on school board
in, 234
Brent, Giles, 159
Brent, Margaret, position of, 159
Brigham, Johnson, equal suffrage supported by, 215
Brinkerhoff, Mrs. Martha H., lectures by,
179
British Columbia, equal suffrage adopted
by, 171
British Parliament, statutes of, 15; wom·
en enfranchised by, 171

Bronson, Minnie, argument of, against
equal suffrage, 218; equal suffrage op·
posed by, 219
Brown, Ella S., election contest of, 231
Brown, Leon, equal suffrage supported
by, 215
Browne, T. M., minority report on equal
suffrage signed by, 16 8
Burial, responsibility of husband for ex·
penses of wife's, 143
Burlington, 21; suffrage society formed
at, 186
Business, women engaged in, 145, 260

California, equal suffrage adopted by, 164
Callanan, James, choice of, as delegate,
193
Callanan, Mrs. Martha C., suffrage activities of, 191; choice of, as delegate,
193
Calvert, Leonard, death of, 159
Campbell, Mrs. Margaret W., assistance
given to, by husband, 181; suffrage
activities of, 191; choice of, as delegate, 193; sketch of life of, 267
Canada, women enfranchised by, during
war, 171
Canfield, Abbie 0., nomination of, 235
Canning factories, hours of work of women in, 149
Carpenter, Cyrus C. , equal suffrage fa.
vored by, 186, 187; woman appointed
State librarian by, 223 , 224; woman
commissioner appointed by, 224
Cassville 1 seminary at, 22
Catt, Mrs. Carrie Lane Chapman, work
of, as suffrage organizer, 192, 207;
choice of, as delegate, 193; speeches
made by, 219
Cattell, Mrs. Deborah, appointment of, as
commissioner, 224
Cedar Falls, superintendent of schools at,
43
Cedar Rapids, 44; lecture of Susan B.
Anthony at, 183 ; convention at, 269
Cedar Rapids Republican, woman suf·
frage department in , 195; equal suffrage supported by, 197
Centennial celebration, effect of, on suffrage sentiment, 187

INDEX
Certificates, granting of, to women, 41
Chaplains, service of women as, 273
Chapman, Mrs. Carrie Lane (see Catt,
Mrs. Carrie Lane Chapman)
Charitable institutions, women on visiting
committees of, 224
Charities and Correction, National Conferenc e of, woman delegate to, 224
Chattel mortgage, proposal to require
wife's signature to, 102; validity of,
between husband and wife, 124
Child labor laws, 149
Children, right of mother to custody of,
11, 12, 253 ; obligation of father to
support, 19; provision for, in case of
divorce, 19, 73, 7 4; legal settlement of,
25; damages for loss of society of, 37;
number of, affected by divorces, 74;
relation of, to divorce rate, 80, 81;
guardianship of, 82-85, 153; right of,
to support, 99, 244; education of, 133 ;
exclusion of, from mines, 148 ; protection of, in industry, 226
Chiropractors, number of women listed
as, 49
·
Chitty, .Joseph, comment by, 244
Choses in action, right of husband to
wife's, under Common Law, 6, 7; right
of wife to, 88
Citizen, definition of, 228, 229
Citizenship, law concerning, 26; giving
of, to negroes, 166
Civil contract, marriage considered as, 64
Civil injuries, husband not liable for, if
committed by wife, 142
Civil Law, existence of, in Louisiana
Purchase, 14; relative position of women under, 16-18
Civil rights of women, 1-151
Civil War, increase of women teachers
during, 42; effect of, on women's property rights, 90 ; equal suffrage previous
to, 159-162; effect of, on suffrage, 162,
163, 166, 167, 176; part of women in,
223
Clarinda, women registered at, 180, 181
Clarke, George W ., equal suffrage amendment signed by, 219
Clarkson, .J. S., equal suffrage opposed
by, 198
Cleaves, M. Abbie, appointment of, as
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physician, 48; appointment of, as delegate, 224
Clergy, benefit of, 244
Clergymen, number of women serving as,
52
Clerical work, number of women engaged
in, 146, 223
Clerk, first woman employed as, 223
Clinton County, petition from women of,
177; vote in, on suffrage and prohibition, 220
Clothing, right of women to own, 210
Clubs, organization of, 192, 201, 212
Coats, Henry, property ri.;hts of widow
of, 97
Gode of 1851, provision of, concerning
testimony, 27, 28; provision of, concerning recovery for injuries to women, 30; provision of, concerning seduction, 34; provision of, concerning med·
ical college, 47; provision of, concern•
ing admission to the bar, 50; penalty
for enticing a virtuous woman to a
house of ill-fame provided by, 56; provision of, concerning arson, 58; provision of, concerning marriage, 65;
provision of, for financial settlement in
case of divorce, 69; provision of, concerning guardianship of children, 83;
provision of, concerning wife's property, 87, 88, 133, 138; provision of,
concerning dower and curtesy, 95, 107;
provision of, concerning contracts by
married women, 116, 118; homestead
exempted from judicial sale by, 125;
provision of, concerning women as administrators, 128; provision of, con•
cerning disposal of property by married woman, 129; provision of, con•
cerning liability for debts, 136; provision of, concerning elections, 17 4
Gode of 187 8, provision of, concerning
testimony, 28; provision of, concerning
responsibility for torts, 31; provision
of, concerning loss of support, 36; provision of, concerning divorce, 66; provision of, concerning alimony, 71;
prov1s1on
of,
concerning
property
rights of married women, 91; provision
of, concerning distributive share, 100,
101; alienat; 0 n of dower by postnup-
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tial agreement prohibited by, 108, 109;
provision of, concerning judicial sale,
112; provision of, concerning contracts
by married women, 120, 121, 260; provision of, concerning dower, 127; provision of, concerning desertion of family, 130; provision of, concerning debts,
141; section of, concerning exemption
of property, 142; provision of, concerning election contests, 230, 231
Code of 1897, provision of, concerning
settlement of married women, 25; p1·0·
vision of, concerning testimony, 28;
penalty for desertion provided by, 57;
provision of, for prison matron, 60;
per capita allowance fixed by, 62; pro·
vision of, concerning legal heirs, 103;
property
concerning
of,
provision
rights, 104; provision of, concerning
postnuptial contracts, 110; provision
of, concerning inheritance by murderer, 113 -; provision of, concerning contracts between husband and wife, 124,
125; provision of, concerning homestead, 126; provision of, concerning
wife's liability for family expenses, 135,
142; employment of women in mulct
saloon prohibited by, 148; provision
of, concerning women voters, 208; provision of, concerning county recorders,
233; provision of, concerning school
officers, 285
Co-education, provisions for, 22; acceptance of principle of, in Iowa, 3 9-41
Coggeshall, Mrs. Mary J., speech by, 209,
210
College of Physicians and Surgeons, en·
trance requirements of, 47
Colorado, school suffrage adopted by, 164;
equal suffrage adopted , by, 164
Commissioner of Labor, duty of, to en·
force law requiring seats for female
employees in stores, 148; inspectors
appointed by, 226
Committees, service of women on, 224
Common Law, distinctions of, between
married and single women, 3, 4; p1·0visions of, concerning women, 8-13;
provisions of, concerning marriages, 4,
18; provisions of, concerning married
women's property rights, 4-8, 152; in-

troduction of, in America, 18; extension of, over Missouri Territory, 15,
16; extension of, to Iowa, 16; relative
position of women under, 16-18; civil
rights of women under, 23, 24; protection under, 53 ; attitude of, towards
women offenders, 58; right of dower
and curtesy under, 94, 95; alienation
of dower under, 105; right of contract
denied to married women by, 114;
right of wife to support under, 129,
130; liability of husband for debts of
wife under, 136, 142; property rights
of married women under, 138; wife
not liable for husband's debts under,
140; provisions of, concerning punishment of married women, 154
Common schools, status of girls in, 89, 40
Competition, harm of, to inexperienced
workers, 147
Congress, history of equal suffrage
amendment in, 167-170; women denied
vote for members of, 221; women eligible to seats in, 237, 240
Connecticut, school suffrage adopted by,
164; wife's property rights in, 210
Consent, age of, 11, 19, 55
Conservatives, 288
Constitution (Iowa), report to framers
of, on negro suffrage, 173, 174; suf175;
concerning,
questions
frage
amendment to, 1·equested, 177; equal
suffrage amendment to, 179, 180, 186,
187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 197,
199, 201, 205, 209, 212, 213, 214,
215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221; popular
vote on amendment to, 219, 220; provisions of, concerning office-holding,
228; attempts to amend, 236
Constitution (United States), proposed
amendment to, 167-170; no sex quali·
fication in, 237
Constitutional amendments, women denied right to vote on, 221
Consul, desire of woman to become, 225
Contracts, right of women to make, 114125, 152, 259; restrictions on making
of, between husband and wife, 141,
258, 260
Contributory negligence, damages barred
by, 82

INDEX
Control, Board of, women's refo1·matory
under, 60; woman to be appointed by,
226

Convicts, treatment of, 59-63
Cook, Elizabeth S., election contest of,
229, 230

Cook, Haniette J., appointment of, as
college professor, 44
Cope, Mrs. Lena H., service of, as State
librarian, 224
Cornell College, woman professor at, 44
Council Bluffs, 32
County auditor, proposal to open office
of, to women, 233
County hospitals, bill to permit women to
vote on, 215; women on boards of,
226

County officers, women denied right to
vote for, 221
County recorder, women made eligible to
office of, 233, 239
County superintendent, women elected to
office of, 228-232, 239; number of
women acting as, 232
County treasurer, office of, combined with
that of county recorder, 233
Court reporters, service of women as, 224,
225
Coverture, meaning of, 4
Cowgill, Mrs. Margaret S., office of, 193
Creditors, right of husband' s, to wife's
property, 88
Creighton, Mrs. Laura C., service of, as
State librarian, 224
Crimes, immunity of wife in respect to
punishment for, 10; punishment of
women for, 58-63, 154
Criminal affairs, status of women in, 154
Criminal law, status of women under, 5363
Criminals, women ns, 58•58; disfranchisement of, 203
Cruelty, divorces granted for, 18; definition of, 67, 68, 80; number of divorces granted for, 74, 79, 80
Cullums, Mrs. Earl S., argument of,
against equal suffrage, 218, 219
Cummins, Albert B., recommendations of,
for punishment of desertion, 181, 132
Cummins, Mrs. Albert B., 207
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Curtesy, right of husband to, 6, 19, 20,
94-105; abolition of right of, 96, 101;
limitation on right of, 136 (see also
Distributive share)
Curtis, George William, defense of equal
suffrage by, 161
Custom, divorce rate affected by, 75
Damages, right of husband to sue for,
8, 9; right to recover for, under Common Law, 29; right of wife to, for illegal sale of liquor to husband, 36-38;
amount of, for girl's death, 248
Dangerous employment, girls under sixteen excluded from, 148; prohibition
of, for boys, 264
Davenport, visit of Horace Mann to, 39
Davenport Manual Labor College, purpose of, 22
Davis, Jefferson, disfranchisement of, 203
Day, Mrs., speech by, 211
Debts, responsibility of husband for
wife's, 9; widow's dower free from,
100; liability of husband and wife for,
133-143; liability of wife's property
for, 141
Declaration of Independence, 160; principles of, 161; anniversary of, 187:
ri;;hts stated by, 202, 203
Deed, alienation of dower by joining in,
106, 107; validity of, if signed by married woman, 123; signing of wife's
name to, by husband, 126
Defective street, damages for accident
due to, 32
Delaware, school suffrage adopted by, 164
Delaware township (Polk County), woman elected sub-director in, 234, 235
Delinquent girls, provision for, 60-63
Democrats, attitude of, toward equal suffrage, 170; enfranchisement of foreigners proposed by, 177
Denmark (Iowa), college at, 22
Denmark, equal suffrage adopted by, 171
Dental hygienists, qualifications of, 50
Dentistry, status of women in, 49 ; number of women in profession of, 52
Depere, seminary at, 22
Deputies, employment of women as, 233 ,
234
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Desertion, divorce granted for, 18, 66,
153; penalty for, 57, 131, 132, 153;
number of divorces granted for, 7 4, 79,
80
Des Moines, Republican State convention
at, 179; R epublican r ally at, 184 ; second suffrage convention held at, 185 ;
meeting of national suffrage association
at, 205; municipal court at, 208
Des Moines, West, superintendent of
schools at, 43
Des Moines County, seminary in, 22;
vote in, on suffrage and prohibition,
220; woman deputy sheriff in, 233 ,
234
Des Moines Equal Suffrage Club, president of, 209
Des Moines Political Equality Club, resolution of, 269
Dickinson, Anna, 183
Dilley, Alice, position held by, 44
Dipsomaniacs, treatment of, 60
Directors, women on board of, 234, 235
Disorderly house, punishment of married
woman for k eeping, 58, 251
Distributive share, assignment of, 101105; equality of, 152 (see also Dower
and Cnrtesy)
Divorce, 8; kinds of, under Common
Law, 12 ; causes for, 18, 65-68, 153, 154,
254 ; granting of, by legislature, 21;
desertion a cause for, 57, 133; status
of women in case of, 65·81; statistics
concerning, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80; factors
determining rate of, 75; distributive
share alienated by, 105 ; dower right
extinguished by, 112; effect of, on husband's control over wife's property,
13 6 ; disposition of children in case of,
153; judicial rulings concerning, 253;
validity of contracts in case of, .258;
legality of legislative, 259
Divorces, number of, in Iowa, 74, 7581; proportion of, to husbands a nd
wives, 76-78, 154, 254
Domestic
difficulties,
non-interference
with, 54
Domestic relations, laws concerning, 16
Domestic service, number of women employed in, 146; hours of work in, 149
Dower, right of wife to, under Common

Law, 12 ; provision of Ordinance of
1787 for, 18; wife's right to, under
laws of Michigan Territory, 20; provisions concerning, 94-114; right of husband to, 99-105; abolition of right of,
101; alienation of, 105-114, 244, 259;
homestead to be included in, 126, 127
(see also Distributive share)
Drainage districts, women permitted to
vote in, 217, 221
Drake University, president of, 192
Dress reform, demand for, 172
Drugs, excessive use of, 60
Drunkenness, divorce granted for, 66~
153 ; number of divorces granted for,
74, 79, 80
Dubuque, equal suffrage organization
formed at, 184
Dubuque County, vote in, on suffrage and
prohibition, 220
Dubuque Seminary, co-education in, 22
Dugdale, Joseph, election of, as vice president of suffrage association, 185
Dunham, Mrs. C. A., nomination of, 235
Dunlap, Flora, campaign managed by,
219; equal suffrage work of, 272
Dunlap, suffrage club at, 201
Earnings, right of married women to, 138
East, conservatism of, 164
Economic conditions, divorce rate affected by, 75
Economic responsibility, share of women
in, 144
Education, equality of women in, 22 ;
status of women in, 39-44; relation of,
to work done · by women, 150, 151
Educational Examiners, Board of, one
m ember of, to be a woma n , 225
Educational offices, eligibility of women .
to, 230, 231, 234, 235, 239
Eighteenth General Assembly, attitude of,
toward equal suffrage, 188; office-hold•
ing and school suffrage for women rejected by, 188
E ldora, reform school located at, 62; investigation of reform school at, 224
Election contest, right of woman to file
notice of, 230, 231
Elective franchise, presentation of petition for, 202, 203

INDEX
Elective offices, qualifications for, 222;
status of women in, 228-237, 240
Electors, requirement that office-holders
be, 222, 228
Eleventh General Assembly, petition for
amendment presented to, 177; resolution introduced in, 178
Emory, R. D., equal suffrage supported
by, 215
Enfranchisement, forms of, 163
England, provisions of Common Law of,
concerning women, 3-13, 15, 16; extension of full suffrage to women of,
171; decision of Court of Exchequer
in, 228, 229
Engle, Perry, bill introduced by, 201
Engrossing clerks, women as, 223
Enrolling clerks, women as, 223
Equal rights, beginning of movement for,
159

Equal suffrage, status of, in United
States, before the Civil War, 159-162;
history of, in United States, 159-170 ;
growth of, in United States, after the
Civil War, 162-170 ; forms of, 163;
political influence of, 166 ; struggle for
federal amendment granting, 166-170;
status of, in foreign countries, 171;
first discussion of, in Iowa legislature,
172, 173 ; history of struggle for, in
Iowa, 172-221; evil effects of, predicted, 181, 182; attitude of S. J. Kirkwood toward, 186; attitude of C. ().
Carpenter toward, 186, 187 ; endorsement of, 190 ; support of, by fusion
candidates, 196; activities on behalf of,
207; committee hearing on, 209; objections to, 216; relations of officeholding to, 236; attitude of political
parties to, 268; protest against, presented to legislature, 269
Equal suffrage amendment (Iowa), history of, 179, 180, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190,
209,
219,
220;

193, 194, 197, 199, 201, 205,
212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217,
220, 221; popular vote on, 219,
summary of, 239, 267

Equal
suffrage
amendment
(United
States), 167-170
Equal suffragists, speeches by, 209, 210,
211, 212
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Estate, increase in amount of, assigned
to surviving spouse, 104
Estates, administration of, 127, 128
Evans, H. 0., equal suffrage supported
by, 215
Evans, H. K ., admission of, to practice
in United States Supreme Court, 250
;Evans, Mrs. H. K., admission of, to practice in United States Supreme Court,
250
Everall, Hannah, property of, freed from
husband's control, 97
Exchequer, Court of, decision of, 228,
229
Executor, limitation on woman's right to
act as, 20
Exemplary damages, right of wife to, 3638
Exempt property, wife's signature required on mortgage of, 104; lien on,
142; widow's right to, 257
Factories, number of women employed in,
154
Factory Act of 1902, provisions of, concerning employment of girls, 148
Factory inspector, woman employed as,
150, 226 (see also Woman factory inspector)
Factory operatives, women employed as,
145
Family expenses, definition of, 133, 134,
135, 136; liability for, 138, 141, 153
Farmington, seminary at, 22
Farms, hours of work of women on, 149
Father, right of, to custody of children,
11, 12, 82, 83, 84; consent of, required, 18, 64; right of, to recover
damages for marriage of minor daught er , 29, 30; right of, to damages for
seduction of minor daughter, 30; obligation of, to support children, 244, 254
Federal amendment, agitation for, 166170; possibility of, 239
Federal courts, woman admitted to practice in, 250
Feeble-minded girl, penalty for seduction
of, 57
Felony, divorce granted for conviction of,
after marriage, 66, 153, 154
Feme Govert, 4 (see also Married women)
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Fifteenth Amendment, effect of, 166, 167;
extension of electorate by, 176; interest in, 200; attempt to include "sex"
in, 238
Fifteenth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment adopted by, 186
Finland, equal suffrage adopted by, 171
Fisher, Mrs. Mary, election of, on school
board, 234
Flagg, Mrs., nomination of, for county
superintendent, 184
Fleming, Mrs. Eva, position held by, 44
Fletcher, Matilda, speeches of, on behalf
of U. S. Grant, 184
Florida, labor laws in, 264
Flynn, Mrs. Martin, speech by, 209
Foreign born voters, attitude of, on equal
suffrage, 220
Foreign countries, equal suffrage in, 171
Fort Madison, seminary at, 22; reference
to, 234
Foster, Mrs. H. A., speech by, 209, 211
Foster, Mrs. Judith Ellen, admission of,
to bar, 50
Fourteenth Amendment, effect of, 166,
167; woman suffrage claimed under,
185; abandonment of claim based on,
192; interest in, 200
Fourteenth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment rejected by, 180
France, divorce rate in, 75
Franchise, qualifications for, 15, 21
Fraud, agreement for the purpose of, 141,
142
Frederica, woman on board of directors
at, 234
"Free love", confusion of political equality of women with, 181 ; connection of
equal suffrage with, denied, 182, 185
Free silver, agitation for, 205
Freeman, Mae, service of, as county auditor, 234
Gage, Frances Dana, lectures by, 175
Gale, A. H., resolution i~troduced by,
214; bills introduced by, 272
Garrison, William Lloyd, protest of,
against exclusion of women from London conference, 161
Gates, George W ., equal suffrage advocated by, 193

Gear, John H. , woman delegate appointed by, 224
General Assembly, action of, on equal
suffrage, 179, 180, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 193, 194, 197, 199, 201, 205,
20~ 21~ 213, 21~ 21~ 21~ 21~
221, 239; policy of, on suffrage amendment, 186; amendment admitting women to, proposed, 188; Miss Anthony
presiding officer of session of, 206; ad·
dress to, 215 ; women employees of,
223; women ineligible to, 228, 229,
236, 239; school offices opened to women by, 230; office of county recorder
opened to women by, 233; right of, to
admit women to offices, 239
German language newspaper, equal suffrage opposed by, 195
Gilchrist, Mrs. Eva S., petition of, 202,
203
Girls, penalty for enticing away of, for
immoral purposes, 56; treatment of
wayward, 61-63 ; minimum age of, for
marriage, 64, 65; employment of, re•
stricted, 148
Gougar, Mrs. Helen ,M., committee addressed by, 197
Governor, women denied right to vote for,
221
Granger, Lottie E., election of, 44
Grant, Ulysses S., 225
Great Britain, statutes of, 22
Greenback party, equal political rights advocated by, 188, 189; women nominal·
ed by, 235
Grimes, James W., vote of, 255
Grinnell College, president of, 193
Guardian, right of, to sue for injurie~,
35, 36; appointment of, 82, 83, 84;
right of mother to act as, 153
Guardianship of children, right of mother to, 73, 153, 254; laws concerning,
82-85
Gue, B. F., support of equal suffrage Ly,
269
Gue, Mrs. B. F., suffrage activities of,
191; death of, 269

Haddock, Mrs. Emma H., admission
to bar, 50, 250
Hallum, Mrs. Julia C., 207

11f,

INDEX
Hamilton, John J., equal suffrage supported by, 215
Harlan, Edgar R., equal suffrage sup•
ported by, 215
Harlan, James, vote of, on equal suffrage, 265
Harrison, Benjamin, support of women
asked for, 198
Hart, Gratia, 130
Hart, Henry, 130
Havre, desire of woman to be consul at,
225
Hay, Mary G., work of, 207
Hayden, Addie, election of, as county recorder, 233
Hayes, E. A., equal suffrage supported
by, 170
Head of a family, definition of, 125, 126;
exemption of property of, 142
Heir, definition of, 103; widow not considered as, 11~
Heirs, provisions concerning, 20, 21
Hickey, Mary B., law degree received by,
51
High schools, statu s of girls in, 40
Hill, Mrs. C. I., election of, as county
recorder, 233
Hobbs, Lucy B., practice of dentistry by,
49
Home ru1e charter cities, municipal suffrage granted by, 165
Homestead, right of widow to choose,
104; right of wife to, 124-127, 261;
platting of, 126 ; relinquishment of
right of, 126
Hospitals for in sane, women physicians
in, 224; woman on committee to visit,
225, 226
Hotels, women employees in, 145; hours
of work in1 150; condition of women
employees in, 150, 151; inspection of,
226
Hours of work, attempts to limit, for
~romen, 149, 150 ; number of, for women employees, 150
House of Representatives (Iowa), report
to, on women's reformatory, 59, 60;
first woman to speak in h all of, 197 ;
woman clerk of, 223; women not eli
gible to, 223, 235 , 236 (see also Gen•
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era! Assembly and the various General
Assemblies)
House of Representatives (United States),
attitude of, toward equal suffrage, 167·
170; vote in, on equal suffrage, 169,
170; adoption of federal equal suffrage
amendment by, 170 ; women eligible to
seats in, 240
Household goods, bill to require consent
of husband and wife to sale of, 102
Housewife, recovery for injuries to, 38,
34
Huff, Howard A., election contest of,
229, 230
Hughes, Charles E., federal action on
suffrage favored by, 170
Hull, Harry E., vote of, on equal suffrage, 266
Hunt, Harriet R., protest issued by, 177
Husband, invalidity of contracts between
wife and, 4; right of, to damages f9r
injuries to wife, 8, 9, 29-34; responsibility of, for wife's acts, 9, 10; right
of, to control wife, 10, 11, 244; right
of, to control wife's property, 18, 19,
20, 68 , 69, 70 , 71, 72, 86-94, 114,
115, 136; right of, to testify, 27-29,
·5 8; right of, to wife's services, 29,
30, 32, 33; criminal cases involving,
53; mu1·der of, 54; punishment of, for
desertion, 57; responsibility of, for
wife's support, 66, 129-133, 143, 153,
244; right of, to alimony, 68-73; right
of, to curtesy, 94-105; alienation of
distributive share of, 112; control of
family property by, 114, 143, 153; position of, as head of the family, 125,
126, 127 ; responsibility of, for family
expenses, 133, 134, 135; wife not Ji.
able for care of, 135; liability of, for
wife's debts, 136, 137, 139, 140;
wife's -earnings not the property of,
138; wife's property liable for debts
of, 138, 139; right of, to sue wife,
142; responsibility of, for care of insane wife, 143 ; liability of, to provide
for burial of wife, 143; right of, to
sue for medical expenses, 247
I-Iu sbands, divorces to, 21; number of divorces granted to, 74, 78, 79, 80, 254

288

INDEX

Hutchinson, Mrs. Anne, demand of, for
equal rights, 159
Iceland, equal suffrage granted to women
of, 171
Idaho, per cent of illiteracy among wom•
en in, 42; equal suffrage adopted by,
164
Idiots, disfranchisement of, 203
Illegitimate children, obligation of father
to support, 19; guardianship of, 85;
inheritance Jaws concerning, 85, 256;
obligation of mother to support, 244
Ill-fame, punishment for enticing a virtuous woman to a house of, 56
Illinois, school suffrage adopted by, 164 ;
presidential and local suffrage adopted
by, 164, 165
Illinois Suffrage Association, president
of, 215
Illiteracy, per cent of, in Iowa, 41
Impotency, divorce granted for, 18, 66
Incompatibility, divorce granted for, 66
Independence, wife not responsible for
care of husband in hospital at, 135;
suffrage society formed at, 186 ; woman trustee for hospital at, 224
Indiana, jurisdiction of officers of, over
District of Louisiana, 14 ; presidential

suffrage in, 165
Indirect injuries, right of women to dam•
ages for, 35-38
Industrial school, girls to be sent to, 61;
provision for, 62, 63
Industrial School for Girls, organization
of, 62, 63
Industry, part of women in, 144-151;
number of women wage earners in,
145-147; protection of women in, 147151; status of women in, 154
Inebriates, treatment of, 60
Ingham, Harvey, equal suffrage supported by, 215
Inheritance, distributive share distinguished from, 103
Inhuman treatment, divorce granted for,
66, 153 ; definition of, 67, 68
Innocence, presumption of, in case of
married woman, 58
Insane, disfranchisement of 203 · women
phy~icians in hospital s f~r, 22~; wom-

an on committee to visit hospitals for,
225, 226
Insane, National Association for the Protection of the, woman delegate to, 224
Institutions, girls sent to, 63
Insurance, 247
Insurance policy, decision concerning,
103
Iowa, status of women in, before organization of Territory of, 14-22; lack of
government for, 16; effect of Michigan
and Wisconsin laws on, 22; per cent
of illiteracy in, 41; number of women
physicians in, 48, 49; number of women dentists in, 49; women lawyers in,
50, 51; divorce rate in, 75-81; num-

ber of women employed in industry in,
146, 147; protection of women in, 147151; tax suffrage adopted by, 164 ;
history of struggle for equal suffrage
in, 172-221 ; vote in, on suffrage and
prohibition, 220; first equal suffrage
amendment in , 238; proportion of divorces granted to wives in, 254

Iowa City, wages of teachers at, 42
Iowa Equal Suffrage Association, name
changed to, 193; incorporation of, 272
(see also Iowa Woman Suffrage Association)
Iowa Federation of Women's Clubs, convention of, 269
Iowa Industrial R eformatory for Females,
establishment of, 60; change of name
of, 61 (see also Women's Reformat-0ry)
Iowa press convention , women permitted
to vote at, 183
Iowa Reform School, provision for girls
at, 61, 62
Iowa State College of Agriculture and
Mechanic Arts, status of women in, 41
Iowa State motto, variation of, 190
Iowa State Register (Des Moines), attitude of, towa1·d equal suffrage, 198,
205; a id for R epublican candidates requested by, 204, 205; comment b,v, on
suffrage meeting, 206;
225

statement in,

(Des
Iowa State Weekly Register
Moin es ) , lett er published in , 181
Iowa Woman Suffrage Association, origin
of, 184; history of, 184, 185, 190, 191,

INDEX
192, 193, 199, 201, 202, 219; meetings of, 184, 185, 190, 191, 193, 199,
201, 202; leaders in, 191; plan of organization of, 191; local clubs organized by, 192 ; affiliation of, with American Woman Suffrage Association, 193;
incorporation of, 193; support of The
Woman's Standard by, 194; activities
of, 201; organization of, 238; name of,
268 (see also Iowa Equal Suffrage
Association)
Iowa Woman's Suffrage Association,
name of, 268 (see also Iowa Woman
Suffrage Association)
Irish, John P., first constitutional amendmen t granting equal suffrage introduced by, 179; bill introduced by, to
give women presidential suffrage, 180;
election of, as vice president of suffrage
association, 185; bill introduced by,
201; equal suffrage amendment opposed
by, 219
Jails, men and women not to be confined
in same apartments in, 59
James I, 15
J~pan, divorce rate in, 75
Johnson County, woman county auditor
of, 234
,Jones, Abraham, divorce from, 21
Jones, Lucinda, divorce granted to, 21
Judicial sale, alienation of dower by, 112
Judiciary committee, equal suffrage referred to, 167
Julian, George W., amendment introduced
in Congress by, 167
Jury duty, proposal to exclude women
from, 209
Kansas, school suffrage adopted by, 163,
164; equal suffrage adopted by, 164;
success of school suffrage in, 198
Karney v. Paisley, decision concerning
wife's testimony in, 27
Keating, Edward, equal suffrage supported by, 170
Kennedy, Mrs. M. Lloyd, appointment of,
on committee, 225
Keokuk, medical college at, 47
Keokuk Constitution, equal suffrage favored by, 195

19
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King, property rights of wife of, 5; penalty for murder of, 10
Kirkwood, Samuel J., attitude of, toward
equal suffrage, 186; women appointed
by, 224
Klinker, Peter J., equal suffraJe opposed
by, 217
Knights of Labor, admission of women
to, 200
Kossuth, Louis, 185
Labor, Commissioner of, laws to be enforced by, 148; inspectors appointed
by, 226
Labor legislation, small amount of, in
Iowa, 149
Larrabee, William, limited suffrage advo•
cated by, 193, 194, 198, 199; equal
suffrage supported by, 196
Latham, Mrs. L. M. , woman suffrage department conducted by, 195
Latty, Mrs. J. H., service of, as deputy
sheriff, 233, 234
Laundries, women employees in , 145; report concerning condition of women
employed in, 150, 151; inspection of,
226
Law, 45; status of women in profession
of, 50, 51; lack of interest in, by women, 225
Law., of I owa, 1862, provision of, 229
Lawyer, first woman, 250
Law·yers, number of women serving as,
52, 145, 225
Lee County, reform school in, 62
Legal status of women, recapitulation of,
152-155
Legalizing acts, passage of, concerning
property transfers, 112
Legislation, attempt of women to influence, 174
Legislative Assembly, divorces granted by,
76
Legislative divorces, 76
Legitimate children, guardianship of, 8285
Lewdness, 63
Libel, right of wife to sue for, 31
Librarians, women as, 145
Library trustees, women eli gible as, 226
Lien, wife's property subject to, Ul
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Liquor, recovery for injuries due to sale
of, 36-38
London, trade carried on by married
women of, 5; anti-slavery conference
at, 161
Loss of time, recovery of damages for,
31; right of husband to recover for,
32, 33, 34
Louisiana, jurisdictions over, 14; tax
suffrage adopted by, 164
Louisiana, District of, organization of, 14
Louisiana, Territory of, organization of,
15
Louisiana Purchase, Iowa included in, 14
Louisville Oourier-J ournal, comment by,
232
Lovejoy, Owen R., equal suffrage supported by, 219
McClain, Emlin, comment of, on Civil and
Common Law, 16-18; facts concerning,
245
McClintock, Mary Ann, convention called
by, 162
l\foCoid, M. A., minority report on equal
suffrage signed by, 168
McCollum, J. R., election contest of, 231
Mccowen, Jennie, service of, on hospital
staff, 224
McGregor, women refused franchise at,
208
Machinery, regulation of employment of
girls around, 148
McKinney, Mrs. Jane 0., service of, as
trustee, 224
Madden, Martin B., equal suffrage supported by, 170
Maintenance, contract of wife for separate, 107
Majority, age of, 65
"Male", amendment to strike, from the
constitution, 179, 180, 186, 187, 188,
189, 190, 193, 194, 197, 199, 201,
205, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 219, 220, 221
"Male citizens", members of General As·
sembly must be, 236
Mal-treatment, damages for, 32
Manitoba, equal suffrage granted by, 171
Mann, Horace, co-education recommended
by, 39, 40

Mansfield, Mrs. Arabella, admission of, to
bar, 50; election of, as secretary of
suffrage as~ociation, 185; facts concerning, 250
Manslaughter, married women punished
for, 10; exemption of woman from
penalty for, 58
Manual labor, women engaged in, 145
Manufactures, number of women employed in, 146
Marion County Political Equality Association, address before, 192
Marriage, contract of, 4; effect of, on
rights of women, 1 7 ; restrictions on,
18, 64, 65, 243, 247; coercing a woman into, 56; prosecution for seduction
barred by, 56; status of women in, 64,
65; demand for abolition of institution
of, 172, 181
Married women, status of, under Common Law, 3- 13 ; property rights of,
under Common Law, 4-8; relative position of, under Civil and Common
Law, 16-18; control of husband over
property of, 19, 20; legal settlement
of, 25; legal name of, 26, 246; right
of, to testify, 27-29; right of, to recover for pe~sonal InJuries, 29-35;
right of, to damages for indirect injuries, 35 -38; protection of, from husbands' mistreatment, 54; ownership of
property by, 86-94, 152, 153; right of,
to property, 91; dower rights of, 94105; alienation of dower right of, 105114; right of, to make contracts, 114125, 260; conveyances by, 120; responsibility for contracts disliked by,
121; contracts with, enforceable, 122 ;
homestead rights of, 125-127; administration of estates by, 127; right of, to
convey property, 129; exemption of
property of, from husbands' debts, 138
Marshalltown , Iowa press convention at,
183; Greenback convention at, 188
Martineau, Harriet, opinion of, concerning position of American women, 161
Maryland, position of woman in, 159
Massachusetts, appearance of equal rights
movement in, 159 ; school suffrage
adopted by, 164
Matron, appointment of, at Anamosa, 60

INDEX
lfotthews, Augusta, position of, as secretary, 223
Maxwell, Mrs. S. B., service of, as State
librarian, 224
Mechanical work, number of women employed in, 146
Mechanic's lien, widow's share exempt
from, 113
Medical attendance, responsibility of husband for, 31, 131
Medical expenses, liability of married
woman for, 33; right of wife to sue
for, 247
Medicine, 45 ; status of women in, 4649; number of women in, 52
Men, number of, in teaching profession,
42
Men's League for Woman Suffrage, organization of, 215
Meredith, 0. A., bill granting school suffrage introduced by, 214
Meredith, E . T., equal suffrage supported
by, 215
Merrill, Mrs. Anna 0., appointment of, as
teacher, 224
Michigan, repeal of laws of, 22; school
suffrage adopted by, 164; presidential
suffrage adopted by, 165; equal suffrage adopted by, 166
Michigan, Territory of, Iowa included in,
16 ; laws of, concerning women, 18-21;
law of, concerning dower and curtesy,
94
.
Military duty, proposal to exempt women
from, 209
Military secretary, woman as, 223
Militia, provisions for, 14
Miller, Mrs. Mary H., service of, as State
librarian, 224
Millinery, notice concerning, 259, 260
Mineral Point (Wisconsin), seminary at,
22
Mines, women excluded from, 148
Minimum wage law, absence of, in Iowa,
150
Ministry, 45
Minneapolis Tribune, statement of, concerning school suffrage, 187
Minnesota, school suffrage adopted by,
164 ; success of school suffrage in, 187
Minors, disfranchisement of, 203
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Mississippi, divorces in, 254
Mississippi River, first suffrage State east
of, 164
Missouri, admission of, 16
Missouri, Territory of, organization of,
15; the Common Law extended over,
15, 16
Mitchell, John, decision of, 230
Mitchell County, election of woman as
county superintendent of, 228, 229
Mitchellville, girls to be transferred from,
60; establishment of Industrial School
for Girls at, 62
Mondell, Frank W., equal suffrage supported by, 170
Mondell Resolution, vote on, 169, 170
Montana, school suffrage adopted by,
164; equal suffrage adopted by, 164
Montgomery County, women in Republican convention of, 184
Moore, Esther, exclusion of, from London
conference, 161
Mortgage, wife's signature required on,
104; responsibility of wife for signature to, 108; right of wife to recover
by, 111 ; execution of, by married woman, 120
Morton, Levi P., support of women asked
for, 198
Mother, right of, to custody of children,
11, 12, 73, 74; punishment of, for
causing death of illegitimate child, 19;
penalty for desertion of children by,
5 7; right of, to guardianship of children, 82-85, 153; appointment of, as
administrator, 128; care of, 147; right
of, to custody of children, 253
Mothers' pensions, provision for, 153
Mott, James, meeting presided over by,
162
Mott, Lucretia, exclusion of, from London conference, 161; convention called
by, 162
Mount Pleasant, seminary at, 22; mention of, 48; girls in reform school
moved to, 62; first suffrage convention
at, 184, 185
Municipal administration, interest of
women in, 227
Municipal court, right of women to vote
on establishment of, 208
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Municipal elections, right of women to
vote at, 202, 239
Municipal officers, women denied right to
vote for, 221
Municipal suffrage, 163; adoption of,
165; suggestion of, as experiment, 194,
196; possibility of, 195; defeat of, 197,
199; attempt to secure, 198; bill conferring, 201, 202; objections to, 239
Murder, punishment of married women
for, 10
Murderer, property not to be inherited
by, 113
Muscatine, 225
Muscatine County, minimum wage for
teachers fixed by, 43
Name, provisions concerning, 26, 246
Names, counting of, 231
National-American Woman Suffrage Association, 268; secretary of, 269
National Union Greenback Labor party,
equal suffrage favored by, 268
National Woman Suffrage Association,
meeting of, 205, 206, 207; organization of, 268
National Woman's Rights Convention,
holding of, 162
Nebraska, school suffrage adopted by,
164; presidential and municipal suffrage adopted by, 165
Necessities, right of wife to contract for,
115, 129; liability of husband for, 142
Neglect to provide, 254
Negro suffrage, effect of struggle over,
161; relation of, to woman suffrage,
173, 174; early failure of, 200
Negroes, exclusion of, from practice of
law, 50; property rights granted to,
90; enfranchisement of, 162, 166, 167,
179
Nevada, divorce rate in, 75; equal suffrage adopted by, 164 ; labor laws in,
264
New Hampshire, school suffrage adopted
by, 164
New Jersey, women entitled to vote in,
160, 161; school suffrage adopted by,
164
New Mexico, school suffrage adopted by,
164; labor laws in, 264

New York, equal suffrage discussed in
constitutional convention
of,
161 ;
school suffrage adopted by, 164; equal
suffrage adopted by, 165, 166; attempt
of women to vote in, 167
New Zealand, equal suffra:;e adopted by,
171
Newspaper work, 45
Newspapers, attitude of, toward equal
suffrage, 189, 191, 194, 195, 199, 219
Newton, John C., divorce from, 21
Newton, Martha, divorce granted to, 21
Newton, 51
Night work, attempt to prohibit, for women, 149
Nineteenth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment adopted by, 189
North, Mrs. Ada E., appointment of, as
State librarian, 223, 224
North Carolina, divorces in, 254
North Dakota, school suffrage adopted by,
164; presidential and municipal suffrage adopted by, 165
Northern Woman Suffrage Association,
organization of, 184
Northwest Territory, rights of inhabitants
of, 16
Norway, equal suffrage adopted by, 171
Notaries public, women as, 224
Notes, right of wife to, 88
Nugent, James, equal suffrage supported
by, 215
Nurses, hours of work of, 149
Nursing, 45; status of women in profession of, 49, 263; number of women in,
52
Nye, Edwin A., equal suffrage supported
by, 215
O'Connor, Henry, election of, as president
of suffrage association, 185; decision
of, 228, 229, 234, 239
Offenders, treatment of, 58
Office, sex qualification for, 228
Office-holders, women as, 207
Office-holding, status of women in, 222237; lack of emphasis on, 236; resolution concerning, 267
Officials, number of women employed as,
52
Ohio, school suffrage adopted by, 164;

INDEX
presidential and municipal suffrage in,
165
Oklahoma, school suffrage adopted by,
164 ; equal suffrage in, 166
Old Blue Book, provision of, concerning
imprisonment, 59
O'Meara, Thomas J., attitude of, toward
equal suffrage, 196
Ontario, equal suffrage adopted by, 171
Ordinance of 1787, extension of, to Iowa,
16; provisions of, concerning widow's
share in property of husband, 18
Oregon, per cent of illiteracy among
women in, 42 ; school suffrage adopted
by, 164; equal snffrage adopted by,
164
Orleans, 'rerritory of, organization of, 14
Osceola, 44
Osteopaths, nnmber of women listed as,
49
Ottumwa, 44
Ownership, notice of, required, 137, 263
Pain and suffering, recovery of damages
for, 33, 34
Paine, Thomas, equal suffrage advocated
by, 160
P almer, Mrs. F. W., election of, as vice
president of suffrage association, 185
Pangborn, Sara A., service of, on hospital
staff, 224
Pankhurst, Sylvia, address by, 215
P a raphernalia, husband's authority over,
6

Parents, consent of, required for marriage of minor children, 65; joint
gu a rdian ship of, 84
Parliamentary law, drill in, 207
Pasadena (California), effect of women's
votes in, 218
Pay, demand for equal, 201
Pella, business woman of, 260
Penal institutions, women on committees
to visit, 224
Penitentiary, provision of, for women,
60 ; woman employed as teacher in, 224
"Person", definition of, 15 , 63, 228
Personal injuries, recovery of damages
for, 29-35
Personal property, right of husband to
wife' s, under Common Law, 6 ; right of
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wife to share in, .102; wife's lack of
control over, 114, 153; signature of
husband and wife necessary for lien on
exempt, 142 ; right of widow to share
in, 257
Personal i-ights of women, 23-38
Personal service, number of women em•
ployed in, . 146
Petit treason, act of, 10
Petitions, presentation of, 202, 203;
charges against, 211; defense of, 212
Pharmacy, 45; women in practice of, 52
Philapdrian College, co-education in, 22
Phillips, Wendell, protest of, against exclusion of women, 161
Physicians, number of women serving as,
48 , 49, 52, 145
Piano, responsibility of wife for price of,
13 4
Pioneer life, equality of men and women
fostered by, 155
Piqua (Ohio), 138
Playground superintendent, ,voman may
act as, 227
Police duty, proposal to exclude women
from, 209
Police matron, appointment of, 59
Police power, exercise of, 53
Police stations, apartments for women at,
59
Political rights of women, history of, 159240; summary of, 221
Political status, recapitulation of, 238-240
Polk City, 234
Polk County, woman elected sub-director
in, 234, 235
Polk County Suffrage Society, organization of, 185, 186; address before, 192
Poor relief, married women not liable for,
21, 22; settlement requirement for, 24,
25
Popular vote, attempt to restrict, 221
Populist party, equal suffrage plank in,
202
Post mistress, women employed as, 223
Postnuptial contract, validity of, 107;
alienation of dower by, prohibited, 108,
109, 110
Poultry, exemption of, 142
Powderly, Terence V., attitude of, toward
equal suffrage, 200, 201

•
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Power of attorney, dower not relin·
quished under, 110
Presidential campaign of 1872, part of
women in, 184
Presidential electors, women entitled to
vote for, 166; women denied vote for,
221; women qualified to serve as, 237,
240
Presidential suffrage, 163; adoption of,
165; proposal of, for Iowa, 180; bill
granting, 201; defeat of bill granting,
214; objections to, 239
Preston, J". H., ruling of, 103
Primary election, equal suffrage amendment submitted at, 219
Primary suffrage, adoption of, 165
Prisoners, treatment of, 58-63
Probation officers, service of women as,
226
Professions, status of women in, 45-52;
number of women in, 146; right of
women to enter, 152; trained nursing
classed among, 263
Progressives, 238
Prohibition, petition for, 174; struggle
over, 189; emphasis on, 205; relation
of vote on, to vote on suffrage, 220
Prohibition party, equal suffrage plank
in, 202; woman nominated by, 235
Prohibition-Republican-Kn ights of Labor
party, equal suffrage endorsed by, 196
Property, classes of, 5; Jaws concerning
rights of, 16; right of husband to
wife's, 19, 20; right to sue for damages to, 35; right of women to own,
86-94, 152, 153; amount of, owned by
women, 90, 91, 92; right of wife to
dispose of, 129; exemption of wife's,
from husband's debts, 138; notice of
ownership of, required, 141; contracts
concerning distributive share in, for•
bidden, 141; importance of rights concerning, 194
Property rights of women, 86-143
Prostitution, attitude of Common Law toward, 54 ; enticing virtuous women to
a house of, 56
Protection, right of women to, 53-58
Protective legislation, lack of, in Iowa,
147, 149, 154

Public comfort stations, woman commissioner for, 227
Public Instruction, State Superintendent
of, nomination of woman for, 189;
women eligible to office of, 235
Public schools, share of women in, 39-44
Punitive damages, 34
Purcell, Mrs. Nellie, speech by, 209
Quakers, equality of men and women favored by, 160, 161
Queen , independence of, 5; r ecognition
of, 225 ; dower right of, 244, 245

"R. W. T.", letter signed by, 181, 182
Ramsey, Linda M., appointment of, as
clerk, 223
Rape, punishment of, 11, 19, 54, 55;
attitude of Common Law towards, 54;
u se of drugs for immoral purposes considered as, 56, 251
Real estate, right of husband to wife's,
under Common Law, 5, 6; transfer
of, 116, 117, 153; conveyance of, by
marri ed women, 129
R ecapitulation of political status, 238-240
Recorder, county, office of, opened to
women , 233 , 239
Reed, Thomas B ., minority report on
equal suffrage written by, 168, 169
Reform school, investigation of, 224
Register and Leader, The (Des Moines),
support of equal suffrage by, 219
Registration, women exempt from, 208,
217
R elative, decision that husband is, 143
Reli ef work, experien.!e of women in, 223
R eli gion, divorce rate affected by, 75
Representation, relation of taxation to,
187
R epresentatives (United States), number
of, from equal suffrage States, 166;
attempt of women to vote for, 167
R epublican party, attitude of, toward
equal suffrage, 170, 198; submission
of amendment approved by, 179; preference of woman nominee for, 189;
prohibition supported by, 198; aid of
women asked by, 204
R epublican State convention, submission

INDEX
of suffrage amendment favored by,
186 ; imitation of, 207
Residence, right of women to acquire, 24,
25 , 2 6
Restaurants, women employees in, 145,
150, 151
Revision of 1860, provision of, concern•
ing testimony, 27; provision of, concerning recovery for injuries to women, 30 ; provision of, concerning wife's
p1·operty, 88, 137, 138; provision of,
concerning dower, 99, 100; provision
of, concerning redemption of property
from tax sale, 113; provision of, concerning contracts by married women,
118, 119, 120, 123; modification of
provision of, concerning liability for
debts, 139
Revolutionary War, demands for equal
rights during, 159, 160
Rhode Island, presidential suffrage adopted by, 165; divorces in, 254
Riccord, Miss H. J ., advertisement by,
259, 260
Riggs, J . F ., equal suffrage supported by,
215
Rights of Man, 160
Road duty, proposal to exclude women
from, 209
Roads, proposal to require women to
work on, 180
Rockford, election of women at, 235
Rockwell City, selection of, as site of
women's reformatory, 61
Roselle, Lucinda, case of, 138
Roselle, W. M., case of, 138
Rourke, Mrs. Ellen :M., appointment of,
as factory inspector, 150, 226
Russi a, equal suffrage tried in, 171
Ruttkay, Mr., speech by, 185
Sabin, H enry, statement by, 232
Saloons, women not to be employed in,
148; mention of, 218
Sanford, Net tie, election of, as vice president of suffrage association, 185
Sanitary agents, law providing for, 223
Saskatchewan, equal suffrage granted by,
171

Savery, Mrs. Annie 0., admission of, to
bar, 50; lectures by, 179: election of,
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as corresponding secretary of suffrage
association, 185; speech by, 185
School, right of women to attend, 39·42,
152
School boards, women on, 234, 235
School elections, right of women to vote
at, 202, 239; registration for, 217
School officers, women denied right to
vote fo1·, 221; women made eligible as,
230, 234, 235; interest of women in,
236
School suffrage, adoption of, 163, 164;
success of, in Minnesota, 187; bill to
confer, 188, 199, 201, 202, 214, 215;
suggestion of trial of, 194; attempt to
secure, 198; denial of, 208; objections
to, 239
Scott County, vote in, on suffrage and
prohibition, 220
Secondary schools, share of girls in, 39,
40
Seduction, right to damages for, 30, 34,
35; attitude of Common Law toward,
54; punishment for, 56; elements in,
57
Seminaries, establishment of, for girls, 40
Senate (Iowa), equal suffrage endorsed
by committee of: 190; women not eli•
gible to, 223, 235, 236 (see also General Assembly and various General Assemblies)
Senate (United States) , attitude of, toward equal suffrage, 167-170; vote in,
on equal suffrage, 169, 170; rejection
of equal suffrage amendment by, 170;
women eligible to seats in, 240
Senators, number of, from equal suffrage
States, 166
Seneca Falls (New York), convention at,
161, 162
Settlement, right of women to acquire, 24,
25, 26
Seventeenth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment rejected by, 188
Sewing, right of wife earning money by,
to sue for injuries, 3 3
Sex, crimes involving differences in, 53;
attempt to include, in fifteenth amendment, 166
Sex crimes, punishment for, 54, 55
Shaw, Anna Howard, work of, 207
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Shepard, Anna A., degree granted to, 48
Sherman, Buren R., refusal of, to support equal suffrage, 189
Shiras, Oliver P ., decision by, 32
Shirt stud, responsibility of wife for price
of, 135
Single women, status of, under Common
Law, 3, 4; status of, under laws of
Michigan Territory, 19
Sinnott, Nicholas J ., equal suffrage supported by, 170
Sioux City Political Equality Club, organization of, 192; program of, 207
Sixteenth General Assembly, action of, on
equal suffrage amendment, 187, 188
Sixteenth amendment, introduction of, 167
Slander, right of wife to sue for, 30, 31
· Slavery, interest of women in abolition of,
161
Slaves, disfranchisement of, 203
Social conditions, divorce rate affected by,
75
Social problems, interest in, 212, 213
South Carolina, divorce rate in, 75, 254
South Dakota, school suffrage adopted by,
164; equal suffrage adopted by, 166
Spencer, Mary E., election of, as clerk,
223
Springer, Arthur, statement by, 266
Springer, Francis, equal suffrage supported by, 266
Standing, girls under sixteen not to be
employed in occupation requiring, 148
Stanton, Mrs. Elizabeth Cady, exclusion
of, from London conference, 161; convention called by, 162 ; suffrnge work
of, 268
State government, proposed change in,
205
State librarian, women appointed to office of, 223 , 224
State officers, women denied right to vote
for, 221: first woman among, 224
Stnte Teachers' Association, women presidents of. 43, 44; resolution that women be given school suffrage tabled by,
175
State Universitv of Iowa. status of women in. 40, 41 ; medical department of,
47: ·women in law school of, 51 ; wornRn on committee to examine law class

of, 225; chancellor of law college of,
245
States, growth of equal st1ffrage in, 162166
Stenographers, 149; women employed as,
223
Stevens, Mrs. Rowena, 272
Stillmunkes, P ., explanation of vote by,
204
Stone, Mrs. Lucy, call for convention
signed by, 162; work of, 268; speech
by, 269
Stone, William M., woman secretary employed by, 223
Stores, women employees in, 145; seats
required for female employees in, 148;
condition of women employees in, 150,
151; inspection of, 226
Stowe, Emilie, speech by, 209, 210
Strawberry Point, address at, 196
Stupefying drugs, penalty for immoral
u se of, 56
Sudlow, Phoebe W., election of, as president of Teachers' Association, 43
Suffrage, extension of, to negroes, 162 ,
163; growth of, after Civil War, 162170; forms of, 163 ; discussion of, 207
(see also ·E qual suffrage)
Suffrage clnbs, organization of, 192
Suffrage societies, organization of, 207
Suits, right of women to prosecute and
defend, 152
Superintendent, provision for , at women's
reformatory, 61 ; girls cared for bv, 62
Supplement to the Code of Iow a. 1907.
provision of, concerning women's propertv rights, 142, 143
Supplemrnt to the Code of Io wa , 1913.
provision of, concerning registration,
217
Support. responsibilitv of husband for
wife's, 9. 31, 66. 153: rii,:ht of wife to
sue for loss of, 36-38 ; right of wife to.
129-133
Suµreme Court of Iowa. ndmission of
women to practice in, 50. 51: right of
women to vote on municipal court upheld h". 208
Swain. Mrs. A. M., nomin ation of. 235
Swisshelm. Mrs. J. G., lecture on suffrage
by, 180

INDEX
Tax levy, right of women to vote on increase of, 202, 221
rrax suffrage, 163
Taxation, 91, 177; association of, with
representation, 187; proposal to exempt
women from, 188
Taxes, dower alienated by sale of land
for, 113; women to vote on increase
of, 202
Taylor, E. B., minority report on equal
suffrage signed by, 168
Taylor, Mrs. Lucy B., 49
Teachers, women employed as, 42-44, 52,
145, 146, 152; wages of, 42, 43, 248
rreaching, status of women in, 42-44
Telegraph operators, hours of work of,
149

Telephone exchanges, employment of wom·
en in, 145; inspection of, 226
Telephone operato1·s, hours of work of,
149; r eport concerning condition of
w omen employed as, 150, 151
Temperance convention, State, equal suffrage favored by, 188
Testimony, ]imitations on, 11; right of
women to give, 26-29, 154
Texas, primary suffrage adopted by, 165
Thirteenth Amendment, interest in, 200
Thirteenth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment adopted by, 179
Thirtieth General Assembly, action of, on
equal suffrage, 213
Thirty-first General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 214
Thirty-second General Assembly, action
of, on eq u al suffrage, 214
Thirty-third General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 214
Thirty-fourth General Assembly, action
of. on equal suffrage, 214, 215
Thirtv-fifth General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 215, 216
Thirtv-sixth General Assembly, action of,
on equ al suffrage, 217
Thirtv-seventh General Assemblv, action
of. on eqnal suffrage, 220, 221
Tilton, Theodore, 183
Tim her culture, right of entryman under,
113

Todd, Miss . E . M., service of, as superintendent of schools, 48
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Torts, responsibility for those committed
by women, 9, 10, 31, 32, 58; actions
for damages for, 31, 32
Township officers, women denied right to
vote for, 221
rrrade, number of women employed in,
146
Trained nurses, number of, 49, 263;
women as, 145 ; hours of work of, 149
Traitor, forfeiture of dower of wife of,
244, 245
Tramp, definition of, 63
'!,ramps, lack of women, 196
'fransportation, number of women employed in, 146
Treason, punishment of married women
for, 10; murder of husband considered
as, 54
Trout, Mrs. Grace Wilbur, address by,
215, 216
'rrustee, contract of wife through, 107,
116, 117
rrrnth, Sojourner, opinion of women's
rights expressed by, 162
Twelfth General Assembly, resolution
looking toward equal suffrage introduced in, 178
Twentieth General Assembly, equal suffrage amendment defeated by, 189, 190
Twenty-first General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage amendment, 194
Twenty-second General Assembly, action
of, on equal suffrage, 197
Twent:v-thh·d General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 199
Twenty-fourth General Assembl y, action
of, on equal suffrage, 201
Twentv-fifth General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 202, 204; petition
to, 202. 203, 204
Twentv-sixth General Assembly, action of,
on equal suffrage, 205
Twenty-seventh General Assemblv, aetion
of. on equal suffrage, 209, 210, 211 ,
212
Twentv-eighth General Assembly, artion
of, on equal suffrage, 212
Twenty-nintli General Assembly. action
of, on equal suffrage, 212

Unchastity, false assertion of, a cause for
divorce, 67, 68
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"White", striking of, from constitution,
179
Whitfield, Isabel G., degree granted to, 48
Widow, right of, to support, 99, 103 ;
exclusion of, from heirs, 103; position
of, as head of the family, 125, 126 ;
right of, to homestead, 125-127 ; right
of, to act as husband's administrator,
127, 128; right of, to exempt personal
property, 257
Widower, position of, as h ead of the family, 125, 126
Wife, prohibition of contracts by, 4; right
of husband to services of, 8; right of
Vagrants, bonds to be required of, 129
husband to collect for injuries to, 8, 9;
Van Hyning, Mrs. Lydia, election of, on
right of, to support, 9, 31, 66, 129school board, 234
133, 143, 153, 253; husband's authorVermont, school suffrage adopted by,
ity over person of, 10, 11 ; immunity
164; women tax payers to vote in, 265
of, for certain crimes, 10, 58, 154 ;
Vice President, number of women enstatus of, in divorce, 21, 65, 67, 73,
titled to vote for, 166
74, 78, 79, 80, 154, 254; testimony of,
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, A,
160
27-29, 58; right of, to recover dam•
ages for personal injuries, 29-34; right
Virginia, divorces in, 254
of, to damages for indirect injuries,
Vocational Education, State Board of,
35-38; criminal cases involving, 53;
woman to serve on, 227
murder of, 54; duty of, to obey, 58,
Vote, demand for, 162; right of women
66; right of, to alimony, 68-73; right
to, 221
of, to property, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 87,
Voting, residence requirement for, 25, 26 .
91, 138 ; right of, to children, in case
of divorce, 73 , 7 4; dower right of, 94Wage earners, number of women, 145·
147
105; right of, as heir, 104, 259; alienation of dower right of, 105-114 ; right
·wages, relative status of women in re•
of, to share in property of husband she
spect to, 42, 43; right of married worn·
had murdered, 113; personal property
en to, 91, 154; amount of, 150
not under control of, 114; right of, to
Wallace, Henry, equal suffrage supported
by, 215
make contracts, 114-125, 258, 260;
contract of, with husband, 122, 123 ;
Warren, Mercy Otis, rights of women
right of, to sue husband, 123, 142;
urged by, 160
homestead rights of, 125-127, 261;
Warren County, election contest in, 229,
230
la ck of responsibility of, for care of
insane husband, 1 35, 262; responsiWashington (D. C. ), suffrage meeting at,
bility of, for family expenses, 133, 134,
193
135, 136; liability of husband for debts
Washington, equal suffrage in, 164, 265
of, 136, 137; responsibility of, for
Weaver, James B., address by, 192
hu sband's debts, 139, 140 ; notice of
Webster City, suffrage convention a.t, 201,
ownership to be filed by, 141 ; right of,
202
to payment for care of husband's
Welch, Mrs. Mary B., suffrage activities
mother, 142; obligation of, to live
of, 191
where husband chooses, 143 ; share of,
West, equal suffrage in, 164, 212, 213
in . family property, 144; personal
West Point, seminary at, 22
property of family not controlled by,
West Virginia, labor laws in, 264

United States, illiteracy in, 42; review of
equal suffrage in, 159-170
United States Constitution, sex not men•
tioned in, 237
United States Supreme Court, women admitted to practice in, 250
Universal suffrage, proposed restrictions
on, 177
Urick, A. L., equal suffrage supported by,
215
Utah, equal suffrage adopted by, 164;
divorces in, 254
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153; right of, to chastise husband, 244

education, 39-44; pay of, as teachers,

(see also Married women)
Will, effect of, on dower, 95, 99, 100,

42, 43; status of, in the professions,
45-5 2 ; opposition to practice of medicine by, 46, 4 7; admission of, to medical college, 47; number of, serving as
physicians, 48, 49; status of, in law,

101, 102, 103, 104, 105

Wilson, Mrs. D. S., election of, as president of suffrage association, 184
Wilson, James F., vote of, on equal suffrage, 265
Wilson, Mrs. Lou M., service of, as superintendent of schools, 43
Wilson, William G., resolution introduced
by, 178
Wilson, Woodrow, equal suffrage favored
by, 170
Wisconsin, repeal of Jaws of, 22; school
suffrage adopted by, 164
Wisconsin, Territory of, i!lclusion of Iowa
in, 21; law of, concerning dower and
curtesy, 94
Wisconsin University, purpose of, 22
Witness, need of, in addition to complainant, 55, 56
Wittenmyer, Mrs. Annie, appointment of,
223

Wollstonecraft, Mary, book by, 160
Woman, enticing of, to a · house of illfame, 56
Woman attendant, requirement of, 61
Woman factory inspector, provision for,
150; report of, 150, 151
Woman suffrage, committees on, 167 (see
also Equal suffrage)
Woman Suffrage, Men's League for, organization of, 215
Woman's

Christian Temperance Union,

petition of, 59
Woman'• Standard, The, establishment of,
194; attitude of newspapers toward,
194, 195; speeches reported in, 209,
210, 211, 212

Women, civil rights of, in Iowa, 1-151;
disregard of, in early laws, 14, 15;
status of, in Iowa country before 1836,
14•22; effect of Common Law on stair
us of, 16, 17, 18; legislation concern•
ing, 21; personal rights of, 23-38;
legal name of, 26; status of, as citizens, 26; right of, to testify, 26-29;
right of, to recover for personal injuries, 29-35; right of, to damages for
iudirect injuries, 35-38; status of, in

50, 51; number of, in various occupations, 52; status Of, under criminal
Jaw, 53-63, 154; treatment of, when
accused of crimes, 58-63; treatment of,
after conviction, 59-63; building for,
at Anamosa, 60; rules concerning mar•

riage of, 64, 65; status of, in divorce,
65-81 ; right of, to guardianship of
children, 82-85; status of, as to property, 86-143, 152, 153; right of, to
make contracts, 114-125; administration of estates by, 127, 128; status of,
in industry, 144-151; protection of, in
industry, 147-151; increase of, in in·
dustry, 148; exclusion of, from mines,
148; seats required for, in stores, 148;
employment of, in mulct saloons prohibited, 148; hours of work of, 149,
150; recapitulation of legal status of,
152-155; number of, in gainful occupations, 154; political rights of, 159240, 245; influence of, in political affairs, 166; share of, in World War,
170; admission of, to floor of Iowa
House of Representatives, 172, 173;
exclusion of, from franchise, 173, 174,
175; resolution to enfranchise, 178;
proposal to exempt from taxation, 188;
right of, to franchise, 190; education of, in public affairs, 192 ; aid of,
asked by Republicans, 204; study clubs
organized by, 212; independence of,

213 ; participation of, in drainage
elections, 217; attempt to submit
amendment to, 221; protection of, in
industry, 226; school offices opened to,
230; reason for attitude of Common
Law toward punishment of, 244; re•
fusal to insure, against accidents, 247;

responsibility of, for keeping disorderly
houses, 251
Women county recorders, number of, 233
Women county superintendents, number

of, 232
vVomen offenders, treatment of, 53-63
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Women wage earners, number of, 145147
Women's Reformatory, The, 61 (see also
Iowa Indu,strial Reformatory for Females)
"Women's rights", demand for, 172, 288
"Women's rights . and children's follies",
prohibition petition referred to committee on, 174
Woodhull, Mrs. Victoria C., repudiation
of doctrines of, 183
Woods, Roma, suffrage activities of, 191

Worcester (Massachusetts), convention
held at, 162
Work, Mrs. Mary A., election of, as subdirector, 234, 235
World War, effect of, on equal suffrage,
170
Wright, Mrs. D. S., speech by, 209
Wright, Martha, convention called by, 162
Wyoming, equal suffrage adopted by, 163,
164, 238, 270; success of equal suffrage in, 198, 199

